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Summary 
The thesis aims at exploring the logic of political survival in Turkish politics 
with analysing the case of Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi-AKP). This study consists of two stages. The research methodology and 
literature review of this research are examined in the first stage of this study. First, 
the literature of explanations concerning the logic of political survival in politics is 
explored. In the following section, case study analysis and elite interview methods 
are examined and reveal how they are combined in this study.  
The second stage is to explore the logic of political survival in Turkish politics 
with the AKP case by empirical evidence. This study also uses evidence from elite 
interviews, party documents, public speeches, and developments and changes for 
exploring AKP’s political survival in the next chapters. This evidence indicates that 
there are four independent variables of dependent variable which is AKP’s political 
survival; -- the legitimization of AKP’s conservatism (2002-2007), AKP’s power 
struggle with Kemalist elites (2007-2011), AKP’s populism and authoritarianism 
(2011-2014) and the instrumentalisation of Islamism and nationalism under 
Erdogan’s leadership (2014-2018) -- within the AKP’s four terms. In other words, this 
research offers a cause-and-effect mechanism between the four different policy 
approaches of the AKP’s four periods and the AKP’s political survival. 
Indeed, the AKP has been the most successful political party at the point of 
ensuring political survival throughout its 16-year rule. In the literature, there are few 
studies analysing the 16-year rule of AKP government integrally. As a result of this 
limitation, the original contribution of this research is that it offers a holistic approach 
of the AKP government between 2002 and 2018 with using the concept of political 
survival which is not explored for the AKP case in the literature. 
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1. The General Context of the Research 
 
The thesis aims at exploring the logic of political survival in Turkish politics 
with analysing the case of Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi-AKP). This study consists of two stages. The research methodology and 
literature review of this research are examined in the first stage of this study. First, 
the literature of explanations concerning the logic of political survival in politics is 
explored. In the following section, case study analysis and elite interview methods 
are examined and reveal how they are combined in this study.  
 
The second stage is to explore the logic of political survival in Turkish politics 
with the AKP case by empirical evidence. This study also uses evidence from elite 
interviews, party documents, public speeches, and developments and changes for 
exploring AKP’s political survival in the next chapters. This evidence indicates that 
there are four independent variables of dependent variable which is AKP’s political 
survival; -- the legitimisation of AKP’s conservatism (2002-2007), AKP’s power 
struggle with Kemalist elites (2007-2011), AKP’s populism and authoritarianism 
(2011-2014) and the instrumentalisation of Islamism and nationalism under 
Erdogan’s leadership (2014-2018) -- within the AKP’s four terms. In other words, this 
research offers a cause-and-effect mechanism between the four different policy 
approaches of the AKP’s four periods and the AKP’s political survival. 
 
Indeed, the AKP has been the most successful political party at the point of 
ensuring political survival throughout its 16-year rule. In the literature, few studies 
analysing the 16-year rule of AKP government integrally. As a result of this limitation, 
the original contribution of this research is that it offers a holistic approach of the AKP 
government between 2002 and 2018 with using the concept of political survival which 
is not explored for the AKP case in the literature.  
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2. Research Question 
 
The central question of this research project is as follows: How can AKP 
ensure its political survival in Turkish politics? The sub-questions of this research are 
listed below: 
 
i. Can the legitimisation of the AKP’s conservative identity be seen 
as a condition of AKP’s political survival in Turkish politics in its first term? 
(Chapter 2) 
ii. To what extent is the AKP’s power struggle the most important 
step towards AKP’s survival in its second term? (Chapter 3) 
iii.  Why is the correlation between the AKP’s populism and AKP’s 
political survival important for the rise of authoritarianism in Turkish politics 
between 2011 and 2014? (Chapter 4) 
iv. How can we explain the instrumentalisation of Islamism and 
nationalism under Erdogan’s leadership between 2014 and 2018 in light of the 
AKP’s political survival? (Chapter 5) 
 
 
 
3. Structure of the Thesis 
 
The research methodology and literature review of this research are examined 
in Chapter 1. First, the literature of explanations concerning the logic of political 
survival in politics has been explored. In the following section, case study analysis 
and elite interview methods are examined and reveal how they are combined in this 
study. As discussed above, the holistic explanation of AKP’s governance between 
2002 and 2018 are explored and supported by empirical evidence. Case study 
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analysis requires the collection of data concerning key political decision-making and 
activity, often at the highest political level, and elite interviews will frequently be a 
critical strategy for obtaining this required evidence in this research. Drawing on 
interviews with a large number of politicians and academics as well as documentary 
sources, the AKP’s rule in four separate periods will be analysed within four 
independent variables to understand the cause of AKP’s political survival in Turkish 
politics between 2002 and 2018. Finally, this chapter focuses on De Mesquita’s 
selectorate theory, which attempts to provide a conceptual bridge for establishing a 
causal mechanism between these variables.  
 
As mentioned above, this research requires empirical evidence in this step, 
and it also uses evidence from elite interviews, party documents, public speeches, 
and developments and changes in the AKP’s policies in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5. This 
evidence indicates that there are four independent variables of dependent variable 
which is AKP’s political survival; -- the legitimisation of AKP’s conservatism (2002-
2007), AKP’s power struggle with Kemalist elites (2007-2011), AKP’s populism 
(2011-2014) and the combination of Islamism and nationalism under Erdogan’s 
leadership (2014-2018)-- within the AKP’s four terms. 
 
Chapter 2 explores why the legitimising of the AKP’s conservative identity is 
the first independent variable of AKP’s political survival in Turkish politics between 
2002 and 2007. It is a significant time period in showing the AKP’s progression in 
Turkish democracy and for developing an understanding of how it legitimises its 
conservative identity. On the one hand, important internal factors during the AKP are 
founding of political concepts, including conservative democracy and other events 
such as the 28 February 1997 coup (soft coup) process affected. On the other hand, 
external factors, such as the increasing support of the United States and Western 
countries in the international context of 9/11, were also a factor. These internal and 
external factors also played a crucial role in the legitimisation of AKP's conservatism 
which is the first independent variable of the AKP’s survival in Turkish politics.  
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For this reason, these factors are also intervening that affect the first 
independent variable. The role of intervening variables is important in legitimising the 
AKP’s conservatism that has provided the survival of the AKP. At the same time, the 
legitimisation of the AKP’s conservatism is seen as a pre-condition for ensuring its 
political survival because AKP has not become a liberal centre-right party due to the 
legitimising of the AKP’s conservatism. Moreover, this chapter also explores the 
conceptual relationship between these variables and De Mesquita's selectorate 
theory, which is explained in the Introduction and Chapter 1. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the second term of AKP governance between 2007 and 
2011. According to De Mesquita's selectorate theory, leaders or political parties 
consolidate their power by minimising their winning coalition against threats to their 
survival. AKP has faced two significant threats; the 2007 military coup attempt and 
the 2008 closure trial. After surviving these threats, the AKP chose to consolidate its 
power by fighting against secular Kemalist elites.  
 
As mentioned before, there are four independent variables of AKP’s survival in 
Turkish politics and the AKP’s consolidation process is the second independent 
variable of this causal mechanism. According to De Mesquita, leaders or political 
parties follow politics to narrow down coalitions in the face of threats to their political 
survival. However, they should keep a large nominal selectorate and gain a mass 
voter base (which in Turkey is predominantly conservative). When the AKP began to 
fight against the secularist bureaucracy, it had to propagate an even more Islamic 
line to win the support of conservative voters in the elections. On the other hand, this 
policy change was a condition for the survival of the AKP and became the second 
independent variable of AKP’s political survival between 2007 and 2011. This 
argument is supported by empirical evidence from the elite interviews, AKP policy 
documents, changes in the AKP’s party structure, the documents of the constitutional 
clashes between the AKP and Kemalist elites, legal changes in Turkish politics, 
analysis of election results and public speeches by AKP’s politicians and other 
documentary sources throughout Chapter 3.  
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Chapter 4 focuses on the third phase of the AKP, which is a real turning point 
in the rise of populism and authoritarianism. As discussed in previous chapters, one 
of the most important factors contributing to the survival of leaders or parties has 
been to keep the nominal selectorate (voters) as large as possible. During its second 
and third periods, the AKP broke that broad voting coalition from its founding 
philosophy and eliminated its partners one by one. The distinguishing feature of 
these coalition partners is that they defined themselves as specifically secular. As the 
tension with the secularists grew from 2007, the AKP had to assume policies that 
were more populist and authoritarian to retain the large nominal selectorate.  
 
Hence, the impending question is, how did the AKP gain the support of the 
majority of voters? The answer to this question also highlights the third independent 
variable linking the cause-effect relationship of AKP’s political survival. Chapter 4 
focuses on the AKP’s populist strategy which can be further expressed as the last 
independent variable to reveal the causal mechanism of AKP’s survival in Turkish 
politics between 2011 and 2014. At this point, the AKP carried out a populist strategy 
between secular and conservative citizens in Turkey and consolidated the support of 
conservative voters.  
 
This chapter uses empirical and statistical evidence, such as the 2014 local 
and presidential election results, public speeches by Erdoğan and other leading AKP 
members, important developments or events in Turkish politics through the rise of 
Islamism, and elite interviews with politicians, academics and student groups to prove 
this argument. Overall, Chapter 4 argues that AKP’s polarisation strategy has 
contributed to the AKP’s political survival in Turkish politics between 2011 and 2014. 
 
After the 2014 presidential elections, the AKP and leader Erdogan's policy line 
evolved into a new way. With these elections, Erdogan was convinced that the 
Kurdish movement and the Fethullah Gulen movement could become a threat to 
political survival. The AKP government needed a new paradigm to put this struggle 
into political adjustment. Although populist and authoritarian politics for secularists or 
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other opponents of the society have been on the agenda, Erdogan needed a different 
paradigm as a way to console the electoral base and increase its votes in the 
elections. At this point, Turkish nationalism, which started to rise in the Kurdish peace 
process, will run for the help of the AKP and Erdogan. In the Erdogan leadership of 
the AKP government, the effort to combine Islamism and nationalism will also be the 
fourth independent variable to explore the survival of the AKP in Chapter 5. 
 
According to De Mesquita's Selectorate Theory, the winning coalition, which 
shrank due to threats to survival, will continue to shrink after 2014. The conflict 
between the Kurdish movement-the Fethullah Gülen movement and the AKP also 
supported this argument. The primary challenge in front of the AKP was how to keep 
the nominal selectorate large against the small winning coalition while this conflict 
was on the way. The AKP, which has adopted a nationalist discourse and action 
against both the Kurdish movement and the Fethullah Gülen movement, thought that 
it would enable the nationalist votes to be in the consulate itself. In this process, the 
coalition with the largest nationalist party, the MHP, and the Islamist-nationalist 
political line drawn by the AKP enabled to survive the AKP and Erdogan's rule in the 
2015 Elections, 2017 Presidential Referendum and 2018 Elections. Here, Chapter 5 
explores the cause-and-effect mechanism between the combination of Islamist-
nationalist policy and the AKP's political survival by analysing election results and 
surveys between 2014 and 2018.  
 
This thesis is followed by a general overview of the context and the thesis 
structure in Introduction. As can be seen from this structure, the thesis consists of 
two parts. Chapter 1, the first part of the thesis, will focus on the literature review of 
the logic of political survival and the methodological issues of the research. After 
Chapter 1, which is the skeleton of the thesis, how the theoretical perspective is 
applied to the AKP case in other chapters will be explored by clarifying the causal 
mechanism between variables. 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review and Methodological Issues 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, theoretical and historical 
approaches in the literature about the concept of political survival in politics, which is 
the main subject of the research, are examined in detail. In the second part, the 
research methodology that has been carried out is explained as well as why this 
research focuses on the case study analysis and elite interviewing in particular. 
Moreover, the relationship between the case study analysis and elite interview/causal 
mechanism is also explored in this chapter. De Mesquita’s Selectorate Theory, a new 
conceptual bridge to explain the causal mechanism between independent and 
dependent variables (the legitimisation of AKP’s conservatism- AKP’s power 
struggle- the beginning of populist authoritarianism under AKP rule- the 
instrumentalisation of Islamism and nationalism under Erdogan’s leadership and the 
AKP’s political survival), has been explained in Chapter 1. 
 
The AKP’s political survival analysed through four different independent 
variables within four chapters in this research. The first independent variable, the 
legitimisation of the AKP’s conservative identity, explores the cause of AKP’s political 
survival between 2002 and 2007. The AKP was established in 2001 and its 
presumed evolving ‘Islamist’ character by analysing the connections between 
external and internal factors in Turkish politics - on the one hand, the internal 
dynamics of the AKP’s founding political principles and other events such as the 28 
February coup (soft coup) process, and on the other, external factors such as the 
increasing support from the United States and Western countries for Turkey’s 
democratically-elected pro-Islamic party in the international context of ‘9/11’. These 
internal and external factors helped to legitimize the AKP’s conservatism in Turkish 
politics when it was established in 2001. Chapter 2 will examine these issues in 
detail. 
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The second independent variable of AKP’s survival analyses the AKP’s power 
struggle with Kemalist elites between 2007 and 2011 in Chapter 3. The ongoing 
tensions between the AKP government and Kemalist bureaucracy in Turkish politics 
during this period are not only evident in the power struggle but also paradoxically 
contributed to increasing the AKP’s conservative authoritarianism instead of the 
democratisation process in Turkey. The legitimisation of the AKP’s conservative 
identity and the AKP’s power struggle cannot be explained by existing debates in the 
literature. This research project draws on political survival theories such as Bruce 
Bueno De Mesquita’s ‘selectorate theory’ (2011: 4), which explains the importance of 
the AKP’s coalitional dynamics, in order to understand the AKP’s political survival in 
the light of the power struggle between the AKP and the Kemalist bureaucracy.  
 
The third independent variable explores the causal mechanism of AKP’s 
political survival is the beginning of populist authoritarianism under AKP rule. Since 
2011, the importance of the AKP’s political survival continued with the narrowing of 
the winning coalition; De Mesquita's explanation was therefore still valid in this 
context. However, it can be said that the AKP pursued a populist strategy in order to 
maintain the nominal ‘selectorate’, cited in De Mesquita’s theory as to gain the 
support of the mass of voters (De Mesquita and Smith, 2011: 5). This populist 
strategy was coated with an Islamist and authoritarian tone, given the impact of 
conservative voters, as the AKP's coalition did not have any secular partners or 
supporters after 2011. AKP’s populism will be addressed in detail in Chapter 4, in 
which intervening variables are applied and contribute to the survival of the AKP. 
 
The instrumentalisation of Islamism and nationalism is also addressed in this 
study as the last independent variable for explaining the survival of the AKP in 
Chapter 5. This research claims that Turkish politics has been affected by AKP’s 
Islamism and nationalism parallel to a populist authoritarianism in the period between 
2014 and 2018. This phenomenon led to the AKP’s insturmentalisation of Islamism 
and nationalism to keep the nominal selectorate large and to ensure its political 
survival in the last period. 
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This research aims to explore four independent variables; the legitimisation of 
AKP’s conservatism, AKP’s power struggle, the beginning of populist authoritarianism 
under AKP rule and the instrumentalisation of Islamism and nationalism under 
Erdogan’s leadership, under AKP rule as a contributing factor to the AKP’s political 
survival. This chapter will primarily complete the literature review of political survival 
and then explore the causal mechanism and other methodological issues between 
independent and dependent variables. 
 
 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
 
2.1. The Concept of Political Survival 
 
But since my intention is to say something that will prove of practical use to the 
listener, I have thought it proper to represent things as they are in real truth, 
rather than as they are imagined. Many have dreamed up republics which have 
never in truth been known to exist; the gulf between how one should live and how 
one does live is so wide that a man who neglects what is actually done for what 
should be done learns the way to self-destruction rather than self-preservation. 
The fact is that a man who wants to act virtuously in every way necessarily 
comes to grief among so many who are not virtuous. Therefore, if a prince wants 
to maintain his rule he must learn how not to be virtuous, and to make use of this 
or not according to need (Machiavelli, 1975: 49-50). 
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The concept of political survival is one of the central topics in the study of 
politics. Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1557), an Italian political thinker, outlined the 
importance of power and survival in his book, The Prince published in 1531. The 
above quote from The Prince shows how Machiavelli is trying to put political survival 
into a conceptual framework. According to Machiavelli, a ruler needs to adopt moral 
standards different to those of ordinary individuals to ensure the survival of the state. 
He argues that to be virtuous or to maintain moral values in accordance with public 
morality does not ensure the survival of a leader. A ruler who wants to hold on to 
power must learn how not be good and to know when it is necessary to use this 
ability (Matravers, Pike and Warburton, 2000: 12-13). A ruler needs to distinguish 
these moral values from the more specific sense of ‘virtue’, as deployed by 
Machiavelli, which includes the notion of being able to understand and act on the 
opportunities provided by time and fortune, to simulate different virtues or qualities as 
needed, and to combine cleverness and charisma (Lukes, 2001: 568-573). 
 
Arguments concerning political survival have not come from Machiavelli alone. 
Since the beginning of politics itself, many political thinkers and philosophers have 
focused on this issue. One of them is ancient Chinese thinker Sun Tzu. Sun Tzu and 
Machiavelli are mentioned as part of the same pragmatic, realist approach, focusing 
on the arts of war rather than the art of peace as a means of ensuring political 
survival. Sun Tzu (2008: 1) emphasizes the importance of survival in his opening 
words: ‘War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the provenance of life or 
death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be vitally studied’. 
 
Another seminal political thinker on the issue of political survival is Thomas 
Hobbes. The state of nature is the situation where there is a state of ‘war of every 
man against every man’ as all men compete for survival (Hobbes, 2013). The 
fundamental law of survival is the reason for this state of affairs. This law states that 
in order to survive, any actions are lawful as long as they serve the aim of survival. In 
The Leviathan, he also concluded that, ‘no king can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure, 
whose subjects are either poor, or contemptible, or too weak through want, or 
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dissension, to maintain a war against their enemies’ (Hobbes, 2016: 163). Another 
important philosopher, Max Weber, emphasizes the importance of political survival 
over the concept of interest. According to Weber, the idea of interest is indeed of the 
essence of political survival. He states that ‘Interest (material and ideal), not ideas, 
dominate directly the actions of men. Yet the 'images of the world' created by these 
ideas have very often served as switches determining the tracks on which the 
dynamism of interests kept actions moving’ (Weber, 2017: 347-348). 
 
One of the political scientists, Hans Morgenthau, focused on political survival 
in relation to power politics in the twentieth century. According to Morgenthau (1985), 
political survival is only a dominant, active interest under conditions of threat against 
the leaders or ruling parties in states. It is assumed that the survival of the political 
actor is valid as argued by Machiavelli. In Machiavelli, the political actor was ‘the 
Prince’, in Morgenthau, the main political actor is the sovereign state, regardless of 
whether that state is viewed as legitimate by any other criteria beyond their ability to 
manage and the control the citizens within their borders. Morgenthau states 
that ‘while the individual has a moral right to sacrifice himself in defence of such a 
moral principle, the state has no right to let its moral disapprobation of the 
infringement of liberty get in the way of successful political action, itself inspired by 
the principle of national survival' (Morgenthau, 1985: 12). 
 
The end of the twentieth century saw a number of studies on political survival 
by different thinkers. As far as a unified causal nexus is concerned, the analytical 
framework is built on the so-called logic of political survival. Building on insights that 
were proposed by Downs (1957), the concept of political survival has gained 
popularity in literature following Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2003) ‘‘selectorate’’ 
model. 
 
 Since the early 1980s, the world has experienced an expansion in the number 
of democratic or nearly democratic governments. Yet, these same decades also 
provide numerous examples of polities that, having adopted democratic principles of 
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governance, then retreated back to illiberal, nondemocratic rule (Przeworski, Alvarez, 
Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000). There are competing answers as to what makes 
countries more or less susceptible to adopting particular forms of government. 
Barington Moore (1966) distinguished between societies that had become democratic 
from those that had not on the basis of policy choices that promoted or discouraged 
the commercialization of agriculture and the co-optation of the peasantry into a 
modern economy. At roughly the same time, A.F.K. Organski (1965) identified stages 
of political development that were contingent on whether workers and peasants, 
workers and owners of capital, or peasants and owners of capital coalesced. In his 
view, the coalitions that formed shaped the economic policies that were subsequently 
followed by the government in power. For Seymour Martin Lipset (1959), the path to 
democracy was through economic growth. Growth-oriented policies, according to 
Lipset, fostered the development of a large middle class that would demand greater 
control over their economic welfare through the political process. So, for Lipset, 
economic growth was hypothesized to lead to democracy, whereas for Organski, 
economic outcomes were shaped, at least in part, by the nature of the government. 
The evidence for these contending perspectives is mixed and many of their central 
claims remain, in modified form, central to current debate especially over whether 
economic conditions determine political outcomes or political choices determine 
economic outcomes (Glaeser, LaPorta, Lopez de Silanes, & Shleifer, 2004; Jones & 
Olken, 2005; Przeworski & Limongi, 1997). Others have focused on the emergence 
of autocratic rule. Wintrobe (1990), Olson (1993), and McGuire and Olson (1996), for 
instance, examine the entrenchment and routinization of autocratic rule. Their studies 
tie institutional design to optimal means by which leaders can extract wealth through 
taxation of their subjects. In Olson’s memorable image, roving bandits fail in 
competition with stationary bandits. The latter choose less confiscatory tax rates so 
as to maximize long-term gains rather than shortterm extraction. These stationary 
autocrats provide security for their subjects in exchange for wealth extraction from 
those same subjects (McGuire & Olson, 1996). Although this literature provides an 
insightful analysis of the emergence and maintenance of nondemocratic regimes, it 
generally is not concerned about explaining democratic governance in light of the 
concept of political survival. 
 
25 
 
In order to synthesize a framework that would be amenable to the research 
question at hand, Kadercan (2012:407) incorporates three qualifications. First, 
following Chiozza and Goemans’ (2011) work on the relationship between foreign 
policy choices and the risk of post-tenure punishment, Kadercan (2012:407-408) 
assumes that a leader will also be concerned about her post-tenure fate, which is 
closely associated with the means of exit. As Chiozza and Goemans point out, 
forceful regime change increases the risk of post-tenure punishment in the form of 
imprisonment, exile, and death. Accordingly, it can be argued that, while forceful 
regime change will not be the sole determinant of office-loss and post-tenure 
punishment, leaders will be highly sensitive to challenges that threaten the stability of 
their regime. The second qualification follows from the first and involves the assertion 
that ideologies—or ‘‘normative [theories] of action’’ that explain ‘‘prevailing social 
conditions and provide individuals with guidelines for how to react to them’’ (Walt 
1996:25)—play a very important role in the game of political competition. As 
Douglass North (1981:53) recognized, all governments need to depend on some 
ideational element, or an ideology, defined here as a comprehensive set of political, 
economic, and social views or ideas, particularly concerned with the form and role of 
government, to legitimize their rule by establishing an abstract relation between the 
ruler and the ruled. Legitimacy, or ‘‘terms by which people recognize, defend, and 
accept political authority,’’ is in fact a ‘‘necessary component of authority and thus of 
power’’ (Bukovansky 2002:2, 70). Accordingly, leaders who are concerned about the 
relationship between legitimacy and their political survival have strong incentives to 
obstruct any challenges to the state-sponsored ideology. A third qualification to the 
political survival approach entails the threats that other states can pose to ruling 
elites; leaders can lose power and face post-tenure punishment not only as a result 
of domestic political dynamics, but also as a result of direct or indirect engagement 
from interstate actors. 
 
This part of the introduction has given a brief historical background of the 
notion of political survival. The reason for this is to show the underlying reason for the 
logic of political survival in Turkish politics under AKP rule, the main topic of this 
study. This thesis tries to establish a cause-effect mechanism for understanding the 
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AKP’s political survival between 2002 and 2018. In doing so, it aims to reveal new 
explanations for exploring the AKP’s political survival.  
 
While trying to explain the survival of the AKP throughout this study, we will 
concentrate on the perspective of De Mesquita and colleagues unlike the other 
researches in the literature. One of the most important reasons for this is that, as 
seen above, there is a separate concept of 'political survival'. The first scholars to 
design this as a conceptual framework around this notion are Bruce Bueno De 
Mesquita1 and Alastair Smith’s books, The Logic of Political Survival and The 
Dictators Handbook. They examine the theme of domestic political survival in the 
context of a range of political, economic and foreign policy issues, such as revolution 
or war, through the application of quantitative methods. De Mesquita and his 
colleagues draw attention to political survival as a central aim of political leaders and 
parties. De Mesquita argues that ‘the actions that a leader makes and takes 
constitute how she governs. And what, for a leader, is the ‘best’ way to govern? The 
answer to how best to govern: however is necessary first to come to power, then to 
stay in power, and to control as much national (or corporate) revenue as possible all 
along the way’ (De Mesquita and Smith, 2011: 24). 
 
De Mesquita and Smith show three political dimensions which can ‘break’ the 
political landscape: the nominal selectorate; the real selectorate; and the winning 
coalition (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2011: 14). According to this theory, on the 
one hand, if the winning coalition is small and the selectorate is large, the leader has 
a great chance to control the country with relative ease. This situation is called an 
autocracy. On the other hand, if the winning coalition and selectorate is large, it 
provides the least amount of stability to a leader’s occupancy of power, a system 
known as a ‘democracy’. This study argues that this theory can be useful to explain 
the dynamics of the AKP government between 2002 and 2018. As previously 
mentioned, the AKP government was established with big support from a large 
coalition, which included liberals and centre-right views. The AKP has taken 
                                                          
1
 Although Bruce Bueno De Mesquita has published many of his research with other academics, 
Selectorate Theory is mentioned in the literature with him. For this reason De Mesquita's name is used 
when exploring the selectorate theory throughout this research. 
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important steps with national reform programmes in many areas in terms of 
democracy and human rights. As a result, this coalition has survived since 2007. 
However, as mentioned above, some groups - like the army and the Kemalist 
bureaucracy - believe that the AKP has a secret agenda for establishing an Islamic 
state in Turkey. Because of this, the AKP started to fight these opposition groups 
after 2007 with the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases which will be explained in Chapter 
3. This research argues that the AKP’s winning coalition started to dwindle due to this 
conflict in light of the clash between the AKP and some liberals and Western 
business associations like TUSİAD. As a result, the AKP under Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan has become more authoritarian than his conservative democratic 
position would suggest. After 2011, the support of liberals and centre-right actors 
decreased due to the AKP’s autocracy. The AKP’s winning coalition has become 
smaller than it was in its first years. As a result of this development, the AKP has 
become more conservative, populist and authoritarian in Turkish political life further. 
 
2.1.1. AKP’s Winning Coalition 
 
As discussed above, when the AKP was established in 2001 and won the 
elections in November 2002, the winning coalition included both domestic and 
external supporters such as European countries and the United States, liberal 
intellectuals within the country, moderate Islamist groups like the Fethullah Gülen 
Movement which mentioned in Introduction, conservative citizens of Turkish society – 
as their votes significantly influence who is elected – centre-right voters, faith-based 
non-profit organisations, Western style business institutions like TÜSİAD (Türk 
Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği) and conservative business interests among many 
others (like MÜSİAD) when the party first assumed power in 2002 (McDonald, 2011: 
525-542). However, this coalition began to shrink after the AKP’s second term 
between 2007 and 2011. Some parts of society like the Western style business 
sector or secular bureaucratic elites have serious concerns about the AKP’s 
approach towards secularism. Although the conflict between the AKP and the armed 
forces and secular bureaucratic elites helped to democratize and normalize Turkish 
politics according to liberal scholars, the second term of the AKP is when it began to 
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fight opposition groups in illiberal ways (Ugur, 2017: 146-147). Nonetheless, it 
demonstrates the rise of Islamism, albeit weakly. Indeed, the real breaking point in 
the AKP’s survival was making its minimum winning coalition as small as possible 
was after the 2011 election. Following the victory of the AKP in the 2011 election, the 
AKP’s conservative democratic identity has severely undermined. The AKP’s shift 
towards more authoritarian and populist marked the end of the long-term alliance 
between independent, non-party liberal democrats/moderate Islamists/centre-right 
voters and religious conservatives. Moreover, most of the members of the AKP’s 
winning coalition in 2001 have withdrawn their support for the AKP after Erdoğan’s 
third term. Chapter 4 will explain that, Turkish society divided into two camps after the 
Gezi Park Protests: Erdoğan’s opponents vs. Erdoğan’s supporters. This polarization 
process has evolved into a different dimension for the post-2014 period, and the 
Kurds and Fethullah Gülen Community, either voluntarily or reluctantly participating in 
the coalition of the AKP, have joined the AKP’s opponents. Along with this war, the 
AKP's coalition narrowed down and aimed to increase the electorate's mass with 
instrumentalising of Islamism and nationalism as it explains in the Chapter 5. Before 
going into these details, it is to be explained in this section what is the concept of 
Selectorate Theory and how it is applied to the AKP case. 
 
2.1.2. The Concept of Selectorate Theory in Turkish Case 
 
As discussed above, the coalitional politics or political alliance is explained by 
many scholars and one of the most well-known theories comes from De Mesquita 
and his colleagues in the form of ‘selectorate theory’. This theory is directly related to 
political survival of political parties or leaders in terms of democracy or 
authoritarianism. It focuses on leaders’ interest in their political survival in their 
country. Leaders must gain a winning coalition, which is formed by ‘selectorate’, to 
control and manage their countries with relative ease. For the authors, the three core 
issues that affect leaders in politics are: the size of the winning coalition needed, the 
size of the selectorate that the winning coalition can be drawn from, and the amount 
of money available to spread around. In small coalition political structures like 
dictatorships, leaders can stay in power through the judicious use of private rewards 
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whilst in democratic countries the selectorate is large. Leaders in large coalition 
polities therefore distribute more public goods - that is, they must actually govern in 
the public interest, at least to a greater degree, to stay in power (Bueno De Mesquita, 
et al, 2003).  
 
Following of this book, De Mesquita and Alastair Smith published their well-
known work, The Dictator’s Handbook: Why bad behavior is almost good politics, in 
2011. As highlighted before, De Mesquita and Smith show three important dynamics 
for political survival: the nominal selectorate, the real selectorate, and the winning 
coalition (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2011: 7-8). The nominal selectorate 
includes every citizen who has some say in choosing the leader or political party. The 
real selectorate means those whose support is truly crucial. The most important one, 
a winning coalition, includes essential supporters whose support translates into a 
victory for leaders. (Bueno De Mesquita and Smith, 2011: 9).  
 
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2011: 19) point out that there are five basic 
rules leaders can use to succeed in any system. The first two rules are that leaders 
should keep their winning coalition as small as possible and keep their nominal 
selectorate as large as possible. A small coalition helps a leader to rely on very few 
people to stay in power and leaders can easily replace any troublemakers in their 
coalition due to the large nominal selectorate in this theory. The authors give the 
examples of North Korea and the early Soviet regime to understand and explain 
these rules within authoritarian states (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2011: 22). The 
third rule is to control the flow of revenue. De Mesquita and Smith (2011: 22) argue 
that the most effective cash flow for leaders is one that make lots of people poor and 
redistributes money to keep their supporters wealthy. Pakistan’s Zardari government 
is good example of this phenomenon. The fourth rule is that the leaders should pay 
their supporters just enough to support them. When Mugabe is faced with a threat 
from military in Zimbabwe, he pays his army to keep his power in the country, for 
example. The last rule for leaders’ political survival in authoritarian states is that they 
should not take money out of their supporter’s pockets to make the peoples’ lives 
better. De Mesquita and Smith (2011: 23) claim that effective policy for the masses 
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does not necessarily produce loyalty among supporters and is hugely expensive. An 
example of this is Myanmar’s General Thans Shwe, who controlled food relief which 
he then sold to his military supporters rather than letting it go to the people during the 
2008 Nargis cyclone (De Mesquita and Smith, 2011: 23-24). 
 
As noted before, the AKP’s history has some similarities in terms of De 
Mesquita and Smith’s political survival rules. The first two rules in particular have 
been implemented by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan between 2007 and 2014. Indeed, the 
nominal selectorate for the AKP is every Turkish citizen who chooses the leader of 
Turkey. As previously mentioned, the AKP government was established with big 
support from a large coalition, which included liberal and centre-right views. This 
coalition shows the ‘real selectorate’ of the AKP. The AKP has taken important steps 
with national reform programmes in terms of democracy and human rights. The real 
selectorate’s effect is influential for these improvements. As a result, this coalition 
survived until 2007. The AKP started to fight opposition groups after 2007 and this 
research claims that the AKP’s coalition started to dwindle due to this conflict. After 
2011, the support of liberals and centre-right actors decreased due to the AKP’s 
autocracy. The AKP’s winning coalition has become smaller it was in the first years of 
the AKP. Tayyip Erdoğan and the AKP government should keep their nominal 
selectorate as large as possible. Nearly 50% of Turkish citizens voted for the AKP in 
the 2011 general elections.2 They are considered to be the ‘nominal selectorate’ and 
choose a leader and political party to govern Turkey. The main result of this 
phenomenon is the change in Erdoğan’s and the AKP’s policy after 2011. The ex-
members of the AKP’S winning coalition, such as liberals, centre-rights, Kurds, 
moderate Islamists, etc., regard themselves as ‘secular and liberal’. Therefore, 
Erdoğan was forced to become more conservative, more populist and more 
authoritarian during the third term of the AKP.  
 
As mentioned above, in the post-2014 period, the winning coalition of the AKP 
would be even smaller. The conflict between Kurdish forces-the Fethullah Gülen 
                                                          
2
 The AKP got 10.8 million votes (34.3% of the valid votes) in 2002, 16.3 million in 2007 (46.6% of the 
valid votes), and approximately 21.4 million (49.8% of the valid votes) in 2011. 
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Movement and the AKP has intensified since 2014. This situation further narrowed 
the AKP's winning coalition, but at the same time AKP would have needed more 
support of the nominal selectorate in the elections. In order to achieve this, a policy 
that combines Islamism and nationalism under the leadership of Erdogan has been 
followed for consolidating of nationalist voters in Turkish elections. Chapter 5 also 
explains how it applies it and the cause-and-effect relationship between AKP’s 
survival and the AKP’s Islamist-nationalist political stance in the theoretical context of 
De Mesquita. Nevertheless, De Mesquita’s and his colleagues’ approach has 
experienced various problems in exploring this political phenomenon. 
 
2.1.3. Critics of De Mesquita’s Selectorate Theory  
 
There are also some empirical or methodological problems that have been 
noted. De Mesquita's analysis suffers from omitted variable bias (Clark and Stone, 
2008: 387-392). In certain statistical tests and situations (when the omitted variable is 
correlated with both the dependent variable and one of the independent variables) 
this can make the results appear stronger than they are. Once this error is corrected, 
the results are no longer interesting. There have also been problems applying the 
theory to case studies. For example, when the theory fails to predict different 
outcomes from different former U.S.S.R member states (Gallagher and Hanson, 
2013: 185-214). 
 
According to Kennedy (2009, 695-714), the measure used for operationalizing 
winning coalition size is inconsistent across regime types. When measures of 
democracy are entered into the equation, the relationship between winning coalition 
size and leadership is either substantially weakened or reverses directions. More 
troubling still, this measure appears to have the opposite effect within the very broad 
categories of electoral and nonelectoral systems, something that explicitly contradicts 
the predictions of selectorate theory. Additionally, the effect of selectorate size is 
substantially weakened in the nonelectoral context, and is only likely to follow the 
predictions of the theory for leaders that have already had very long tenures. The 
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effect of the measure of selectorate size, whether the country has an elected 
legislature, is mostly due to the difference between temporary and institutionalizing 
military regimes. Legislatures in non-military regimes have a generally destabilizing 
effect on leadership tenure and this only slowly dissipates with time in office. At the 
same time, legislatures in military regimes are stabilizing for leaders as they reflect 
an attempt to institutionalize power. Such a relationship is not predicted by 
selectorate theory, and indeed the destabilizing effects of military regimes go directly 
against the predictions of selectorate theory. This raises serious questions about the 
appropriateness of this measure of selectorate size. 
 
Although selectorate theory was designed to explain politics in authoritarian 
regimes, its basic constructs (like the selectorate) are not clearly applicable to non-
democratic regimes (Gallagher and Hanson; 2015: 367-385). In these countries, 
formal political institutions don't really structure how politics happens, so a theory 
based on those institutions doesn't make sense. Gallagher and Hanson also found 
that the Logic of Political Survival suffers from using crude measurements. For 
example, according to de Mesquita's coding scheme about 80% of all countries have 
an elected legislature. This includes both the United States as well as countries like 
Uzbekistan. These measurements are so broad that they are meaningless. Any 
conclusion drawn from these measurements is (at best) imprecise. They note that; 
 
 
Although rulers of other countries (North Korea comes to mind) appear to 
find that a different mix of carrots and sticks ensures their survival, the same 
calculus is present. By making the size of the winning coalition the critical factor 
in their model and linking political repression to low levels of public good 
provision, Bueno de Mesquita et al. predict that all small coalition polities are like 
North Korea rather than like China, South Korea, Taiwan or Singapore. The 
analysis in this chapter suggests that a theory of autocratic resilience must go 
beyond the LPS in permitting rulers to respond to revolutionary threats with 
different combinations of carrots and sticks. (Gallagher and Hanson, 2013:23) 
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Indeed, De Mesquita and his colleagues offer a positivist approach within 
political sciences through their political survival theories based on quantitative 
methods, especially in their book The Logic of Political Survival. Moreover, they claim 
that control of the whole economy helps to create authoritarian regimes in, for 
example, African states. This study discusses that this is an American approach 
against the third world countries and has many problems in terms of colonial or 
imperial legacies. As mentioned above, the other three rules are related to the 
economic policy. Although Erdoğan creates his oligarchs who support him as a 
leader, there is no clear evidence that the Erdoğan government controls the whole 
economy in Turkey.  
 
Obviously, De Mesquita’s theory provides a realist picture and their methods - 
based on a positivist approach - attempt to explain leader’s political survival but does 
not pay attention to leaders’ personal motivations or personal leadership skills. De 
Mesquita and his colleagues’ method is only provided by statistical data and is only 
valid for the case studies in third world countries which are/were controlled by 
authoritarian leaders. Bueno de Mesquita's method is grounded on the assumption 
that people are basically rational beings and everybody is rational like political 
leaders, according to De Mesquita. Corinne Rockoff criticizes this issue and notes 
that; 
 
If one assumes that leaders are not solely motivated by the personal desire to 
stay in power, then a variety of factors could be behind the differences between 
leaders’ choices. These factors could range from the personal, such as issues 
that leaders have personal attachments to, to the nationally strategic. How do 
leaders choose which issues they emphasize? Do they focus on longer range 
planning? Do leaders choose issues in adherence with what they promised 
during campaigns? It’s also possible that leaders shift their focus over time and 
as they near the end of their terms, they become less willing to conform to 
political norms that require them to skirt issues they care about. The permutations 
are endless in any given scenario, and the mathematical constraints of 
selectorate theory make this question a difficult one to answer (Rockoff, 2014: 4). 
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Rockoff's criticism specifically examines whether the leader's decisions cannot 
be explained by rationality and mathematical scenarios. At this point, the influence of 
AKP leader Erdogan's growing leadership position on the survival of the AKP should 
not be overlooked. As a response to Rockoff's criticism, Chapter 5 shows why and 
how the role of Erdogan's leadership is important on the AKP’s political survival. 
 
While explaining the survival of the AKP with the De Mesquita’s Selectorate 
Theory, it also introduces some limitations in these criticisms. One of these limitations 
is related to De Mesquita’s case examples. As Gallagher and Hanson (2013) point 
out, the countries in De Mesquita's samples have very serious differences in terms of 
the electoral systems or the role of the military. Indeed, Turkey with the AKP case 
also has different features from other countries. While AKP is ensuring its political 
survival, it has always aimed to keep the nominal selectorate large in the democratic 
elections. Although the AKP's winning coalition is getting smaller every period, it has 
never transformed into a dictatorial states such as North Korea or Zimbabwe due to 
Turkey’s democratic electoral system.  
 
If De Mesquita’s theory is correct, the AKP’s story would now be very different. 
As discussed in the last section, the first two rules in De Mesquita’s selectorate 
theory are that leaders should keep their winning coalition as small as possible and 
keep their nominal selectorate as large as possible. A small coalition helps a leader 
to rely on very few people to stay in power and leaders can easily replace any threats 
in their coalition due to the large nominal selectorate in this theory. Indeed, Erdoğan 
was very successful in preventing these threats like the military’s coup attempt and 
began to make his coalition smaller after 2007. This power struggle has continued 
after 2011 with the important victory of the AKP in the 2011 Election. At Turkey’s 
general elections on 12 June 2011, the governing AKP won 50% of the overall vote. 
This was the first time that a ruling party in Turkey has increased its vote in a third 
term and was vitally important for Erdoğan. In the lead-up to the election, he had 
indicated that during his first and second terms in power he was an ‘apprentice’, then 
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a ‘foreman’, but a third term would make him a ‘master’. Indeed, Erdoğan’s style of 
government would be changed during this third term of AKP.  
 
As noted above, the AKP’s winning coalition has became smaller than the first 
years but it would continue with two important members of Turkish politics - the 
Fethullah Gülen Movement and some liberal intellectuals. However, this alliance had 
been concluded after 2012 with the Gezi Park Protests and the 17-25 December 
corruption scandals. Following the 17-25 December 2013 corruption scandals, 
Erdoğan declared ‘war’ against the Gülen Movement and these liberal intellectuals 
due to their support for corruption claims. Indeed, this conflict may be explained by 
De Mesquita’s selectorate theory because Erdoğan has continued to dissolve the 
partnership with the AKP’s coalition members in order to prevent threats to his 
political survival. However, the interesting point is the position of the other actors of 
Turkish politics during these conflicts. First, some of the Kemalist elites who had 
been eliminated by Erdoğan government during the AKP’s second term supported 
the Erdoğan against the Gülen Movement. Second, Western business associations 
like TUSIAD, which clashed with the AKP after 2007, supported the AKP against the 
Gülen Movement due to their economic interests. If De Mesquita’s theory is right, 
Erdoğan does not need the support of these actors and will become like North Korea 
or the African dictatorships which are mentioned by De Mesquita’s theory. 
 
From this point of view, De Mesquita's Selectorate Theory has some 
limitations or problems when exploring the importance of AKP case in the logic of 
political survival in Turkish politics. However, this study does not aim to criticise the 
De Mesquita’s Selectorate Theory. Although it has been discussed its limitations or 
critics in the literature, it is one of the most appropriate concepts that can be used to 
explore the political survival of the AKP. There are two important reasons to support 
this argument. The first point is that when the AKP has survived its 16-year rule, it 
determines the majority of the electorate by sanctifying the concept of ‘national will’ 
(milli irade) as the AKP’s most significant political objective. At this point, it was the 
first rule that De Mesquita kept the nominal selectorate large in the selectorate theory 
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to ensure the survival of political leaders or parties. The AKP government has 
successfully implemented this rule for 16 years to ensure its survival. 
 
The second point is a series of threats to the political survival of leaders or 
political parties, as mentioned in De Mesquita's Selectorate theory. Military coups or 
civil uprisings are the first of these threats. The AKP government was the most 
exposed political party to these threats against its political survival. In April 2007, the 
e-military coup attempt, Ergenekon investigation, the Gezi Park protest in 2013 and 
the July 15 coup attempt was some of the examples of these threats. Another reason 
for focusing on De Mesquita's Selectorate Theory while examining the AKP’s political 
survival is the relation between political survival and those threats. For these 
reasons, the fact that the 16 years of political success of the AKP is not explored in 
the literature through political survival further increases the importance of De 
Mesquita's theory for the AKP case.  
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3. Research Methodology 
 
Researchers choose two main research data methods when they want to 
explain and improve their hypothesis: qualitative and quantitative. On the one hand, 
qualitative data collection methods result in descriptions of problems, behaviours or 
events and can provide narrative descriptions of people’s thoughts and opinions 
about their experiences, attitudes, and beliefs. On the other hand, quantitative data 
collection methods consist of counts or frequencies, rates or per centages, or other 
statistics that document the actual existence or absence of problems, behaviours, or 
occurrences. This data can yield representative and generalisable information. 
 
This research uses qualitative methods for three reasons. First, qualitative 
methods provide the ‘case studies’ that illustrate the nature of the problem 
addressed. This study explores a case study about the logic of political survival 
Turkish politics during the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government. 
Second, the main research question of this study concerns questions of ‘why’ and 
‘how’, so qualitative data methods capture more depth and provide insights as to the 
‘why’ and ‘how’ of attitudes and behaviours. Lastly, this research depends on specific 
cases about Turkey and the AKP government and case study analysis is one of the 
most useful qualitative methods in this study. 
 
3.1. Case-study Analysis 
 
Qualitative methods can include different types of approaches, such as case 
studies, elite interviews, critical discourse analysis and so on. This study offers a 
case study research in light of the AKP case for understanding the logic of political 
survival in Turkish politics. 
 
Case study research may be said to begin with J. S. Mill’s magisterial study, ‘A 
System of Logic’, first published in 1843. In the early twentieth century, case study 
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research was influenced by logicians such as Cohen and Nagel (1934) and was the 
subject of intense discussion among sociologists such as Carl Becker (1934), Ernest 
Burgess (1927, 1928, 1941), Charles Cooley (1927), Leonard Cottrell (1941), Paul 
Foreman (1948), Katharine Jocher (1928), Robert Park (1930), Clifford Shaw (1927), 
and Samuel Stouffer (1931, 1941, 1950). In the 1960s and 1970s, another wave of 
research attempted to define, improve, and integrate case study methods into the 
mainstream of social science methods. Influential studies include Campbell (1966, 
1975), Eckstein (1975), George (1979), Glaser and Strauss (1967), Lijphart (1971, 
1975), Przeworski and Teune (1970), and Skocpol and Somers (1980). Today, the 
literature on case study methods is so abundant and diverse that it defies 
description—which may be a testament to either its success or its failure, depending 
on your point of view. 
 
As discussed above, it is not easy to describe what a case study is because 
there is no easy explanation (Solberg Søilen & Huber, 2006,). A case study can be 
defined as an intensive study about a person, a group of people or a unit, which is 
aimed to generalize over several units. In a case study the focus is based on a 
specially unit (Jacobsen, 2002). Another, similar, definition is that a case study is an 
analyse of systems that are studied with a comprehensive view by either one or 
several methods (Thomas, 2011). The case study method is not aimed to analyse 
cases, but it is a good way to define cases and to explore a setting in order to 
understand it (Cousin, 2005). “The case study method “explores a real-life, 
contemporary bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over 
time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of 
information… and reports a case description and case themes” (Creswell, 2013, p. 
97). 
 
In a case study, one or more cases can be investigated. When examining one 
case, we refer to a singular case study, and a multiple or plural case study is used to 
describe a study examining several cases. In multiple case studies, each case is 
studied as if it is a singular study and is then compared to other cases. The analysis 
of each following case is built on the knowledge obtained in the analysis of previous 
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cases (Mesec 1998, p. 384). For singular and multiple case studies, Thomas 
suggests an additional classification, according to the type of time dimension. 
 
The types of singular case studies, regarding time dimension, are as follows 
(Thomas 2011, p. 517): 
 
i. Retrospective case studies: The simplest type of study; it involves the 
collection of data relating to a past phenomenon of any kind. The 
researcher is looking back on a phenomenon, situation, person, or 
event and studying it in its historical integrity. 
 
ii. Snapshot studies: The case is being examined in one particular period 
of time, such as a current event, a day in the life of a person, a diary, 
etc. Whether a month, a week, a day, or even a period as short as an 
hour, the analysis is aided by the temporal juxtaposition of events. As 
the snapshot develops, the picture presents itself as a Gestalt over a 
tight timeframe. 
 
iii. Diachronic studies: Change over time and are similar to longitudinal 
studies. 
 
This research offers a single and retrospective case study in light of the AKP’s 
political survival in Turkish politics. Single case study analysis has some advantages 
and disadvantages. Benefits with a single case study are that they are not as 
expensive and time-consuming as multiple case studies. Single case studies are 
better when the writer wants to create a high-quality theory because this type 
produces extra and better theory. A single case study also makes the writer to have a 
deeper understanding of the exploring subject. Other benefits are that single case 
studies richly can describe the existence of phenomenon and it is better to make a 
single case study than a multiple case study when the writer wants to study, for 
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example, a person or a group of people. When a single case study is used the writer 
also can question old theoretical relationships and explore new ones. This is because 
a more careful study is made. George and Bennett (2005) conclude that these 
strengths lie in four categories:  
 
“Case studies are generally strong precisely where statistical methods and formal 
models are weak. We identify four strong advantages of case methods that make 
them valuable in testing hypotheses and particularly useful for theory 
development: their potential for achieving high conceptual validity; their strong 
procedures for fostering new hypotheses; their value as a useful means to closely 
examine the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms in the context of individual 
cases; and their capacity for addressing causal complexity”. (George and Bennett 
2005:19) 
 
 
However, some scholars have demonstrated the disadvantages and problems 
of case study analysis. Some social scientists believe that case study analysis can be 
the weakest test method for observations compared to other methods like 
experimentation or large-n analysis (Van Evera, 1997). According to this view, case 
study analysis has some difficulties in controlling the effect of omitted or third 
variables. Large-n analysis allows better control for these variables. Van Evera 
(1997) shows that; a second main criticism is that a case study cannot be 
generalised to other cases. This criticism can be a problem for my research because 
a single case has many difficulties in examining and identifying the hypotheses of 
other cases. Gerring has identified a paradox in which he correctly states that a case 
study exists in a strange, curious methodological limbo, which, he believes, is due to 
a lack of understanding of this method (Gerring 2004, p. 341). Flyvbjerg has therefore 
sought to resolve this paradox and, in so doing, to achieve a wider acceptance and 
application of research using case studies. He has identified five misunderstandings 
about case studies that undermine the credibility and application of this research 
type. These misunderstandings refer primarily to the theory, reliability, and validity 
(Flyvbjerg 2006; 2011):  
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i. General, theoretical (context-independent) knowledge is more valuable 
than concrete, practical (context-dependent) knowledge. 
ii. It is impossible to generalize on the basis of an individual case; 
therefore, the case study cannot contribute to scientific development. 
iii. The case study is most useful for generating hypotheses (that is, in the 
first stage of a total research process), whereas other methods are 
more suitable for hypotheses testing and theory building. 
iv. Case studies contain a bias toward verification; that is, a tendency to 
confirm the researcher’s preconceived notions. 
v. It is often difficult to summarize and develop general propositions and 
theories on the basis of specific case studies. 
 
Since case studies not develop testable generalizations, they are often 
criticized in not to be enough scientific according to Encyclopedia Britannica, II 
(1979). Yin (2009) writes that during the design of the case study, the structure 
should be identified. To identify the structure and to extenuate the criticism the writer 
should have a thoughtful research design and a precise language through the report 
according to Eisenhardt & Graebner (2007). Another thing to take under 
consideration is that tables and figures make the case more reliable because of the 
rich presentation of evidence. If the case study also contains appendixes with extra 
information or/and theoretical sampling of the case or cases the case study become 
more dependable according to Eisenhardt & Graebner. One of the most important 
limitations of this study is the problem of generalization over the AKP case in the 
logic of political survival in Turkish politics. At this point, as Eisenhardt & Graebner 
stated, we used tables and figures throughout the study and at the same time gave 
extra information with elite interviews to make the case study more dependable. 
 
 
3.1.1. Case Study and Causal Mechanism 
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Causation (also referred to as causality) is the relation between cause and 
effect. A cause is why something happens and the effect is what happens. Causation 
shows the connection between causes and effects generally. The understanding of 
causation has become one of the big philosophical issues between philosophers who 
have discussed it for centuries (Mumford, 2012: 44-45). David Hume was one of the 
most important philosophers in these discussions and played a prominent role in 
shaping the philosophical debate about causation (Ayer, 2000: 67). 
 
 
Some general thoughts about causation persevere, like the idea that causes 
necessitate their effects or causes have the power to bring about their effects. David 
Hume criticised these beliefs in terms of the relationship between cause and effect. 
Hume thought that causal connections were unobservable and people could not 
know the causal connection between the first event and the second event in all cases 
(Hume, 1995: 29-36). Mumford gives an example of this:  
 
We can see one event, such as someone taking a pill, and a second event when 
they get better, but we never see causal connection between two events… The 
problem is deeper than merely that, I cannot see inside someone’s body. Even in 
the simplest case, Hume alleges that we can never see the causal connection 
(Mumford, 2012, p.46). 
 
 
Indeed, Hume does not argue that the relationship between causes and 
effects could not be generalised. Ayer argues that “Hume is concerned with causality 
as the ground of factual inference; it has to supply the bridge which carries us safely 
from a true belief in one matter of fact to a true belief in another” (Ayer, 2000: 69). 
The main problem for Hume is the necessary connection between causes and effects 
in all cases. Hume claims that there is no necessary connection between cause and 
effect if the relations are between external objects and the power of the will over the 
body or mind (Honore, 2014). Hume asserts the importance of causal inference 
rather than general theories of causation in order to understand the relationship 
between cause and effect. According to Hume, causal inference is defined as the 
discovery of causal relations rather than a consequence of them (Garrett, 2009: 73-
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92). Hume also points out that the nature of relation depends so much on that of the 
inference that he is obliged to advance in this seemingly preposterous manner of 
examining causal inference before explaining the nature of causal relation (Hume 
1995: 29-36).  
 
Case studies examine the operation of causal mechanisms in individual cases 
in detail. Within a single case, we can look at a large number of intervening variables 
and inductively observe any unexpected aspects of the operation of a particular 
causal mechanism or help identify what conditions present in a case activate the 
causal mechanism. Firstly, how the causal mechanism will be defined and what it will 
mean in this work will be examined. 
 
The first difficulty with the current vogue of mechanism-centred causal 
analysis is establishing how it is defined. Gerring (2010: 1500-1501) demonstrates 
that ‘causal mechanism’ may refer to: (a) the pathway or process by which an effect 
is produced; (b) a micro-level (microfoundational) explanation for a causal 
phenomenon; (c) a difficult-to-observe causal factor; (d) an easy-to-observe causal 
factor; (e) a context dependent (tightly bounded or middle-range) explanation; (f) a 
universal (i.e. highly general) explanation; (g) an explanation that presumes 
probabilistic, and perhaps highly contingent, causal relations; (h) an explanation built 
on phenomena that exhibit law-like regularities; (i) a technique of analysis based on 
qualitative or case study evidence; and/or (j) a theory couched in formal 
mathematical models (Gerring, 2008; also see Hedstrom, 2005: 25; Mahoney, 2003; 
Mayntz, 2004; Norkus, 2004).  
 
Clearly many scholars try to identify causal mechanisms in many ways. 
However, these differences do not affect the importance of causal mechanisms for 
this research. As mentioned before, the causal mechanisms between independent 
and dependent variables in the research play the most important role in this study. 
Causal mechanisms can be defined as ‘a complex system, which produces an 
outcome by the interaction of a number of parts’ (Glennan, 1996: 52). Studying 
causal mechanisms in qualitative, in-depth, single case studies enables the 
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researcher to make strong within-case inferences about how outcomes come about, 
thus updating the level of confidence we have in the validity of theorised causal 
mechanisms (Gerring, 2004: 341-354). 
 
This research chooses Mahoney’s classification to explain causal mechanisms 
rather than these explanations. According to Mahoney, causal mechanisms refer to 
three different explanations; (1) something that intervenes between a cause and 
outcome; (2) the specific defining aspects of the causal factor that affect the 
outcome; or (3) a potentially invariant general property or process (Mahoney, 2015: 
206). This research does not offer a simple causal inference or causal mechanism to 
explain the logic of political survival in Turkish politics in light of the AKP case. In 
regular causal analysis, X is the direct cause of Y or Y is the direct cause of X. This 
study does not argue that the independent variables are the direct cause of the 
AKP’s political survival in Turkish politics. It provides a causal mechanism (a series of 
intervening variables) between the independent variables (cause = the legitimisation 
of AKP’s conservatism- AKP’s power struggle- the beginning of populist 
authoritarianism under AKP rule- the instrumentalisation of Islamism and nationalism 
under Erdogan’s leadership) and dependent variable (outcome = AKP’s political 
survival in Turkish politics). Mahoney explores the understanding of causal 
mechanism below: 
 
I treat mechanisms in the same way as causes and outcomes; they are particular 
events or specific values on variables. Mechanisms are different from causes and 
outcomes because of their temporal position: they stand between a cause and 
outcome in time. Thus, in the expression X → M → Y, the letters refer to events 
or specific values on variables, with X being treated as the cause, M as the 
mechanism, and Y as the outcome (Mahoney, 2015: 206). 
 
The other important point for the causal inference and case study methods is 
collecting and evaluating evidences or data. Careful design of a case study is 
therefore very important. This is because case study method, through interviews or 
journal entries, must be able to prove that: 
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i. it is the only viable method to elicit implicit and explicit data from the 
subjects 
ii. it is appropriate to the research question 
iii. it follows the set of procedures with proper application 
iv. the scientific conventions used in social sciences are strictly followed 
v. a ‘chain of evidence’, either quantitatively or qualitatively, are 
systematically 
vi. recorded and archived particularly when interviews and direct observation 
by the researcher are the main sources of data  
vii. the case study is linked to a theoretical framework (Tellis, 1997) 
 
As seen this perspective, the case study method needs sufficient evidence to 
prove its hypothesis. This study offers elite interviewing methods to collect sufficient 
evidences to make a causal mechanism between dependent and independent 
variables. 
 
3.1.2. Case Study and Elite Interviewing 
 
Before explaining the relationship between the case study analysis and elite 
interviews, this research will to define 'elite interviewing', regarding it as a research 
technique with particular relevance to politics. Increasingly, numbers of political 
analysts use and recognize elite interviewing as an important research method in 
modern political science to collect information and knowledge. Elite interviews offer 
political scientists a rich, cost-effective method for producing data to analyse the 
complexities of politics (Beamer, 2002: 86). 
 
In recent years, a small but growing body of research has documented the 
issues and dynamics associated with interviewing ‘elite’ participants in qualitative 
research (e.g. Duke, 2002; Harvey, 2011; Hertz & Imber, 1995; Mikecz, 2012; Morris, 
2009; Neal & Mclaughlin, 2009; Smith, 2006; Stephens, 2007; Welch, Marschan-
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Piekkari, Penttinen, & Tahvanainen, 2002). The term ‘elite’ is not always defined 
within this literature, but is generally used to describe individuals or groups who 
ostensibly have closer proximity to power or particular professional expertise (Morris, 
2009). A variety of challenges associated with researching elites have been 
documented in the literature, ranging from difficulties with gaining access to the 
suggestion that elite participants may seek to exert too much control over research 
and manipulate dissemination processes (for discussion see Smith, 2006; Welch et 
al., 2002). In the context of policy research more specifically, it has been suggested 
that additional issues must be considered when the ‘elite’ participants in question 
also interact and operate within policy networks (Duke, 2002; Farquharson, 2005). 
 
Beamer (2002) and Dexter (1970) argue that elite interviews target people 
directly involved in the political process. Individuals may have special insights into the 
causal mechanisms or processes of politics and elite interviews offer an in-depth 
exploration of specific political matters. The resulting information or knowledge 
explains not just the potential for a richer description of political processes, but also 
for more efficient and valid data for inferential purposes. Elite interviews should be an 
important part of the research for an answer to a main research question. According 
to Beamer, elite interview research design should be systematically developed and 
executed in four basic steps: 1) identify the constructs of interest and develop 
observable measures and instrumentation to tap into them; 2) develop sampling 
procedures to maximize the validity of the study; 3) conduct interviews and collect 
corroborative data; 4) analyze data (Beamer, 2002: 87). 
 
As said before, some scholars, like George and Bennett (2005: 223), argue 
that elite interviewing methods are relevant for case study research. Another of these 
scholars, Oisin Tansey, explains the importance of elite interviewing as a means of 
collecting the kind of data necessary and explores the specific advantages elite 
interviewing. Tansey offers four important uses of elite interviews and when using this 
data collection technique to uncover causal processes (Tansey, 2007: 5). 
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There are four important aims of elite interviews in Tansey’s articles. This 
study tries to adopt these goals into the research because this study offers elite 
interviewing methods to examine the logic of political survival in Turkish politics under 
the AKP government. First, elite interviewing methods can be used to support the 
early findings which come from documents or secondary sources about the overview 
of events or issues. This research uses the archival or legal documents of the AKP 
government such as party programmes or election guides, laws and constitutional 
changes, and important news or events about the AKP’s political survival. All of these 
documents have been corroborated by interviews with key players like policy makers 
or academics in Turkey to explore the AKP’s political survival. Second, elite 
interviews aim to establish what a group of people think. This research was carried 
out through interviews with policy makers and politicians from the AKP or other 
political parties and it helps to establish what people think and what their attitudes, 
values and beliefs are. Tansey (2007: 7-8) points out that researchers can thus 
gather rich detail about the thoughts of key policy makers concerning the central and 
important matters of this research project.  
 
Third, elite interviews make inferences about the larger population’s 
characteristics or decisions. According to Tansey, interviews with key political groups 
can be used to generalise the larger population’s thoughts or decisions. For instance, 
this research has conducted interviews with members or policy makers from all of 
Turkey’s key political parties and these findings can be generalised to the wider 
population of other political party members or voters of these political parties. As 
Tansey notes: ‘characteristics, traits and actions found through the sample group 
were inferred to exist also in the population from which the sample was drawn and 
general conclusions were made concerning the wider political elite’ (Tansey, 2007: 
7).  
 
Lastly, elite interviews help rebuild an event or set of events. Elite interviewing 
methods show the hidden elements of the political process that are not clear from the 
analysis of political outcomes or from other sources. This study needs to clarify the 
independent and intervening variables of the AKP’s political survival. 
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The fieldwork for this research included around 70 interviews with politicians, 
academics and student groups. The present research has involved interviews held 
with direct participants in the process of AKP’s power in Turkey for 15 years. For 
example, the gradual legitimisation of the AKP’s founding philosophy and its overall 
conservatism has been examined on the basis of interviews with the AKP’s founding 
staff, such as Abdüllatif Şener. In the second period of the AKP, the Kemalist elite 
struggle and its consolidation of power are illuminated through interviews with 
journalists (such as Işık Kansu and Melih Aşık) and politicians (such as Mustafa 
Balbay), who were either convicted in the Ergenekon and Balyoz (Sladgehammer) 
cases or who were members of the Kemalist elite. This research also posed some 
general questions to the interviewees as below: 
 
1) How do can identify the AKP? Is it a Muslim-democratic party or is it a 
continuation of the Milli Görüş movement/pro-Islamic party? 
2) What do you think about the establishment process of the AKP? Was there 
a deviation from the party programme afterwards? Was the implementation 
in line with your expectations? 
3) Particularly after 9/11, there was what you call a demand for the “moderate 
Muslim democracy” label. For several years Turkey was an important 
example of this demand with the concept of ‘conservative democracy’. Why 
did this happen? Did the AKP succeed in this demand? 
4) The idea that the AKP was “pro-Islamist” became widespread throughout 
the 2000s. Many people thought of it as a technocratic party that was only 
interested in modernizing Turkey’s economy with regards to neo-liberalism, 
rather than pursuing a religious-Islamic agenda. Did this perception take 
root?  
5) How would you evaluate the AKP’s changing rhetoric in recent years in 
terms of Turkish domestic and foreign policy issues? 
6) It has been often said that the AKP and its leader Erdoğan have a hidden 
agenda. Which laws or regulations approved by the AKP government or 
which speech by Erdoğan shows the rise of Islamism in Turkey? 
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7) Has there been a rift between secularists and Islamists in Turkey during the 
AKP’s second and last term or are most of the conflicts in Turkey related to 
the country’s democratic deficit in light of the Erdoğan’s political 
discourse?3  
 
The case studies necessarily involved small sampling frames, given their 
specific focus on particular policy development processes. Individuals were invited to 
participate due to their key roles or involvement in these processes. Researchers can 
gain evidence about political debates that preceded decision making and supplement 
official accounts with first-hand testimony. Such interviews can allow the researcher 
to collect first-hand testimony from direct participants and witnesses regarding critical 
events and processes and provide the researcher with a means to probe beyond 
official accounts and narratives and ask theoretically-guided questions about issues 
that are highly specific to the researcher’s objectives (Beach and Pedersen, 2012: 
134). The meaning of 'first-hand testimony', which Beach and Pedersen emphasize, 
also plays an important role in the field research of this project. The vast majority of 
interviewees were politicians who were involved in Islamist movements like Milli 
Görüş or who were directly or indirectly affected by the rise of Islamism in Turkish 
politics. This research collected the first-hand memories of these significant players in 
Turkish politics to explore the variables of this research.  
 
Van Evera (1997) points out that there are three basic ways to test theories 
and hypotheses in researches: experimentation, observation using a large-n analysis 
and observing using a case study analysis. Case studies have powerful advantages 
in the heuristic identification of new variables and hypotheses through the study of 
deviant or outlier cases and in the course of field work—such as archival research 
and interviews with participants, area experts, and historians. When a case study 
researcher asks a participant “were you thinking X when you did Y,” and gets the 
answer, “No, I was thinking Z,” then if the researcher had not thought of Z as a 
causally relevant variable, she may have a new variable demanding to be heard. The 
popular refrain that observations are theory-laden does not mean that they are 
                                                          
3
 These interviews have been made in Ankara between October 2015-December 2015  
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theory-determined. If we ask one question of individuals or documents but get an 
entirely different answer, we may move to develop new theories that can be tested 
through previously unexamined evidence. The variables of this research use to 
explain the political survival of the AKP also benefit from these strong advantages of 
the case study method. For example, at the point where the AKP has successfully 
survived for 16 years, reasons of AKP’s political survival are being conducted through 
Şerif Mardin’s center-periphery analysis or Cihan Tugal’s passive revolution theories. 
However, as a result of the interviews conducted during the study, it is determined 
that AKP ensures its political survival by using different variables in four different 
AKP’s terms between 2002 and 2018. New hypotheses on the AKP’s political survival 
are explored in this study in light of the case study analysis and elite interviews. 
 
Elite interviews have some other advantages in light of this research’s 
methodological puzzle. Elite interviews can help in interpreting documents, or reports, 
particular if you gain access to the authors responsible for putting together a relevant 
document or report. They can help in interpreting the personalities involved in the 
relevant decisions and help explain the outcome of events. They can provide 
information not recorded elsewhere, or not yet available (if ever) for public release. 
According to Beach and Pedersen (2012: 134-135), elite interviews provide the 
opportunity to interview the persons who actually participated in the process. The 
important question is, ‘what was the interviewee’s role’ in the process? This question 
accounts for a more direct measure of a causal mechanism, depending on how the 
theoretical test has been operationalized (Beach and Pedersen, 2012: 134). As 
discussed above, this research chooses the interviewees who actually participated in 
the Turkish politics during the AKP period between 2002 and 2017. This study tests 
the orthodox explanations and shows why these explanations are not sufficient to 
understand and explore the AKP’s political survival in Turkish politics. In addition, 
data from interviewees helps to reveal new alternative explanations and tests the 
dependent variables and intervening variables of this research. 
 
On the other hand, elite interviewing is certainly not a precise skill and there 
are a number of methodological, operational and interpretational problems involved. 
51 
 
Although unrepresentative sampling is not often an issue in elite interviewing, where 
it is so, it may be due to problems of access. Sometimes, it is simply not possible to 
obtain a representative sample, because certain individuals or categories of 
individuals (possibly those with something to lose from being interviewed), refuse a 
request for an interview. Where this is the case, the political scientist must 
acknowledge this fact.  
 
 
This problem was another important limitation when elite interviews were 
carried out. AKP politicians totally rejected the rise of authoritarianism-populism or 
Islamism under AKP rule and they refused to give an interview for this reason, while 
this research is aiming to establish a cause-effect relationship between the AKP's 
political survival and the rise of authoritarianism-populism or Islamism. In order to 
reduce the impact of this problem, interviews were made with the former AKP 
members, who took part as policymakers at certain periods from the establishment of 
the AKP until the last period of AKP. For example, while the establishment of the 
AKP is being analysed by Abdüllatif Şener, one of the founders of the AKP. AKP’s 
power struggle process between 2007 and 2011 was examined by Suat Kınıklıoğlu, 
one of the AKP’s vice presidents during this period. Moreover, interviews were 
conducted with other Islamist or conservative Kurdish politicians or liberal academics 
that supported the AKP in various time periods until 2015, the end of their support to 
the AKP government. 
 
 
The reliability of the interviewee is sometimes questionable. This often results 
from failures in his or her memory. The older the witness, and the further from events 
they are, the less reliable the information (though the more willing they may be to 
talk). This is partly a result of the stretch of time, but interviewees also have the 
problem of confusing what they can actually remember of events, with what they 
have later read on the same subject. They may also adjust their interpretation of an 
event in order to avoid being seen in a poor light or, in some cases, they may have 
an axe to grind. Thus, the interviewer must constantly be aware that the information 
the interviewee is supplying, can often be of a highly subjective nature. In the 
extreme, an interviewee may deliberately set out to mislead or falsify an issue or 
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event. Some groups prove to be far more reliable than others. Evidence suggests 
that the least satisfactory group are [ex] politicians who: ‘often encounter pathological 
difficulties in distinguishing the truth, so set have their minds become by long 
experience of partisan thought’ (Seldon, 1988: 10).  
 
The disadvantage of the elite interview was one of the limitations of this study. 
In particular, the politicians' own partisan and subjective perspectives have created 
various difficulties in exploring the study's research questions. Two student groups 
were added to the interview participants to reduce the effect of this problem. These 
students came from the department of political science or other similar fields and 
their testimonies about the AKP period are both more recent and provide much 
reliable data at the point of objectivity of this research. As a result of these critics and 
limitations, it is not possible, though, for the elite interview alone to explain 
everything. Beach and Pedersen indicate this issue when they note:  
 
As a consequence of the imperfections of human memory, interviews will never 
be a perfectly reliable measuring instrument. Reliability can, however, be 
improved through the careful use of triangulation both across different persons 
and between different kinds of sources (interviews, archival observations, and so 
forth) (Beach and Pedersen, 2012: 135). 
 
In the present research, party documents, legal regulations, archival 
documents, public speeches and other written texts are used in conjunction with 
interviews in order to uncover the operative causal mechanism and to identify the 
intervening variables. Overall, case study method requires the collection of data 
concerning key political decision-making and activity, often at the highest political 
level, and elite interviews will frequently be a critical strategy for obtaining this 
required information. While their corroborative function should not be under-played, it 
is the additive role of elite interviews that is most relevant when considering their use 
in association with case study analysis. 
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3.1.3. Intervening Variables in Causal Mechanism 
 
Elite interviews are tools used to study causal mechanisms in a single-case 
research design. As mentioned above, the causal mechanism is crucial to 
understanding the relational integrity between dependent and independent variables. 
In some research, however, the cause and effect relationship between independent 
and dependent variables is not obvious without the discovery of a hypothetical 
intervening variable (King, Koheana and Verba, 1994). An intervening variable is 
something that impacts or mediates the relationship between independent and 
dependent variables. The causal mechanism, in turn, defines a series of intervening 
variables. King, Kohena and Verba explain the role of intervening variables in causal 
mechanisms below: 
 
Hence, our definition of causality is logically prior to the identification of causal 
mechanisms. Furthermore, there always exists in the social sciences an infinity of 
causal steps between any two links in the chain of causal mechanisms. If we 
posit that an explanatory variable causes, a ‘causal mechanisms’ approach would 
require us to identify a list of causal links between the two variables. This 
definition would also require us to identify a series of causal linkages, to define 
causality for each pair of consecutive (intervening) variables in the sequence, and 
to identify the linkages between any two of these variables and the connections 
between each pair of variables. This approach quickly leads to infinite regress, 
and at no time does it alone give a precise definition of causality for any one 
cause and one effect (King, Kohena and Verba, 1994: 86). 
 
The intervening variables this study has tried to examine are frequently used 
in the social sciences, particularly political science. In the study of religion and 
politics, which is the main topic of this research, the concept of the intermediate 
variable is used in explaining cause and effect relations. This phenomenon can be 
examined through case studies, as Masdar Hilmy has done in his book Islamism and 
Democracy in Indonesia: Piety and Pragmatism. Hilmy’s work aims to explore the 
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causal mechanism between a liberal state and democratisation in the case of 
Indonesia. Hilmy claims that; 
 
It is in such a delicate interaction between the state and society that Islam has 
come to be a significant intervening variable in this long and strenuous process. It 
seems to be confident that the process of democratisation in Indonesia will take a 
different shape from that in most of the Western democratic countries, where 
there is a firm separation of church and state…. In other words, Indonesia’s 
democracy will be characterized by the integrality of religion and public life 
(Hilmy, 2010, pp.67-68). 
 
Hilmy (2010: 67) views Islam as the intervening variable to explore the 
relations between independent and dependent variables. He argues that Indonesia’s 
democratisation is inseparable from Islam’s involvement as a predominant cultural 
force. 
 
The other case comes from Lawrance Rubin’s work Islam in the Balance: 
Ideational Threats in Arab Politics. This research’s independent variable is Islamist 
regimes while its dependent variable is state policy. Rubin claims that the cause-
effect relationship between these two variables is explored by using intervening 
variables as ‘threat perception’. He points out that; 
 
These dyads as a whole exhibit both within-case and cross-case variation to test 
alternative hypotheses and explore interesting theoretical and empirical puzzles. 
The within case studies focus on the changes in threat perception (intervening 
variable) and state policy (dependent variable) before and after Islamist regime 
(independent variable) comes to power… Policies and statements as indicators 
of threat should therefore be consistent with a change in threat perception 
(Rubin, 2014: 15). 
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Rubin’s methods for demonstrating the role of intervening variables in the 
research are very similar to those used in this study. Rubin uses the elite interviewing 
method and archival observation to explore the cause-effect relationship by utilizing 
intervening variables. The sources of data are interviews with current and former 
government officials, academics, and other local analysts, as well as reports in the 
local Arabic press and media (Rubin, 2014: 15-16). 
 
Apart from these studies, other studies conceptualize intervening variables in 
the field of religion and politics in international studies. Other similar examples can be 
given in the literature on Turkish politics. For instance, Murat Somer focuses on the 
cause-effect relationship between political Islam and democratisation in Turkey and 
Tunisia in his research’s intervening variables which are the main Turkish and 
Tunisian political actors, the AKP and Ennahda respectively. Somer indicates this 
phenomenon below: 
 
What explains this discrepancy between theoretical expectations and actual 
performance and what does all this say about the way we should conceptualize 
and theorize the relationship between political Islamism and democratisation? 
This article develops the thesis that Turkish and Tunisian Islamists seem to share 
a characteristic, which appears to be a key intervening variable undermining or 
reversing the democratic potentials of political Islamic actors. At least partially in 
response to their countries’ respective histories and processes of pro-secular 
nation-state building, these actors seem to have developed a prerogative, which 
may be described as “preoccupation with conquering the state as opposed to 
democratizing it” (Somer, 2016: 2).  
 
The other key example is Çiğdem Kentmen’s research on Turkey’s EU 
accession. Kentmen’s research shows the indicators and important factors of support 
for Turkey’s EU accession which is her dependent variable. Kentmen (2008: 495-
497) identifies independent variables in her empirical analysis in three categories: 
“Attachment to Islam, Utilitarian Considerations and National Identity”. The first 
category - attachment to Islam - is important to test whether there is support for 
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Turkey’s EU membership in spite of the rise of political Islam. The cause-effect 
relationship between political Islam and support for EU membership is explained by 
some intervening variables in Kentmen’s research. Kentmen (2008: 497) claims her 
research included the respondent’s age, gender, education level and income level. 
The years in which the surveys took place are intervening variables because earlier 
studies have shown them to be related to the dependent and independent variables 
used in this study.  
 
3.1.4. The Intervening Variables of This Research 
 
In this research, the cause and effect relationship between the independent 
variables such as; the legitimisation of AKP’s conservatism, AKP’s power struggle, 
the beginning of AKP’s populism and authoritarianism, the instrumentalisation of 
Islamism and nationalism under Erdogan’s leadership and dependent variable; the 
AKP’s political survival in Turkish politics is not obvious without using the intervening 
variables to clarify the causal mechanism. As discussed above, the present study 
examines the AKP in four periods, employing in this research intervening variables to 
explain the relationship between the dependent variables and AKP’s political survival 
in Turkish politics. In the AKP’s first period, the focus is on the legitimisation of the 
AKP’s conservative identity in the context of the AKP’s political survival in Turkish 
politics. As the continuation of Milli Görüş, the AKP is not radical Islamist and has not 
functioned as a centre-right party. Nonetheless, legitimising of the AKP’s 
conservative identity under the banner of ‘conservative democracy’ constituted a 
preparatory factor in the AKP’s survival, because the AKP could not give up its 
conservative identity due to electoral pressure from conservative voters. In the 
present study, legitimisation of the AKP’s conservatism is described as a first 
independent variable. Relevant intervening variables include external/internal actors 
supporting the AKP, the military process of 28 February, and the concept of 
conservative democracy. On the one hand, these variables occurred because of the 
survival of the AKP; on the other hand, these variables protected the AKP’s 
conservative identity and structure.  
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Following the 2007 elections, the AKP faced two important threats to its 
survival: the attempted 2007 e-Military coup and the AKP’s Closure Trial. Both of 
these attempts had been instigated by Kemalist secular elites, with the power 
struggle between the AKP and Kemalist elites being the direct result. The present 
research defines this as the period of the AKP’s power struggle and it shows this 
struggle process to be an independent variable that explains the cause of the AKP’s 
political survival in Turkish politics. The AKP’s reaction to these attempts reduced the 
importance of the secular elites in Turkish politics, as well as in other institutions like 
judiciary or military bureaucracy. Perhaps the best-known examples of these 
reactions are the Ergenekon/Sledgehammer (Balyoz) investigations and the 2010 
constitutional amendment referendum. Both of these movements may be considered 
intervening variables under the ‘AKPs power struggle’ variable. These variables, 
rooted in the survival of the AKP, are among the indicators of the AKP’s power 
struggle which is the second independent variable of the present research. 
 
The beginning of authoritarianism and populism has been experienced since 
the third period of the AKP (2011-2014). One of the most important factors 
contributing to the survival of leaders or parties has been to keep the nominal 
selectorate (voters) as large as possible. During its second and third periods, the 
AKP broke that broad voting coalition on the basis of its founding philosophy and 
eliminated its partners one by one. The distinguishing feature of these coalition 
partners is that they defined themselves as specifically secular. As the tension with 
the secularists grew from 2007, the AKP had to assume a more conservative identity 
in order to keep the nominal selectorate wide. This forced the AKP to produce a 
polarizing strategy over the Kemalists and secularists, and this strategy was realised 
via populist and authoritarian policies such as anti-intellectualism or anti-Kemalism. 
This strategy is identified as a dependent variable of the AKP’s political survival in 
Turkish politics, especially after 2011. The populist policy mechanisms like anti-
intellectualism, anti-Kemalism or lower class mythology can be identified as 
intervening variables between AKP’s populism and AKP’s political survival. 
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As discussed in Chapter 4, the AKP’s claims to Black Turk identity were 
initially used as part of ‘soft’ populist discourse to articulate demands of conservative 
Muslims for democratic inclusion in the mainstream of Turkish society, economy and 
politics. As these demands lost their urgency and relevance, and as the AKP started 
to falter in maintaining its political and ideological hegemony, references to White and 
Black Turks became part of a hardening nativist, populist discourse. The reconfigured 
discourse on White and Black Turks is now used in the making and legitimising of a 
majoritarian and authoritarian populism, claiming to represent the ‘native and the 
national’ (yerli ve milli) against those seen as the inauthentic, foreign elements in the 
body politic.  
 
 
This ‘native and national’ policy approach helps the AKP to instrumentalise 
Islamism and nationalism under Erdogan’s leadership in the post-2014 period for 
keeping the large nominal selectorate in the elections. This instrumentalisation is also 
addressed in this study as the last independent variable for explaining the survival of 
the AKP. There will be intervening variables such as; the conflict with the Kurdish 
forces, the 2015 elections, the fight against the Fethullah Gülen movement and 15th 
July coup attempt to be used for examining the causal mechanism between the 
instrumentalisation of Islamism and nationalism under Erdogan’s leadership and 
AKP’s political survival in the post-2014 period.  
 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The research methodology and literature review of this research are examined 
in Chapter 1. First, the literature of political survival in world and Turkish politics has 
been explored.  
 
In the next section, case study analysis and elite interview methods were 
examined in depth, explaining how these methods are combined in this study. Case 
study analysis requires the collection of data concerning key political decision-making 
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and activity, often at the highest political level, and elite interviews will frequently be a 
critical strategy for obtaining the required evidence for this research. Interviews with a 
large number of politicians and academics and documentary sources explain the 
AKP in four separate periods within four independent variables for understanding the 
AKP’s political survival in Turkish politics between 2002 and 2018. 
 
Finally, this chapter focuses on De Mesquita’s selectorate theory, which was 
fore grounded as a conceptual bridge for establishing a causal mechanism between 
these variables. Following in this chapter, Chapter 2 will examine in detail the 
legitimisation of AKP's conservatism, the first independent variable that describes the 
cause of AKP’s political survival between 2002 and 2007. 
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Chapter 2: First term of AKP (2002-2007): The Legitimisation of the AKP’s 
Conservatism in Turkish Politics 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
Chapter 1 discusses theoretically how the logic of political survival was studied 
in the literature. Later on, the logic of political survival was examined in a way that 
was applied methodically to Turkish politics and AKP case. In this direction, AKP 
period was divided into 4 different periods and 4 independent variables were 
expressed in these 4 periods by establishing a causal mechanism with the political 
survival of AKP which is the dependent variable of this study. In Chapter 2, the first 
dependent variable, 'the legitimisation of AKP's conservatism', will explore the causal 
mechanism of AKP's political survival between 2002 and 2007. The first important 
point here is that the Milli Görüş (National Vision) movement, which constitutes the 
founding members of the AKP, has failed to protect its political survival and that the 
AKP, which has been lecturing on these failures, has tried to legitimise itself in order 
to preserve political survival in Turkish politics. 
 
 
As a result of the democratic multi-party system, most of Turkey’s political 
parties had Islamic themes and views in their party programmes. However, only one 
of them, the Nation Party (Millet Partisi) had a single seat in the Grand National 
Assembly after the 1950 Election (Zürcher, 2003: 244). The Nation Party was both a 
conservative and nationalistic political party and it claimed to bring Turkey to true 
secularism and prevent a slide to atheism and Communism (Buğra, 2002).  
 
As mentioned before, the tension between secularists and Islamists had been 
increased due to the authoritarian secularism under Mustafa Kemal’s rule and the 
state’s control of religion. When the DP was established in 1946, the founders of the 
DP had supported the reformation of Islam and secularism in their party programmes 
up until the 1950 election (Ahmad, 1988: 756). The DP criticised the RPP’s 
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authoritarian approach to Islam while its liberal attitudes to Islam encouraged Islamic 
voters (Toprak, 2005). Nevertheless, the end of militant secularism did not mean the 
triumph of the Islamists. The party which had total confidence of the Islamist press, 
the Nation (Millet) Party, was an electoral flop and was no threat to the Democrat 
Party. Nevertheless, throughout the 1950s, this liberal attitude towards Islam 
encouraged an Islamic reassertion which was essentially cultural in nature (Ahmad, 
1991: 10). Overall, the DP’s victory did not depend on only Islamic voters’ pressure 
and the RPP’s anti-democrat and illiberal approach played a prominent role in the 
DP’s victory in the 1950 election (Zürcher, 2003: 227).  
 
After this election the DP began to reform the role of Islam in Turkish public 
life. The Democrat Party government set up special secondary schools for the 
training of imams and preachers in 1951. They proposed ending prohibition (began 
during the RPP’s tenure) on the call to prayer (the Ezan in Arabic) (Ahmad, 1993). 
The DP began describing the Republicans as communists and ‘unbelievers’ and 
boasted about the number of mosques and religious schools opened under the 
Democrats. Zürcher demonstrates the rise of Islam in Turkish public life below: 
 
The relaxation of secularist policies under the DP made Islam much more 
prominent in everyday life in the cities, where the culture of the countryside was 
anyway becoming more visible through the massive urbanisation. Turkish 
intellectuals at the time – and later – saw this as a resurgence of Islam, but 
although there were fundamentalist groups at work, it was really only the existing 
traditional culture of the mass of the population, the former subject class, 
reasserting its right to express itself (Zürcher, 2003: 245). 
 
As mentioned, Sufi orders were banned by Mustafa Kemal’s regime until the 
1950s. The DP’s material interest for electoral pressure helped to revive new Sufi 
orders such as ‘Nurcular’4 and ‘Süleymancılar’5. They cooperated with the DP due to 
                                                          
4
 The Nur Movement (Turkish: Nurculuk) is a religious movement in Turkey based on the writings 
of Said Nursi (d. 1960), which promoted the concept of the Quran as a "living document" which 
needed to be continually re-interpreted. 
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its support of pro-Islamic policies. Nevertheless, the DP tried to find a balance 
between secularists and Islamists up until the 1957 election. For instance, as one of 
the extremist Islamic groups, Ticani’s6 leader Kemal Pilavoğlu was given a jail 
sentence due to his anti-Atatürk speeches during this period (Ahmad, 1991: 11).By 
the 1957 election, the DP had begun to erode its position. Zührer (2003: 245) points 
out that the DP needed shayks, landlords or their allies in Anatolia because they 
were ‘vote banks’ for elections. The DP demanded their support due to the decline in 
its power after 1954. Ahmad (1993) explains that the DP’s leader and Prime Minister, 
Adnan Menderes, tried to woo Nurcus’ leader, Said-i Nursi7, whose influence was 
thought to be considerable. He argues that although Menderes reduced his majority 
in the 1957 election, the role of Sufi orders and Islam may have played a part in the 
DP’s victory.  
 
Overall, the conflict between secularists and Islamists receded during the DP’s 
rule and the DP tried to cooperate with Islamists and Sufi orders due to electoral 
pressure. Although this support was based on the DP’s interests, it is clear that the 
role of Islam increased in everyday life, especially in the Anatolia. This situation 
would become one of the important indicators to explain the creation of the Milli 
Görüş’s movement in Turkish politics after the 1970s. 
 
 
2. Milli Görüş (National Vision) Movement 
 
The political cadres that formed the AKP in 2001 had impeccable Islamist 
credentials. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his colleagues learned their trade under 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
5
 After the banning of religious education in 1925 a group under the leadership of Süleyman Hilmi 
Tunahan vowed to continue teaching the Quran to individuals and small groups. Tunahan received his 
own religious education in the Naqshbandi-Khalidi order. This movement came to be known as the 
Süleymancı, which aimed primarily at providing Quranic education and keeping the mosques open. 
6
 Ticani is a religious sect which was active in the 1930’s and 1940’s, spoke for the reinstatement of 
the call-to-prayer in Arabic and even going so far as to smash statues of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. 
7
 Said-i Nursi is a Turkish Islamic leader and thinker from Turkey's Kurdish region. Founder of the 
Nurculuk movement. His outlook was shaped by the Naqshbandi tariqah and westernization in the 
Ottoman administration. 
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Turkish Islamism’s modern founder, Necmettin Erbakan8, the political and theological 
driving force behind the Milli Görüş (National Outlook) movement. Rooted in the 
humble beginnings of the “Turkish Union”, a small conservative association formed in 
1967 by migrants in Berlin, over a short period of time Milli Görüş became one of the 
leading Turkish diaspora organisations in Europe and one of the largest Islamic 
organisations in the Western world by the end of the 1960s (Vielhaber, 2012: 47-48). 
Necmettin Erbakan, who is considered the ideologue of Milli Görüş has frequently 
visited the European branches of this movement and the organisation supported 
Erbakan to expand this movement towards Turkish politics (Çarkoğlu and Rubin, 
2006, p.63-64). Erbakan’s manifesto, “Adil Düzen” (Just Order) was published in 
1969 (Vielhaber, 2012: 48). With the organisation’s extensive financial support, 
Erbakan founded the National Order Party (MNP-Milli Nizam Partisi) in 1970, which 
was the first in a series of political parties that would carry the Milli Görüş flame.  
 
Erbakan’s party, the National Salvation Party, was active in the 1970s but was 
suppressed by the military regime in 1980. After 1980, the same social groups from 
Milli Görüş established the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi- RP) in 1983. After the 1987 
referendum, which allowed ex-politicians to enter into politics after their banning 
during 1980 military coup, Necmettin Erbakan and some of the pre-1980 Islamic 
figures took over the leadership of the Welfare Party (Zürcher, 2003: 299). However, 
the Welfare Party would not become important political actors until the mid-1990s 
due to the influence of Özal’s leadership. Turgut Özal was the first elected Prime 
Minister after the military government controlled most of the religious groups like Sufi 
orders and conservative people in Anatolian cities and villages supporting Özal’s 
party, the Motherland Party (ANAP), in elections during this period (Atasoy, 
2009:128). Öniş (1997: 756) indicates this phenomenon and argues that it was 
Özal’s personality and his unusual combination of a liberal Western orientation with a 
strong attachment to Islam. A connection confirmed by his link to the National 
Salvation Party in 1970 that held the liberal ’and` conservative’ factions of the ANAP 
                                                          
8
 Necmettin Erbakan, the former Turkish prime minister who died on 27 February 2011 aged 84, was 
his country's most prominent Islamic politician, and an intellectual father to many key figures in the 
dominant party of the last decade, the incumbent AKP. 
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together under one umbrella (Öniş, 1997: 757). After Özal became president, the 
ANAP changed his position and moved from a conservative to a more liberal outlook 
with Mesut Yılmaz’s leadership (Coşar and Özman, 2004: 57-74). The RP began to 
rise in Turkish politics because ANAP lost its influence on conservative voters after 
Özal’s death. 
 
Nevertheless, some other scholars explain the rise of the Welfare Party after 
1990 differently. For instance, Gülalp (2001: 442-443) argues that the major reason 
for this phenomenon was the global crisis of modernism. While the Islamists 
mentioned in this chapter were left out of the centre of the state, the crisis that the 
modernisation had entered in the 1990s provided a new field of struggle for Islamic 
elements on this periphery. He explains this phenomenon below: 
 
…in Turkey the crisis of modernisation led to Islamism. Islamist themes, such as 
anti-Westernism, championing the periphery against the centre, and emphasizing 
the particularism of Islamic culture, began to find resonance among the post-
modernist sensibilities of a new generation of students and other intellectuals 
whose counterparts in the West favored environmentalism and multi-culturalism 
as political project (Gülalp, 2001: 443). 
 
As a result of Islamist movements against Kemalist ideology, the Welfare 
Party increased its power, especially in rural areas of Anatolia. How has this been 
achieved and what role did the conflict between the Islamists and the Kemalists play 
in supporting it? While giving the answer to this question, it is necessary to 
concentrate on the issue of migration, which became an important phenomenon in 
Turkey in the 1990s. The immigration wave of those from Anatolia to the big cities in 
the 1990s was one of the important factors explaining this success (Narlı, 1999: 42). 
The underdeveloped areas, which are the subject of immigration from the Anatolia to 
the big cities, became the primary electoral base of the RP in the elections. 
Bayramoğlu notes that:  
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In RP, there is conjunctural solidarity with dozens of different identities. Moderate 
Muslim identity, Islamic identity, Kurdish identity, Central Anatolia, the poor parts 
of the gecekondu, Devout minority merchants and industrialists of Anatolian 
origin excluded by the overpowering, the lower middle classes in the central 
districts ... These are all different identities in the RP (Bayramoğlu, 2001: 27). 
 
 The RP, which entered parliament in the 1991 elections, has also been 
differentiated from the principles of the Milli Görüş movement. Erbakan defined this 
period as ‘those who are members of the Welfare Party and those who are waiting to 
become a member of the Welfare Party’, rather than Milli Görüş's anti-Western and 
anti-American perspective. The findings of Olivier Roy in this regard is even more 
striking: ‘Western type political party which is trying to adopt the maximum number of 
elements in the elections and multi-party system framework: the Welfare Party in 
Turkey’ (Roy, 2005: 72).  
 
Moreover, the Welfare Party’s view on secularism is different to its successor, 
the MSP. Before the elections, Erbakan focused on the critics of authoritarian 
secularism under Mustafa Kemal’s rule rather than the rejection of secularism (Ercan, 
2012: 364-365). Öniş (1997: 743-766) argues that, according to Erbakan, the militant 
or authoritarian secularism associated with the Republic has limited the rights of 
individuals in a country with a predominantly Muslim population to practise their 
religion freely. The Welfare Party’s 1995 Election Guide (Refah Partisi, 1995:19) 
outlines that ‘Imitators (i.e. Kemalists) took advantage of the fact that the ‘secular’ 
word was a foreign word, and secularism was implemented in the form of the enemy 
of religion. But nowhere in the world is secularism an enemy of religion. On the 
contrary, it means that all beliefs are guaranteed’. According to this declaration, the 
most important right after the right to life is the freedom of religion. Obviously, the 
Welfare Party aims to establish a truly `secular’ regime in which any restrictions 
concerning the free practice of Islam will no longer be tolerated. It was to establish an 
alternative model to Western civilisation. One of the other important factors in the rise 
of the Welfare Party was that it suggested Ottomanism as an alternative model. 
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During the political history of the Welfare Party, Erbakan and his colleagues 
focused on an anti-Western perspective with the criticism of authoritarian secularism 
under Mustafa Kemal’s regime. The other important difference from other Milli 
Görüş’s parties is the emphasizing of Ottoman heritage in Turkish politics in the 
Welfare Party. Tanıl Bora, a prominent analyst of Turkish politics, interpreted this as 
‘the continuation of Özalian neo-Ottomanism’ (Bora, 1996: 23). Another scholar of 
Turkish politics, Ahmet İnsel, argues that Refah (Welfare Party) narrows the inclusive 
parameters of Islamic identity by punctuating it in terms of Turkish-Ottoman historical 
particularities (Insel, 1996: 31). Neo-Ottomanism, thus, has a powerful ethnic Turkish 
meaning by positioning Turkey at the centre of a new imperial project to ‘lead’ the 
Muslim world. This ethno-religious (Turkish-Islamic) neo-Ottomanism is distinct from 
the ‘Ottomanism’ that was officially promoted by the Ottoman state (Dağı, 1993: 71-
77). 
 
Indeed, The RP wanted to recover the glorious position of Muslims and 
Turkish-Muslims (e.g. the Ottomans) in history. This could only be achieved by an 
ummah in the Turkish state, which must ‘straighten’ itself up by attaining its lost 
virtues. Winning the reputation of the Refah Party’s Turkey in the Muslim world would 
also open up an alternative model that could be developed against the West. For this 
reason, the concept of Ottomanism was emphasizing the nation system of the 
Ottoman Empire. It was stated that it would stay away from a radical Islamist model. 
This Ottomanist movement evolved into neo-Ottomanism especially under the 
influence of Ahmet Davutoglu in the AKP government. However, this research argues 
that the tolerance of non-Muslim societies during the early Ottoman period would not 
be possible given the RP’s agenda. Although the RP’s foreign policy focused on 
some Balkan countries and former Ottoman lands, which is mentioned in the 
Davutoğlu’s article (Davutoğlu, 1997: 35-36), this was not equal to the Gaza theory of 
the early Ottoman period because Erbakan aimed to only defend Muslims and also to 
expand Islam in these areas in a non-peaceful or intolerant way. Atasoy (2009: 125-
130) indicates that Erbakan’s perspective had classic orthodox Islamic values in 
contrast with the early Ottoman period and was more like Abdulhamid II’s Pan-
Islamism. As discussed before, Abdulhamid’s Islamism rallied support from the 
Muslim lands to ensure the survival of the Ottoman Empire and its own power. Like 
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Abdulhamid II, the Welfare Party wanted to establish itself in Turkish political life with 
an alternative model to the West, and Ottomanism was also conducive to this 
objective. A similar political survival strategy will be seen once more in the third term 
of the AKP and will be examined in detail in Chapter 4. 
 
The other explanation for the rise of the Welfare Party in Turkish politics 
comes from an economic perspective. The Islamist movement criticizes the current 
economic system in the founding document of Adil Düzen (Just Order) and offers 
suggestions for solutions in this direction. The Milli Görüş had two objectives in its 
economic perspective. The first was to attract people in Anatolia who were outside of 
the centre of the state and economically impoverished with economic promises. 
According to the Adil Düzen and Welfare Party election declarations (Refah Partisi, 
1995: 14-15), ‘There will be no interest in the new vision of Milli Görüş, the unfair tax 
will be removed, the value of money will be accepted as the right measure, money 
will not be reduced and credits will be useful in fair measures’. With the emphasis on 
the principles of equality and justice, Milli Görüş aimed to get the support of the 
masses excluded by the Kemalist regime in Anatolia. 
 
The second main objective was to support the medium-sized conservative 
economic actors who were at the periphery of the state and were being weakened by 
pro-Western free-market actors. Hakan Yavuz (1997: 63-82) indicates that Turkey’s 
open-door trade policies along with Özal’s neo-liberal policies helped to establish the 
Welfare Party, because the conservative bourgeoisie had been created with the 
establishment of the Association of Independent Businessman (Müstakil Sanayici ve 
İşadamları Derneği- MÜSİAD) and other similar economic institutions. Moreover, Sufi 
orders such as Nakşibendis played a prominent role in developing their business 
connections and facilitated their penetration into the economy (Akdogcm, 2007: 207-
230). Indeed, Islamist groups such as Nakşibendis strengthened year by year during 
the 1990s both politically and economically.  
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This section of this chapter focuses on the rise of the Welfare Party in Turkish 
politics in relation to the concept of political survival in Turkish politics. Their popular 
vote increased over the years until they became the largest party under Prime 
Minister Necmettin Erbakan in the 1996 election. Erbakan established a coalition 
government with the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi- DYP) after the election. 
Turkey was faced with a strong Islamist party in government. However, this situation 
did not continue for long. Erbakan’s Welfare Party used his religious perspective on 
domestic and foreign policy rather than attempting to create ‘true secularism’ in 
Turkey (Somer, 2007: 1284). The Welfare Party became a serious threat to liberal, 
left and centre-right supporters due to its pro-Islamic agendas in Turkish politics 
(Zürcher, 2003: 306-307). Moreover, Erbakan and his party took on military powers 
during this period. The coalition government of Erbakan was forced out of power by 
the Turkish military on 28 February 1997. In 1998, the Welfare Party 
was banned from politics by the Constitutional Court of Turkey for violating 
the separation of religion and state as mandated by the constitution. After the 
banning of the RP, the Milli Görüş movement founded the Virtue Party in December 
1998. Although their agenda came from the RP, they did not become successful like 
the RP until 2001. The Virtue Party was found to be unconstitutional by 
the Constitutional Court and then banned in June 2001 for violating the secularist 
articles of the Constitution. After that, the Milli Görüs movement split into two parts: 
the reformist AKP and the traditionalist Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi- SP) (Atacan, 
2005: 188-189). 
 
While entering Turkish politics with an anti-Western policy understanding in its 
first foundation period, Milli Görüş has shown serious changes since the 1990s, but 
despite these changes, Milli Görüş’s political parties’ survival has not been able to 
last long. This is why the Milli Görüş has not been able to survive and the AKP has 
taken lessons from this experience. 
 
As with many other Islamists from the nineteenth century, the Milli Görüş’s 
manifesto called for a radical rejection of secular ‘Western’ values and opposition to 
all kinds of ‘infidel’ economic and political ideas. The agenda of the manifesto was 
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the overthrow of the Kemalist secular system in Turkey and its replacement with what 
Erbakan described as an Adil Düzen based on Islam. According to Şebnem 
Gümüşçü (2010: 857), the Milli Görüs movement under the leadership of Necmettin 
Erbakan has implicitly envisioned an Islamic state, and it explicitly aimed for 
Islamization of Turkish society. Mardin (2006: 238) argues that Erbakan held a 
romanticized view of Islam’s early days during the first generations after the death of 
the Prophet Muhammad and he called for a return to their model by purifying society 
of its un-Islamic influences. He blamed the moral and political decline of Turkey on 
corrupting Western influences through which the Kemalist regimes weakened Islam 
in Turkey. As Güneş Murat Tezcur (2010: 81) points out, for Erbakan, ‘Islam was a 
holistic ideology that was in an inevitable struggle with the West.’ Vielhaber (2012: 
49) argues that, “Erbakan’s political rhetoric was typical of other mainstream Islamists 
of his generation. He frequently used Manichean language, describing a fundamental 
struggle between ‘us versus them,’ ‘good versus evil,’ and ‘us against the West and 
the Jews.’” Bahri Zengin, who is an important member of all political parties which 
were founded by Milli Görüş’ ideology, explains this struggle further: 
 
…The West has not been able to create a world or a political system free of 
domination. Here is the main difference between East/ Islam and others. 
According to Islam, sovereignty belongs to God, but this does not mean that 
somebody can dominate nature or a group of people in the name of God. It 
simply means the emergence of a new model where nobody can dominate the 
other. That is why the political philosophy is different. Everybody is equal before 
the law. Western philosophy is based on domination and hence on power. As a 
result, it is colonialist and imperialist. That is why the West uses different ways of 
discrimination against others in the name of civilisation, evolution, etc. In this 
framework Milli Görüş is the name of a movement which tries to establish a new 
civilisation in the world (Atacan, 2005: 190). 
 
Zengin’s view shows that one of the most prominent features of Milli Görüş’s 
political agenda during the foundation period is the dream of establishing a new 
Islamist civilisation with an anti-Western mentality. During his short tenure as the 
Prime Minister of Turkey, Erbakan founded the ‘Developing Eight,’ (D-8) which was 
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intended as an Islamic equivalent to the Western-dominated ‘Group of Seven’ (Aral, 
2006: 89-107). The Milli Görüş’s perspective is also crucial in terms of the main 
arguments of this research. This study, which does not claim the AKP as the 
continuation of Milli Görüş, also argues that the AKP has learnt from the Milli Görüş 
period. One of these lessons is to reject the Anti-Western policy of Milli Görüş. Milli 
Görüş could not stay in power in Turkish politics because he could not get support 
from any power in the centre of the centre-periphery dichotomy and any Western 
actor. The AKP is aware of this danger and has integrated conservatism with 
concepts such as human rights, democracy and freedom of religion and has reached 
a legitimate position in Turkish politics. 
 
Another lesson that the AKP has learned from the National Vision movement 
is to keep electoral support as high as possible while ensuring political survival. 
Especially after the February 28th, the Welfare Party's failure to raise the voter 
turnout rates was one of the most important factors in its loss of political survival. In 
the first part of Chapter 1, the lessons learned from these failings of Milli Görüş will 
be explored. At the same time, there are also intervening variables that clarify the 
cause-and-effect mechanism between the AKP’s legitimisation process and its 
political survival.  
 
In this chapter, these intervening variables, such as the 28 February 1997 
military coup or EU-US support for the AKP, will be examined in detail. This chapter 
will examine how these variables were effective in legitimising the AKP's 
conservative identity and how this situation has become a pre-condition for the AKP’s 
political survival. Before explaining these variables in detail, it is necessary to 
examine how the AKP was established and the divisions in the Milli Görüş movement 
at the end of 1990s. 
 
3. The Origins of the AKP 
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3.1. The Closure of the Welfare Party 
 
Before explaining the AKP’s original principles in 2002, this chapter will 
examine how the AKP was created and what the differences between the AKP and 
the Milli Görüş movement were after the closure of the Welfare Party. As mentioned 
in Chapter 2, the Welfare Party (RP - Refah Party) had increased its power by 1996 
when it became a coalition member of the government in Turkey. However, there 
were serious tensions between the military and economic bureaucracy and the RP 
government after 1996 and Erbakan’s government had not been successful in 
decreasing this tension (Özbudun, 2006: 545). The major economic institutions such 
as TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialists and Businessman’s Association), TESK 
(Confederation of Tradesmen and Handcrafts), and TÜRK-İŞ (Confederation of 
Turkish Trade Unions) criticised the RP’s economic plans and saw the RP as a 
serious threat to a secular republic. They were in favour of a military bureaucracy 
against the RP-True Path Party (DYP - Doğru Yol Partisi) coalition government 
(Atacan, 2005: 193).  
 
 
As a result of these developments, the National Security Council made some 
decisions on 28 February 1997 that gave advice to the government in order to 
prevent anti-secular activities occuring around the country. Islamic fundamentalism - 
such as Kurdish separatism - had become a serious threat to the Turkish Republic 
according to the council’s declaration (Çınar, 2006: 472). Military commanders 
strongly criticised Erbakan’s government due to his support for anti-secular activities 
and other social and economic groups in society supported the military bureaucracy 
against Erbakan’s government (Tombuş, 2013: 317). This decision, which was called 
a ‘soft coup’, led to the resignation of Erbakan’s government. Moreover, the RP was 
closed down by the Constitutional Court in 1998 for having violated the secularist 
principles of the Turkish constitution. In fact, the 28 February coup laid the 
foundations for the establishment of a new party, which became the AKP.  
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3.2. The Virtue Party 
 
After the closure of the Welfare Party and Erbakan’s and other party members’ 
political ban of five years, the RP was replaced by the Virtue Party which was 
founded by former RP members. Although most people claimed that the Virtue Party 
(FP - Fazilet Partisi) was the continuation of the RP, the FP attempted to present a 
less confrontational and more reform-oriented stance than its predecessor (Dağı, 
2006: 91). It is clear that the FP preferred far more market-friendly economic policies 
and was supportive of developing close relations with the European Union. The FP’s 
agenda shifted to the extension of religious freedoms within the boundaries of the 
existing secular order, in contrast to the RP’s agenda (Atacan, 2005: 194). Moreover, 
some former Motherland Party members were invited into the FP because it wanted 
to prevent claims that it was a continuation of the RP (Yeşilada, 2006: 68). 
 
 
Despite these developments, the FP was not successful in its attempts to raise 
its power and popularity in Turkey. The FP had become the third party and lost its 
votes in the 1999 general election. While the Welfare Party signalled the biggest 
success of Milli Görüş's history in the 1995 elections and received about 21% of the 
votes, the Virtue Party, which was a continuation of the Welfare Party, lost 25% of its 
votes in the 1999 elections and received only 15% of the vote (Cem, Kirmanoğlu and 
Şenatalar, 2005: 551). Indeed, critics of the RP’s anti-secular policies did not 
disappear during the FP period (Gülalp, 2001: 434). Moreover, although Erbakan 
was banned from Turkish politics for five years, most people believed that Erbakan 
controlled the FP. A group of individuals from the younger generation - called 
Yenilikçiler (reformists) - were uncomfortable with Erbakan’s intervention in party 
politics (Atacan, 2005: 193). Yenilikçiler heavily criticised FP leader Recai Kutan 
because they believed that he was controlled by Erbakan (Larabee and Rabasa, 
2008: 45-46). On the one hand, Yenilikçiler thought that the party leadership and its 
anti-democratic policies lost votes in the 1999 election. It claimed that this party had 
become the new RP under the secret leadership of Erbakan. On the other hand, 
Gelenekçiler (traditionalist), which had close links with Erbakan, identified this group 
as ‘dividers’ of the Milli Görüş movement (Selim, 2002: 50). 
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Yenilikçiler requested some changes to the party structure as well as its 
ideology and demonstrated against a candidate for the leadership, Abdullah Gül, at 
the Virtue Party Congress in 2000 (Larabee and Rabasa 2008: 45). The most 
important point of this conflict was the position of former Motherland Party members 
and centre-right members of the FP who were the promoters of the Turkish-Islamic 
synthesis of Turgut Özal’s government. Some of them, such as Abdulkadir Aksu, 
Cemil Çiçek and Ali Coşkun strongly supported the group. Despite this support for 
Yenilikçiler, Recai Kutan, who was supported by Erbakan, won this congress and 
regained the leadership of the FP (Özbudun, 2006: 546). At the time, Kutan and 
other traditionalists emphasized the stability of Virtue Party. Relations between the 
two camps soon worsened. Following a meeting between Abdullah Gül and Deniz 
Baykal, leader of the Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP - Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), 
traditionalists in the FP decided to send Gül and the other reformist followers, such 
as Bülent Arınç and Abdüllatif Şener to the disciplinary committee of the party 
(Yeşilada, 200: 69).  
 
 
3.3. The Division within the Milli Görüş movement 
 
 
After the congress of 2000, the Milli Görüş movement had other problems with 
its future. The FP would be closed by the Constitutional Court in 2001 for similar 
reasons to the RP’s closure; its threat to the Turkish Constitution due to its anti-
secular activities. This situation caused a new problem within the party. The 
Yenilikçiler opposition group members became free to establish a political party 
which defended their own values (Boyraz, 2011: 152). It is clear that this conflict 
divided the supporters of the Milli Görüş movement. Yeşilada shows this 
phenomenon using surveys:  
 
… In this survey, the interviewees were also asked to identify themselves as 
being close to the Reformists or the Traditionalists or both. They were then asked 
to indicate their preference for the successor party to the FP—should it follow the 
National View or be a more moderate political party? As expected, those who felt 
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close to the Traditionalists preferred the National View by 78 to 18.3%. The pro-
Reformists chose the more moderate approach by 85.2 to 11.8%. Those in the 
middle split their choice: National View (44.8%) and moderate (44.6%) (Yeşilada, 
2002: 77). 
 
 
As seen in this survey, the Virtue Party must be divided into reformists and 
traditionalists. This division in the Milli Görüş movement was researched and 
analysed by Islamist author Yavuz Selim. Yavuz Selim’s book Yol Ayrımı contains 
interviews with 26 politicians who were members of the FP. Some of them come from 
Yenilikçiler, but some of them supported Erbakan and his colleagues. This book is 
one of the sources that helps explain the conflict between Yenilikçiler and 
Gelenekçiler in the Milli Görüş movement. Yenilikçiler argue that Erbakan’s 
authoritarianism and Milli Görüş’s anti-Western ideology should be changed. For 
instance, Bülent Arınç, one of the most important members of the RP and the founder 
member of the AKP, argues: 
 
This system is totally wrong. It is not humanitarian and it is not Islamic. I had 
supported opponent groups for this reason. I saw this phenomenon for 30 years. 
‘This movement, this action etc.’; all of them are silly ideas. They are caused by 
4-5 people who take a stand against other people. They blunted us. They created 
many difficulties for us. Erbakan likes money and he likes comfortable politicians. 
He does not care about oppressed people (Selim, 2001: 47). 
 
 
The first issue of the Yenilikçiler in Milli Görüş is that the movement is entirely 
under Erbakan's control. The absence of the notion of intra-party democracy coupled 
with the Welfare Party’s anti-Western agenda was seen as a major problem for the 
Yenilikçiler group to protect the political survival of the Milli Görüş movement. Another 
important Yenilikçiler figure in the Milli Görüş movement is Abdullah Gül, who 
became a candidate against Recai Kutan of the Virtue Party Congress in 2000. Gül 
believes that this movement should change its direction from an anti-Western 
ideology to moderate policies towards the Western world. Gül gave his views in an 
interview with Yavuz Selim: 
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… Erbakan’s wording and his speeches were far removed from reality. We 
opposed him sometimes but he continued using his wording. I believe that these 
speeches had a negative impact on the Western world. Western countries did not 
support the Milli Görüş movement due to these speeches. If our movement had 
presented democratic, transparent, moderate policies during this period, the RP-
DYP coalition government would not have had difficulties or problems (Selim, 
2001: 73-74). 
 
 
According to Selim’s interpretation of the AKP party’s founding staff; the 
division in the Milli Görüş movement was inevitable due to the conflict between 
Gelenkçiler and Yenilikçiler. After the suppression of the FP, the four most important 
members of the Yenilikçiler group – Bülent Arınç, Abdullah Gül, Abdüllatif Şener and 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan – established a new political party by the name of the Justice 
and Development Party (Bogdani, 2011). However, Gelenekçiler, who supported 
Necmettin Erbakan, founded the Felicity Party. The Felicity Party (SP - Saadet 
Partisi) claimed that it was the only representative of the Milli Görüş movement. 
Yeşilada (2013: 69) points out that the SP’s emblem is a white crescent with five 
stars on a red background - the five stars represent (1) love, peace of mind, and 
peace, (2) human rights, freedom, and democracy, (3) justice, (4) welfare (refah), and 
(5) self-respect and honor. The number ‘five’ also represents the number of political 
parties that the National View has established over the years - the MNP, MSP, RP, 
FP, and SP (Yeşilada, 2002: 68-69). 
 
 
It is clear that the Felicity Party did not accept the AKP as the representative of 
the Milli Görüş movement. Bahri Zengin, one of the important founders and members 
of the Milli Görüş movement and an SP member, explains the difference between SP 
and the AKP in his interview with Fulya Atacan: 
 
They wanted to follow real politics, which meant that we must act according to 
political restrictions in Turkey. They said that the military, the media and the big 
industrialists determined the political structure of Turkey and we had to try to get 
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their support. They were right. These powers determine politics but our mission is 
not to follow them but to establish a new civilisation (Atacan, 2005: 194). 
 
 
After the closure of the Virtue Party, the members of Yenilikçiler took action in 
order to establish a new political party. One issue that this new political party needed 
to address was who would be the leader of the party. Some surveys have given clues 
about the debates on the party leadership. For instance, A&G Research conducted 
its survey of the Milliyet newspaper about the leadership of a new political party. 
According to this survey, out of 822 individuals who voted for the FP in the last 
national elections in the provinces of Ankara, Adana, Istanbul, İzmir, Konya, Manisa, 
Malatya, and Samsun, 68.8% preferred Erdoğan to lead the new political party. Gül 
was the second choice followed by Bülent Arınç.9 According to ANAR’s survey, 
support for Erdoğan was 40.8% among all respondents and 63.8% among former FP 
supporters. Once again, Gül was the preferred second choice as leader of the 
party.10 Although Gül became a candidate for the Virtue Party Congress, Erdoğan 
was selected as party leader due to his support and his popularity from his time as 
Istanbul’s mayor in 1994 (Heper and Toktaş, 2003: 157-185). Overall, the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) was established in August 2001 under the leadership of 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The first important test for the Justice and Development 
Party was the 2002 general election. During this period, the AKP established two 
important documents that would define the AKP’s political program, the AKP’s first 
party programme and the Election Guide for 2002 Election. These documents are 
analysed here to explain how the AKP changed from a conservative democratic to an 
Islamist direction.  
 
 
According to these documents, this study argues that the AKP learned two 
lessons from the Milli Görüş movement. First, the importance of secularism and 
fundamental rights in the Turkish state, and second, the rejection of the Welfare 
Party’s anti-Western ideology in Turkish domestic and foreign policy (Tepe, 2005: 
                                                          
9
 Milliyet, July 27, 2001 
10
 ANAR, Haziran-2001 Türkiye Gündemi Araştırması (June-2001 Turkey’s Agenda Research) 
(Ankara: Anararaştırma, 2001): 14–15. 
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71). As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Welfare Party’s Election Declaration of 1995 
indicated that the secularism was implemented in the form of being the enemy of 
religion (Refah Partisi, 1995: 19). The Welfare Party completely excluded secularism 
and emphasized the importance of religious freedoms only. The AKP's first important 
difference with the Milli Görüş tradition was internalizing secularism and interpreting 
religious freedoms in the context of human rights and democracy. Many clues or 
views about these differences can be seen in the AKP’s party programme. For 
instance, the AKP’s main aim depends on the democratisation process in Turkey and 
the programme states that the ‘AKP considers as one of its most important tasks, the 
assurance of democratisation by placing the individual at the centre of all its policies, 
and to provide and protect fundamental human rights and freedoms’ (AKP, 2002a). 
The other important matter for the AKP is the approach to secularism in this 
programme, which does not use the terms ‘Islam’ or ‘Muslim’. The programme 
focused on the importance of secularism in terms of religious freedom and states 
that: 
 
Secularism is a principle which allows people of all religions, and beliefs to 
comfortably practice their religions, to be able to express their religious 
convictions and live accordingly, but which also allows people without beliefs to 
organize their lives along these lines. From this point of view, secularism is a 
principle of freedom and social peace. Our Party refuses to take advantage of 
sacred religious values and ethnicity and to use them for political purposes. It 
considers the attitudes and practices which disturb pious people, and which 
discriminate them due to their religious lives and preferences, as antidemocratic 
and in contradiction to human rights and freedoms. On the other hand, it is also 
unacceptable to make use of religion for political, economic and other interests, 
or to put pressure on people who think and live differently by using religion (AKP, 
2002a: 5). 
  
 
There are very similar expressions in the AKP’s constitution and 2002 Election 
Guide. According to these documents, the state should not favour or oppose any 
belief and thought (AKP, 2002c). The AKP's founding philosophy and documents 
also criticise the traditionalist wing of Milli Görüş, especially on the point of secularism 
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and human rights because the Milli Görüş movement, according to the AKP, aims to 
exert Islam by using it only for its own agenda. This is evidenced by the fact that the 
secularism and human rights section of the SP's 2002 election manifesto has not 
been widely considered and it was only evaluated with an Islamist focus (Saadet 
Partisi, 2002). However, as mentioned from the documents above, the AKP was 
founded with a more reformist perspective, especially in terms of secularism and 
human rights. Along with these documents, data from elite interviews also supports 
this view. 
 
Abdullatif Şener11 has played a prominent role in the establishment of the 
AKP. He claims that he has prepared the AKP’s first party programme. He said: ‘the 
party programme of AK Party was considered by 4-5 boards, and the members of 
these boards were changing quite often. However, as the chair of the board, I was 
always there’.12 According to Şener, this party programme was a democratic 
programme that made reference to modern democratic values. Şener points out that 
they have avoided using the terms ‘Islam’ or ‘conservatism’ in their programme. He 
believes that this party programme is democratic, for instance the opponents of the 
party policies have freedom of opinion about the critics in their party. Şener joined 
and founded the party and has tried to realise his ideals, which are to prove the 
compatibility between Islam and democracy. Indeed, Şener did not identify the AKP 
an Islamist party and believes they can become an important model for the 
democratic concept in Muslim politics.  
 
The second lesson taken by the AKP from Milli Görüş was rejecting the anti-
Western policy of the Milli Görüş. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the AKP saw that anti-
Western policies pioneered by the traditionalist elements in Milli Görüş could not 
                                                          
11 Şener entered politics and was elected in 1991 as deputy of Sivas Province from the 
Islamist Welfare Party (RP). He was Minister of Finance from 1996 to 1997. Following the ban of the 
Welfare Party in 1998, he became a member of the newly established Virtue Party (FP), which was 
also banned after three years in 2001. He was co-founder of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
in 2001. He was elected to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey as deputy of Sivas Province, and 
he served under the AKP government as Deputy Prime Minister from 2002 to 2007. He did not run for 
a seat in parliament in the 2007 general elections. After leaving the AK Party, he formed a new party; it 
was officially announced on 27 May 2009 and named the Turkey Party. 
12
 Interview with Abdullatif Şener- Ankara/26th November 2015. 
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ensure its survival in Turkish politics. Because of this, the AKP has focused on the 
EU process and has improved relations with Western countries. The traditionalist 
Felicity Party continued to criticize the EU in the same manner as the Welfare Party.  
 
 The differences between the AKP and the traditional views of Milli Görüş’s 
politicians are also important in terms of the main argument of this study. The first 
independent variable that determined the causal mechanism of AKP's survival is the 
legitimisation of the AKP’s conservatism. On the one hand, in domestic politics, the 
AKP's reformist initiatives on secularism and human rights, and the EU accession 
process in foreign policy led to the legitimisation of AKP’s conservatism. On the other 
hand, the AKP has never left its conservative identity as a result of the sensitivity of 
the electorate's support, and this situation emerges as a precondition for the AKP’s 
political survival in the first period of the AKP government. These internal and 
external factors are examined in detail in the next section of this chapter. 
 
4. The Role of the 28 February Process on AKP’s Political Survival 
 
As noted in the beginning of this chapter, the Turkish military presented an 
ultimatum to the Islamist-dominated coalition government following a meeting of the 
National Security Council (MGK) on 28 February 1997. As a result of this ultimatum, 
the coalition of the Welfare Party-True Path Party (RP-DYP) government resigned its 
position but the change of government was not the only result to come from this 
event. In that period, the headscarf was banned in universities, the İmam Hatip 
secondary schools were closed, and the teaching of the Quran for children under 12 
years of age was reported as ‘illegal’ (Açıkgöz, 2014: 50). Some liberal scholars like 
İhsan Dağı (2006) and Ahmet Kuru (2006) argue that the military powers expelled 
allegedly Islamist and avowedly pious officers. Most of the Islamic social and 
economic institutions faced official discrimination. Hakan Yavuz argues that the real 
aim of the military powers during this period was as follows: 
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The goal of the military was to roll back the Muslim sectors of civil society by 
closing off their opportunity spaces. Because of the emergence of these new 
opportunity spaces, Kemalist hegemony had lost its control over national and 
municipal layers of the state. Pro-Islamic mayors had been winning and 
controlling large budgets and these mayors were using the resources of 
municipalities to compete at the national level (Yavuz 2003: 244). 
 
The first major success of the Welfare Party in the 1990s was the 1994 local 
elections. The symbolic importance of the 1994 balloting, because of its religious 
implications, probably exceeded the actual significance of the party's turnout. Tayyip 
Erdoğan, the Welfare Party's candidate for mayor of Istanbul, and Melih Gökçek, its 
mayoral candidate for Ankara, both won (Howe, 1998: 18). In addition, Welfare Party 
candidates for mayor won in twenty-seven other cities and in 400 towns, including 
almost all of the predominantly Kurdish municipalities in the Southeast (Bozarslan, 
1996: 16-19). These results show the Welfare Party's strength in middle and lower-
class urban neighbourhoods and in the Kurdish areas of the Southeast. Şerif Mardin 
describes this as the first steps of the movement towards the centre. This study 
argues that the Islamist movement with the local administrators in the periphery has 
moved towards to the centre of Turkish state.   
 
During this process, the Milli Görüş movement and the Welfare Party's inability 
to show sufficient and correct political prospects for survival were highlighted, in 
particular by the Yenilikçiler group. Most the reformists in the Milli Görüş movement 
are self-critical of the political style and policies of the Welfare Party, which, they 
believe, contributed to the 28 February process and its subsequent political mistakes 
(Selim, 2002). One of them, Bülent Arınç, argues that the Refahyol (Welfare Party-
True Path Party Coalition) experience shows the need to acknowledge the 
guardianship role of the military in Turkey, which should be taken into account as a 
political reality. Arınç stated that ‘If we are to be realistic ‘we should not come up 
against and clash with the military.’ (Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 326). 
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Bülent Arınç and other reformist politicians in the Welfare Party, as well as 
criticizing Erbakan on 28 February military coup showed how the AKP would 
legitimize its conservative identity under the auspices of democratisation and 
civilisation. Islamist politician Ahmet Faruk Ünsal 13 explores the importance of the 28 
February military coup to explain the legitimisation of the AKP’s conservative identity. 
Ünsal14 notes the role of ‘this post-modern’ coup on the establishment of the AKP. 
Ünsal believes that the process of the military intervention is one of the most 
important factors for explaining the AKP’s establishment in Turkish politics. This 
process destroyed and removed the Milli Görüş movement from Turkish politics and 
reformists in Milli Görüş needed to establish a new political party to espouse their 
discourse. The AKP has been successful in this aim. A very similar perspective came 
from another AKP member, Yasin Aktay. Aktay is a leading politician and 
parliamentary member of the AKP in the Turkish Assembly. Aktay thinks that the 28 
February process damaged the role of Islamism in Turkish politics and the AKP must 
provide a new ideology, like conservative democracy, rather than Islamism in order to 
increase its power in Turkish politics.15  
 
As discussed above, the 28 February process played a prominent role in 
developing the AKP’s conservative identity and this research conducted an interview 
with one of the victims of 28 February, Hüda Kaya16. Kaya is an important political 
figure for the process tracing method of the research to probe the role of Islam in the 
                                                          
13
 Faruk Ünsal was an AKP member of Parliament from 2002 and 2007 and he is currently head of an 
Islamist human rights organisation called Mazlum-Der. 
14
 Interview with Ahmet Faruk Ünsal-Ankara/ 23 November 2015. 
15
 Interview with Yasin Aktay- Ankara/ 3 December 2015. 
16
 This research chooses some interviewees from Kurdish-Islamist political actors due to their support 
for the AKP’s establishment process in light of 28 February postmodern coup’s role. Hüda Kaya is one 
of these actors. Kaya had a political line from an ultra-nationalist thought to Islamic one, from actions 
of türban (headscarf) to Kandil Mountains. Before the 1980 coup in Turkey, she was part of the youth 
wing of the extremist nationalist movement. When she read the Qur'an, she came to critique the 
nationalist variety of Islam aggressively preached by the Turkish state—including the reigning AKP 
government. Her arrival in Malatya coincided with the wave of repression against the elected 
government known as the "postmodern coup" of February 28, 1997. Kaya was arrested for a piece 
she wrote critiquing Islamic men in the movement. Around 500 others were arrested at the same time, 
including Kaya's high-school-age daughters, who were arrested for reading a prayer. In the Malatya 
jail, Kaya met Kurdish activists; the state's repression in the Kurdish region was intense at the time, 
when the war in the region was ongoing. As a result of this, she went to Kandil Mountains along with 
her son who had been jailed due to PKK operations in 2013. She heard about the stories of PKK 
members here and affected from them. Following of this visit, she has joined pro-Kurdish party, 
People’s Democratic Party (HDP) and she is a parliament member now.  
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AKP’s establishment process. In one of the television programmes before 2015’s 
Presidential election, she said ‘I was crying when I watched Erdoğan’s balcony 
speech on the AKP’s election victory in 2002’.17 When asked about this view she 
accepted that she supported Erdoğan and the AKP government during this period. 
Kaya claims that the Muslims who suffered under the Kemalist elites or secularists 
had not come to power in Turkish politics yet and the AKP was the first example of 
this. According to Kaya, the AKP would begin to fight against the anti-democratic 28 
February process when it came to power. However, she said this does not mean the 
continuity of the Milli Görüş movement is part of the AKP’s identity. Kaya18 thinks that 
Erdoğan and his colleagues had wanted to create a peaceful environment for non-
Muslim minorities and support religious freedoms rather than orthodox Sunni 
Islamism when they founded the AKP in 2001. 
 
The 28 February process was considered an opportunity for a new political 
entity for the opposing Yenilikçiler movement within the Milli Görüş. Cizre and Çınar 
explain this opportunity as follows: 
 
The reformist faction, which eventually formed the AKP under the leadership of 
the prominent ex-mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, reads the 28 
February process… For reformists, the RP’s policies reached an impasse 
because it let religious issues dominate its political agenda, it underplayed the 
importance of consensus-seeking and dialogue building with the other sectors of 
society, and it did not address itself to a broader public… The reformists’ stated 
goal was to establish a party that would refrain from employing a rhetorical 
discourse, would not restrict its political horizon to Islamic issues, would pay 
special attention to pluralism by building a dialogue with non-Islamist sectors of 
society, and would be predictable, dynamic, and open to change, with no hidden 
agenda on critical issues (Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 326). 
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 http://haber.sol.org.tr/video/hdpli-aday-huda-kaya-balkon-konusmasini-aglayarak-dinlemistim-
112929 (Accessed Date: 01/09/2017) 
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 Interview with Hüda Kaya- Ankara/2 December 2015. 
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While the 28 February process was one of the most important factors in 
legitimising the AKP's conservative identity, the search for EU and US support for the 
AKP was one of the most important external factors. At the same time, these internal 
and external factors helped the legitimisation of AKP's conservatism which is the first 
independent variable of the AKP’s political survival in Turkish politics. 
 
5. Turkey’s EU Accession Process 
 
This chapter began by explaining the AKP’s establishment and its success 
after the 2002 general elections. Indeed, the AKP’s domestic and foreign policy 
agenda has been excitedly awaited by many people in Turkey and the Western 
world. This research claims that one of the most important agendas of the AKP’s 
policies was EU accession. As stated throughout this chapter, the legitimisation of the 
AKP’s conservatism is the first independent variable of AKP’s political survival. This 
first independent variable has internal and external determinants such as the EU 
process. The Milli Görüş movement focused on anti-Western ideology in Turkish 
domestic and foreign policy, but the AKP rejected Milli Görüş’ agenda and EU 
accession became one of the most important goals for Erdoğan’s government. This 
chapter will summarise how Turkey’s EU accession process developed in the 1990s 
(before the AKP) and how the AKP managed this process to its advantage by using 
the notions of Westernisation and conservative democracy.  
 
The European Union rejected Turkey’s application for candidate status in 1997 
at the Luxembourg Council of Europe due to its poor human rights record and 
tensions with Greece. The Turkish government believed the EU’s decision to be 
extremely critical and did little to encourage Turkey to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria 
(Hale, 2011: 324). Then Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz threatened the European Union 
with withdrawing Turkey’s membership application and froze relations with the EU 
(Özer, 2016). Smith indicates that Yılmaz and his government thought that some 
European countries, especially Germany, were pursuing a policy of Lebensraum, 
which was Hitler’s foreign policy and Germany’s policy is not related to the human 
rights problems in Turkey (Smith, 2003: 119-120). On the other hand, the politics of 
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Turkey changed with the 1999 election. The far-right National Action Party won about 
17% of the vote in this election becoming the second-largest party in parliament and 
a partner of the coalition government until 2002. The EU was concerned about this 
situation due to the Eurosceptic views of the National Action Party (Düzgit and 
Keyman, 2007). In conjunction with this concern, despite of all these negative events 
and developments, the EU finally recognised Turkey as a candidate country at the 
Helsinki Summit of December 1999 (Yılmaz, 2016: 86-100). 
 
After the Helsinki Summit of 1999, the EU placed outlined some short and 
medium-term conditions for full membership. Smith (2003: 130-131) explains that 
strengthening freedom of expression, civil society, stamping out torture, giving 
opportunities for legal redress against human rights violations, intensifying human 
rights training for law enforcement officials, and maintaining the moratorium on 
capital punishment were some important short-term aims for Turkey to fulfil to be able 
to join the EU. Over the medium-term, Turkey needed to guarantee all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, improve freedom of thought and religion, review the 
Turkish constitution to improve protections for human rights and freedoms, abolish 
the death penalty, improve detention conditions in prisons, and guarantee cultural 
rights for all citizens (Smith, 2003: 130-132). As a result of these conditions, the 
Turkish government started to build a framework where Turkey carried out political 
reforms in order to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria (Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber, 2016: 1-
14). Moreover, the Turkish authorities prepared a ‘National Programme for the 
Adoption of the Acquis’ in March 2001 (Doğan, 2006: 243-259). Following the 
National Programme, political reform continued with 34 constitutional amendments 
taking place in October 2001.  
 
After the 2002 election, EU authorities and the Western world awaited 
Erdoğan’s and the AKP’s policy towards the EU accession process. As mentioned 
above, EU accession is one of the most important aims of the AKP’s foreign policy 
due to Milli Görüş’s anti-Western ideology. In the 2002 AKP Election Guide and the 
AKP’s Party Programme, it was claimed that Turkey would rapidly fulfill its promises 
in its relations with the European Union and the conditions which the union demands 
of other candidate nations as well (AKP, 2002a; 2002c). AKP politicians’ vieRPoint on 
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the European Union has changed dramatically. For instance, the first prime minister 
of the AKP government, Abdullah Gül identified the EU as a ‘Christian club’ when he 
was a young politician in the Milli Görüş movement (Çınar, 2006: 469-486). However, 
after the establishment of the AKP, Abdullah Gül has become one of the more 
prominent politicians with regard to relations with Western countries and the EU. 
Abdullah Gül described Turkey-EU relations as follows: 
 
Turkey’s EU membership will mean that Europe has achieved such maturity that 
it can incorporate a major Muslim country into its fold. And that EU stands for 
common values and institutions rather than common religion. For Turkey, EU 
membership will mean anchoring more than a century old western vocation into 
highest standards of democratisation, good governance and integration. For the 
world, this would evidence that civilisations line up in terms of their democratic 
vocation, and not on the basis of religion (Gül, 2007: 29). 
 
 
Abdullah Gül, the ex-member of Welfare Party (which portrays the European 
Union as a satanic organisation) naturally has a pragmatic perspective on the issue. 
The main reason for this pragmatism is the fact that the Welfare Party had many 
difficulties ensuring the Milli Görüş’s survival of both international and domestic 
politics due to its anti-EU and anti-Western propaganda. Similar pragmatic 
expressions came from Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who made very aggressive anti-
Western speeches at the beginning of the 1990s in the Welfare Party. Erdoğan went 
to meetings and conferences in Western countries in order to explain the AKP’s 
conservative democracy and its differences from the Milli Görüş movement. In a 
speech at Oxford University in 2004, Erdoğan explained why Turkey needs the EU 
and why the EU needs Turkey: 
 
 
We in Turkey have reconciled our traditional Islamic culture with our secular and 
democratic structures. We have demonstrated that a country with an 
overwhelmingly Muslim population could turn its face to and integrate with the 
Western world … We have targeted not the conflict of civilisations, but their 
meeting in Turkey … There should be no doubt that Turkey’s full membership will 
reinforce the desire and will for cohabitation between the Christians and Muslims 
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… Being a European who understands Europeanness as ‘politics commanded by 
values’, I would expect all that I have said to be put on record as expressed for 
the common good of Europe and the world (İçener and İçener, 2011: 28). 
 
Erdoğan's speech was an effort to prove that the AKP was not an anti-EU 
party like the Welfare Party had been since its establishment in 2001. As explained in 
the beginning of this chapter, there were clear signs of Milli Görüş’s anti-Western 
ideology with Necmettin Erbakan’s speeches and policies about the Western 
countries. However, the AKP differed from the Milli Görüş movement in terms of the 
EU accession process and Europeanisation (Keyman, 2010: 322). As a result of 
these views and developments, the EU accession process continued apace until 
2005. The Turkish assembly passed nine harmonisation packages before 2004. 
These packages aimed to improve and protect workers’ rights, freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, the right to demonstrate, freedom of thought, and 
cultural rights, especially for minority groups (Düzgit and Keyman, 2007: 69-89). 
Official negotiations had begun with the European Union in October 2005. It was an 
important moment for the AKP in proving its conservative democrat and pro-
European identity. However, these positive developments have not continued after 
2005 due to the inefficient reform process on the human rights records and 
democratic issues in Turkish law. William Hale summarizes this inefficient reform 
process as below:  
 
Between 2001 and 2005, Turkey made remarkable advances in the improvement 
of human rights. However, over the next four years, the reform process 
slackened severely, causing pessimists to predict that it might evaporate 
altogether. A commonly given explanation for this was that, up to 2005, Turkish 
governments had a powerful incentive to improve Turkey’s human rights regime, 
as demanded by the European Union (EU) as an essential condition for the start 
of accession negotiations. Once these negotiations had officially begun in 
October 2005, it was suggested, the incentive for further reform slackened 
significantly. This effect was compounded by the fact that some European 
leaders, in France and Germany in particular, now voiced open opposition to the 
whole principle of eventual Turkish membership, strengthening the arguments of 
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those in Turkey who opposed further political reforms or closer alignment with the 
EU.” (Hale 2011: 323). 
 
 As Hale emphasized, the AKP has proven that it has not been anti-EU with 
regard to the EU accession process. Yet, another goal of the AKP was to establish 
good relations with Western countries and the US, which the Welfare Party had 
undermined. This would be another external factor that enabled the AKP to 
become a legitimate actor in Turkish politics as a conservative party. 
 
6. The Importance of US and Western Support in the AKP’s 
Establishment  
 
The second important issue during the AKP’s establishment was the support 
of the United States and Western countries for the party and Erdoğan’s government. 
After the 2002 election, EU authorities and the Western world awaited Erdoğan’s and 
the AKP’s policy towards the EU accession process. As discussed in Chapter 3, the 
EU accession is one of the most important agendas of the AKP in terms of Turkish 
foreign policy due to Milli Görüş’s anti-Western ideology. In the AKP 2002 Election 
Guide and the AKP’s Party Programme, they pointed out that Turkey shall rapidly 
fulfil its promises in its relations with the European Union and the conditions, which 
the union demands of other candidate nations as well. Moreover, the AKP has been 
seen as the ‘moderate Islamist party model’ by the United States after the 9/11 
terrorist attacks and the rise of fundamentalism in the Middle East. Some of my 
interviewees focused on this issue during the interviews.  
 
One of these interviews was with Ruhsar Demirel, a deputy leader of the 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP - Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi). Demirel gives a different 
perspective from the other participants when exploring the AKP’s founding process. 
Demirel points out that the external interference in Turkish politics before 2002 
helped to create and cause the rise of the Justice and Development Party. The 
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divisions in the Democratic Left Party (DSP - Demokratik Sol Parti) and the 
establishment of the Genç Party caused the two biggest centre-right parties to gain a 
vote below the 10% threshold. As a result, the AKP become the ruling party in the 
November 2002 election. Following this, the members of parliament in the Siirt 
province were forced to resign their positions and scheduled a new election due to 
Erdoğan’s candidacy. Demirel believes that internal developments in Turkish politics 
should be assessed with the external factors such as the US and Western support of 
the AKP in understanding the AKP’s establishment process. Moreover, she rejected 
the AKP’s identity as an Islamist party. She claims the AKP was founded as a huge 
coalition with social democrats, liberals and other elements in Turkish politics. 
Demirel said that ‘AKP does not represent Islam or nationalism; it is a simple case or 
example of opportunism in Turkish politics due to its coalitional structure’.19  
 
Like Demirel, Nimetullah Erdoğmuş, looked to the importance of external 
factors to understand the legitimisation of the AKP’s conservatism. Erdoğmuş is a 
former Diyarbakır mufti and he joined the Peoples’ Democracy Party (HDP) before 
the June 2015 Election. He is currently a deputy of the HDP in the Turkish Assembly. 
According to Erdoğmuş, Iran’s Islamic revolution was an important indicator for 
developments in the Middle East. The West and the United States looked to be a 
Sunni partner due to the threat posed by the rise of Iran’s power in the Middle East. 
The AKP and Erdoğan’s government used this Western concern against Iran and 
Erdoğmuş claims that the AKP has continued the EU accession process and reforms 
in many areas of Turkish politics due to this reason.20  
 
Some academics, like Özgür Özdamar, agreed with this perspective and 
added that the terrorist attacks on 9/11 played a part in this issue. Özgür Özdamar is 
Deputy Chairperson and Director of Graduate Studies at Bilkent University’s 
Department of International Relations. His research focuses on Turkish foreign policy 
analysis, international relations theories and security studies. He claims that an 
alliance of civilisations after the attacks helped to raise the AKP’s power and 
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 Interview with Ruhsar Demirel- 26th November 2015/Ankara 
20
 Interview with Nimetullah Erdoğmuş 19 November 2015/Ankara 
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popularity in international relations. He says that Turkey changed its foreign policy 
agenda from the notion of building an intercontinental bridge to an alliance of 
civilisations under Erdoğan’s government. 21 Like Özdamar and other academics at 
Bilkent, Ali Bilgiç 22 focuses on the importance of US support for the AKP 
government. Bilgiç23 argues that the United States put forward the AKP as a model of 
a moderate Islamic political party because of their concept of conservative 
democracy.  
 
Another academic, Menderes Çınar, explains this alliance between Erdoğan 
and Western powers after 9/11. Menderes Çınar is a professor at Baskent University 
and his research is based on political Islam and the AKP in the Turkish political 
arena. He doesn’t think that the AKP engaged in deception (takiye) during its 
relations with the United States and Western powers.24 Moderate Islamist parties in 
the Middle East are highly important to the United States and Western countries. As 
a result, this alliance with the AKP has many advantages for both parties. The AKP is 
concerned about a lack of legitimacy in international affairs and an alliance with 
Western powers improves the Erdoğan government’s legitimacy.  
 
As seen in all these debates concerning the AKP’s establishment process and 
the AKP’s first term between 2002 and 2007, the participant’s interpretations overlap 
on two common points that this research highlights. First, the AKP could not identify 
as a purely Islamist party due to its founding staff, establishment principles, the 
importance of the 28 February process, the lessons from Milli Görüş’s failure, the 
concept of conservative democracy and other similar internal factors. Second, the 
alliance or good relations between the United States and other Western powers like 
the European Union during the AKP’s establishment and first term played a 
prominent role in increasing the AKP’s role in international affairs. This alliance had 
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 Interview with Özgür Özdamar-Ankara/24th November 2015 
22
 Bilgiç is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at Bilkent University. His research interests 
include feminist postcolonial approaches, critical security studies with a focus on security, migration, 
contemporary protest movements, Middle East and North African politics, and Turkey’s foreign policy. 
23
 Interview with Ali Bilgiç- Ankara/15 December 2015 
24
 Interview with Menderes Çınar-Ankara/22 December 2015 
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many advantages for the AKP in light of the first independent variable of ensuring 
AKP’s political survival; the legitimisation of the AKP’s conservatism.  
 
Indeed, Erdoğan and his colleagues avoided being called Islamist due to the 
inability of Milli Görüş to gain electoral success in Turkish politics. The Welfare 
Party's mistakes in securing political survival were considered an opportunity for the 
AKP. On the other hand, the AKP had to attract conservative electorates who support 
the Welfare Party. This has led to the AKP legitimising its conservative identity and 
avoiding being a typical centre-right party. This study claims that this situation is a 
pre-condition for ensuring AKP’s political survival. So far we have explained why the 
AKP has chosen this way in Turkish politics in this chapter. The next section of this 
chapter asks the question, how did the AKP accomplish this? The AKP's 
conservative democracy is an important concept to look at for this question. 
 
7. The Concept of Conservative Democracy 
 
We are bringing about a new concept (conservative democracy), not in an 
abstract manner, but also in a concrete manner, and this is something that needs 
to be discussed, debated.… A significant part of Turkish society desires to adopt 
a concept of modernity that does not reject tradition, a belief in universalism that 
accepts localism, an understanding of rationalism that does not disregard the 
spiritual meaning of life, and a choice for change that is not fundamentalist. 
Conservative democracy is an answer to the desires of Turkish people (Tepe, 
2005: 76). 
 
 
This speech was made by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at a meeting in Washington 
DC in 2004. Erdoğan attended similar meetings between 2002 and 2004 in order to 
explain the AKP’s conservative democracy to the Western world. This research will 
explore the meaning of conservative democracy in detail in the next chapter. 
However, the notion of conservative democracy is important to understand the AKP’s 
history. As Erdoğan’s speech indicated, Milli Görüş’s anti-Western ideology would be 
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replaced by conservative democracy in terms of the role of Islam in Turkish politics 
(Kalaycıoglu, 2010: 35). The issue of religious freedom and the notion of democracy 
played a crucial role in exploring the relations between Islam and politics in Turkey 
within the context of the AKP’s conservative democracy (Hale, 2006). Etyen 
Mahçupyan identified conservative democracy as a bridge between Islam and 
secularism. According to Atilla Yayla, conservative democracy, like social democracy, 
may become a term that designates a specific socio-political ideological line 
(Akdoğan, 2006: 56). Although most liberal scholars, like Mahçupyan and Yayla, 
have offered new intellectual debates about conservative democracy, this concept 
was first implemented within the AKP by Yalçın Akdoğan, the former vice-prime 
minister of Turkey. Akdoğan’s book, AK Party and Conservative Democracy (AK Parti 
and Muhafazakar Demokrasi), offers another crucial argument to contextualise the 
AKP’s conservative democracy. The key arguments in these books will be analysed 
in detail in the next chapter. Nevertheless, Akdoğan’s book offers another view of 
how and why the AKP is different from the Milli Görüş movement and this chapter 
aims to explain this difference. Akdoğan summarises that: 
 
 
… JDP’s (AKP) political ideology and what political strategies it employs with that 
of Erbakan’s National Outlook Movement (Milli Görüş) parties, it becomes clear 
that JDP has distanced itself significantly from an ‘Islamic values’ platform. … 
The administration and government of the present-day JDP includes members 
who have come from the Truth Path Party, the Nationalist Action Party, and the 
Motherland Party. It could be said that as a conservative party the JDP, while not 
ignoring, the importance of the social structure. If the party’s first year in 
government is studied, it becomes apparent that the JDP chose not to continue 
its previously active relationship with Islamism (Akdoğan, 2006: 63-64). 
  
Akdoğan's argument also shows the mechanism by which the AKP enlarges 
its electoral base in coalition with centre-right actors and achieves a much higher 
vote than Milli Görüş. The legitimisation of the AKP’s conservatism is the first 
independent variable when explaining the causal mechanism of AKP's political 
survival in Turkish politics. Moreover, this variable shows how the AKP’s large 
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winning coalition in De Mesquita's selectorate theory is created and the next section 
of this chapter focuses on the AKP’s large winning coalition in detail. 
 
Coşar25 argues that the AKP’s establishment can be associated the rise of the 
centre-right in Turkish politics. Coşar claims that the continuity of the Milli Görüş 
movement lives on in the AKP’s founding principles, but the main issue for this claim 
is the AKP’s transformation of the Turkish centre-right. Centre-right parties eroded in 
the 2002 election. The AKP and Erdoğan tried to transform these political parties and 
views from the centre-right into a conservative political force using the concept of 
conservative democracy. Like Coşar, Yasin Aktay argues that ‘conservative 
democracy’ is the only possible concept with which to understand the survival of the 
AKP in Turkish political history since it is illegal to form a party on the basis of 
religious ideas.26 
 
Another interviewee, Mehmet Bekaroğlu27, who comes from the Milli Görüş 
movement, discusses the pragmatism of the AKP’s conservative democracy. As seen 
in his biography, Bekaroğlu is a well-known political figure in the Islamic sphere. He 
argues that the AKP is not classified as an Islamist Party as its main aim is only to 
legitimize a power grab in Turkish politics. Erdoğan and his colleagues established 
this party in order to come to power in Turkey, because conservative voters were 
under pressure from the military and Kemalist elites, so they looked to create a new 
political establishment to support it. Bekaroğlu, who identifies the AKP as a 
pragmatist movement, argues that the AKP has consolidated these voters by using 
the concept of conservative democracy. This research supports Bekaroglu’s points 
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 Interview with Simten Coşar- Ankara/ 8 December 2015. 
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 Interview with Yasin Aktay- Ankara/ 3 December 2015. 
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 Bekaroğlu was elected to Turkish Parliament in the 1999 general election as a Virtue Party 
Member for Rize. After the Virtue Party was closed down in 2001, he joined the Felicity Party and 
became its deputy leader. After resigning from the party, he formed an 'Islamic left' alliance 
with Ertuğrul Günay who resigned from the Republican People's Party (CHP) in 2004. However, this 
new movement failed to take hold after Günay joined the Justice and Development Party (AKP). In 
2010, he became the deputy leader of new Islamist Party, the People's Voice Party (HAS Party) 
founded by Numan Kurtulmuş (he is a Vice Prime Minister of AKP government now). When the HAS 
Party decided to merge with the AKP in 2012, Bekaroğlu decided not to take part in the merger and 
resigned from the party. In September 2014, the main opponent and secular party, CHP’s 
leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu invited Bekaroğlu to become a member of his party as part of an attempt to 
expand the party's appeal to conservative voters in the elections. Bekaroğlu subsequently joined the 
CHP and became deputy leader of the party. 
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and claims that there is a connection between the AKP’s survival and the concept of 
conservative democracy in light of the legitimisation of the AKP’s conservatism. 
 
I appreciate the importance of pluralism, variety and tolerance. As a requirement 
of my beliefs, I have set my political ideals as democracy, freedoms, tolerance, 
basic human rights, secularism and political participation and I know that we have 
to go hand in hand with other countries of the world in furthering both technologic 
advance and democratic values.28  
 
The above quote is from one of Erdoğan’s interviews from 2002. Indeed, the 
AKP is concerned with creating a new public discourse according to which 
democratisation, accountability, civil society, and the rule of law would shape the 
Turkish political system and the concept of ‘conservative democracy’ would be 
helpful for reforming these areas. In its general definition, the term 'conservative 
democracy' highlights the compatibility of Islam with democracy, a Western-oriented 
foreign policy and secularism within government. The concept of conservative 
democracy encompasses abroad coalition of ideas. Religion is not the prominent part 
of this concept because the AKP prefers to call itself a ‘hizmet’ (service) party rather 
than an ideological Islamic party. However, they need to consolidate Islamic voters 
and as a result did not drop the conservative idea in Turkish politics. For this reason, 
the AKP, in describing itself as conservative/conservative-democratic, does not need 
to stress its valuation of Islamic principals as well. But, as religion has an influence on 
most conservative thought all over the world, a steady exchange and mutual 
interaction should be understood as a rather normal phenomenon. Hakan Yavuz 
points out that the AKP was wrapped up in a number of contradictions:  
 
It seeks to “reform” the political system and state-society relations while at the 
same time declaring its identity as a introduction “conservative” democracy; it 
champions for political participation and pluralism while at the same time the 
party does not allow much room for its own internal democracy; the party 
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identifies decentralization and local-based governance as a solution to Turkey’s 
overburdened bureaucracy while it seeks to centralize AKP’s own party structure 
and decision making”. (Yavuz, 2006: 9-10)  
 
Both conservatism and democracy are determining factors in exploring the 
AKP’s identity and the concept of conservative democracy needs to create a broader 
coalition with regard to the political spectrum in Turkish politics. Indeed, this broad 
coalition idea of unifying conservatism and democracy is explained by the political 
survival of the AKP. De Mesquita's selectorate theory is the conceptual bridge used 
in this work to understand this mechanism. As mentioned in Chapter 1, selectorate 
theory addresses the choices that leaders make as the product of a set of 
calculations made by leaders to assess the best way for them to stay in power. 
According to De Mesquita and his colleagues, in modern mass democracies, the 
selectorate is the electorate and coalitions are determined by specific electoral rules. 
The winning coalition is often a small group of powerful selectorates who have the 
positions (for example, membership in a single-party system) to aspire to make and 
break leaders (De Mesquita and Smith, 2011: 6). Although the current socio-political 
changes under the AKP governance raise questions about whether or not it fits into 
the definition of conservative authoritarianism, Turkey has been classified as a 
‘democratic country’ for many years. Thus, the winning coalition and selectorate 
should be prominent in Turkish politics in order to provide stability for the leaders’ or 
political parties’ power. 
 
Moreover, Turkey’s political, social and economic structure had been in 
serious crisis before the 2002 election. Indeed, the political party who would become 
the ruling party had to solve problems of democracy, the rule of law, economic crisis, 
transparency, and corruption in this election (Şarlak 2016: 297). As noted in Chapter 
2, DSP-MHP-ANAP (Democratic Left Party-Nationalist Action Party-Motherland 
Party) coalition government between 1999 and 2002 were too close to the state and 
too distant from economic lobbying groups and civil society organisations (Uğur and 
Yankaya, 2008: 590-597). As a result, these economic lobbying groups supported 
the AKP due to the economic crisis in Turkey after 2001. Moreover, the AKP’s 
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commitment to democracy, secularism, and religious pluralism made the AKP 
decisively different from its Islamist Milli Görüş party heritage. As a result of these 
factors, the AKP supports democratic values in Turkish politics by rejecting Milli 
Görüş’s anti-Western ideology. The anti-Milli Görüş perspectives of the AKP helped 
to create the AKP’s large selectorate and winning coalition in light of the democratic 
consolidations in Turkish politics.  
 
One important debate is the AKP’s large winning coalition in party structure 
when it has been established. On 28 November 2002, the newly-formed AKP 
government presented its 25 cabinet members to the Turkish parliament for a vote of 
confidence. With eleven fewer members than the outgoing cabinet, the new cabinet 
represented the AKP's commitment to smaller government. In addition to six names 
from the Islamist Welfare Party (RP), which was banned in 1998, the cabinet includes 
eleven new figures, who rose in politics with the AKP. There were also six deputies 
formerly associated with the centrist Motherland Party (ANAP - Anavatan Partisi), 
one deputy each from centre-right True Path Party (DYP) and Nationalist Action 
Party (MHP - Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi), as well as a female member, Tourism 
Minister Güldal Akşit (Sayari, 2007: 204). This diversity is proof of the AKP's desire to 
form a government that represents the party's voters, ranging from Islamists to 
moderate liberals. Analyses of the voter base of the AKP demonstrated that the party 
is not a direct descendant of any of the older parties, nor do its party leaders claim 
such lineage. A 2002 pre-election survey showed that only 27.4%% of the AKP 
voters had voted for the FP in 1999, a surprisingly high 21.9%% had voted for the 
ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP), 9.2% for the centre-right ANAP, 7.3% 
for the centre-right True Path Party (DYP), and 6.9% for the centre-left Democratic 
Left Party (DSP) (Özbudun, 2014: 160). Similarly, 57%% of former FP voters, 30.5% 
of former MHP voters, 16.8% of former DYP voters, 16.7% of former ANAP voters, 
and 10.8% of former DSP voters expressed their intention to vote for the AKP in the 
2002 elections (TÜSES, 2002: 70–71). The AKP seems to have received substantial 
support from the former voters of the two centre-right parties (ANAP and DYP) and 
those of the ultra-nationalist MHP, in addition to more than half of former FP voters. 
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Further evidence of the AKP’s large winning coalition is the AKP’s alliance with 
other groups in Turkish society and politics. Erdoğan and his colleagues were highly 
critical of the Yenilikçiler group in the Milli Görüş movement after the 28 February 
military coup and they needed to gain support from the other Islamist movements in 
Turkey to consolidate support from Muslim voters in the 2002 election. One of the 
Islamist movements in Turkey, the Gülen movement and its ideologists helped the 
AKP on this issue. One of these ideologues, Ali Bulaç29 criticized both Kemalists and 
Islamists on the 28 February process. A central element of these criticisms against 
the Kemalists is that the Kemalist project has been the question of democratisation 
and the rule of law (Kılınç, 2014: 140). According to Bulaç and other scholars, 
democracy must be instituted as a constitutional framework that guarantees rights 
and liberties about freedom of religious practice, thought, and expression. However, 
Bulaç and other Gülenist ideologists thought that the Milli Görüş movement had not 
been successful in realizing these aims under the Welfare Party government (Kuru, 
2007: 140-151). Bulaç declared that ‘political’ Islamism was dead. He called for a 
new ‘civil’ Islamism which did not contradict secularism as a political regime. Along 
the same lines, the influential Gülen movement abandoned its indifference and 
participated in the debate on secularism. As a result of this, the Journalists and 
Writers Foundation which is related with Gülen’s movement began to organize Abant 
Workshops in order to search for a new social consensus in Turkey in light of these 
debates. Ahmet Kuru (2006: 136-160) points out that the younger generation of the 
National Outlook movement (Milli Görüş) which was called as Yenilikçiler also moved 
away from the Milli Görüş’s ideology. Several of them have participated in the Abant 
Workshops to discuss issues such as secularism. In 2000, four leaders from this 
younger generation – Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdüllatif Şener, Bülent Arınç, and Abdullah 
Gül - emphasized their pro-democratic and pro-secular ideas (Kılınç, 2014: 140-141). 
This alliance between the AKP’s founding members and the Gülen movement 
highlights why the AKP was not been the continuation of the Milli Görüş movement 
and how the AKP established a large coalition in order to survive in Turkish politics.  
 
                                                          
29
 Ali Bulaç, Interview, Aksiyon, November 7-13, 1998; see also Ali Bulaç, “Niçin AB [Why the EU]?” 
Zaman, December 11, 1999. For Bulaç’s pro-secular views, see Ali Bulaç, Din, Devlet ve Demokrasi 
[Religion, State, and Democracy] (Istanbul: Zaman Kitap, 2001): 11-65. 
97 
 
As mentioned above, the AKP passed a series of reform packages to 
harmonise Turkey’s judicial system, civil-military relations, democratisation and 
human rights practices with European norms. This democratisation process on the 
EU’s accession earned the support of Turkey’s Western-style business community, 
liberal intellectuals and the pragmatic middle class. There is an alliance between 
these groups and the AKP due to the party’s agenda on the EU accession process. 
In relation to the AKP’s commitment to EU accession, one of these business 
organisations, TÜSİAD, supported the AKP government between 2002 and 2007 
(Uğur and Yankaya, 2008: 581-601). The AKP needs to form a coalition with TÜSİAD 
and other Western-style economic institutions due to the fact they do not want to 
share the same fate as the Welfare Party. TÜSİAD and other secularist groups 
supported the military bureaucracy against the Milli Görüş movement during the 28 
February process (Öniş and Türem, 2002: 451). TÜSİAD made its position on the 
Welfare Party very clear with an advertisement in the press and asked the two 
centre-right parties to ally their forces against possible Islamist involvement in the 
government. As a result of this situation, the AKP does not want to oppose secularist 
Western-style business organisations like TÜSİAD. 
 
During the AKP’s first term, the winning coalition included both domestic and 
external supporters, including the following: European countries and the United 
States, liberal intellectuals within the country, moderate Islamist groups like the Gülen 
movement, conservative citizens of Turkish society (as their votes determine who is 
to be elected in elections), centre-right voters, faith-based non-profit organisations, 
Western-style business institutions such as TÜSİAD, and conservative business 
organisations, among many others, such as MÜSİAD or TUSKON. These alliances 
with important sections of Turkish society helped to increase the power of the AKP in 
Turkish politics. Most of the AKP’s founding members came from the Islamist Milli 
Görüş movement and Erdoğan and his colleagues knew that if their party continued 
with the Milli Görüş’ anti-Western agenda, they could not survive in Turkish political 
life. De Mesquita and colleagues argue that leaders or ruling parties must satisfy 
large coalitions with its policy agenda in democracies. For the greater part of Turkish 
society, the AKP will not overstep the limits imposed by the 28 February military coup 
process. The AKP should assert that it is not a continuation of the Milli Görüş 
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movement and it must expand its coalition for this reason. Ebru Bulut argues that the 
AKP did this by; 
 
Drawing lessons from conservative-democratic ideology, inspired by German’s 
Christian Democracy. Traditional right-wing politicians were welcomed into the 
party. Emphasis was put on the party’s determination to pursue economic and 
political relationships with Western countries. The headscarf issue was passed 
over in silence during the 2002 election campaign. Furthermore, during its time in 
government, the AKP’s constant retreats concerning the secularism issue (for 
example about reforms of the educational system) have fostered the idea of its 
normalisation. Even if the headscarf issue has provoked tensions at the highest 
level of state, the AKP has not or cannot insist on the legalization of the veil in the 
university system (Bulut, 2006: 133). 
 
Bulut’s view also supports the basic argument advocated throughout the 
chapter. Throughout this chapter it was said that in many ways the AKP put forward 
liberal policies in order to survive but the AKP did not lose its conservative identity. 
The AKP’s efforts on these issues and developments on EU accession and the 
democratisation process increased its power in Turkish politics. Furthermore, it also 
won political legitimacy in the eyes of the military. However, the AKP needed a new 
concept in order to implement these policies in light of the Muslim voters’ support. At 
a conservative congress organised by the party in 2004, Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat, 
the late vice-president of the party, defined conservative democracy as a “synthesis 
of conservatism and democracy that connects traditional Turkish values with 
elements of European conservatism”.30 The creation of the term ‘conservative 
democracy’ - instead of using ‘democracy’ alone - was doubly advantageous for the 
party. By choosing the adjective ‘conservative’, it assigns itself – not least in the 
international context - to an established ideology. Concerning Turkey, it positions 
itself in amongst approved conservative actors. Moreover, the term ‘conservative 
democracy’ allows the party to establish its own discourse within conservative 
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discourse. The message to the public (and the voter) is that of a new political 
beginning without losing its connection to the past.  
 
Overall, the AKP’s identity in its establishment process and during its first term 
between 2002 and 2007 has been explained using two main elements, 
‘conservatism’ and ‘democracy’. Conservatism was useful in consolidating Muslim 
voters’ support in the 2002 election against the Milli Görüş’s Felicity Party. 
Democracy was used to create the AKP’s coalition with a broad spectrum of Turkish 
society to ensure its survival in Turkish politics as a political actor. Both concepts - 
conservatism and democracy - have been merged due to the heavy pressure against 
Muslims in Turkey after the 28 February process. As a result of this, both liberals and 
conservatives in Turkey supported to the AKP in the 2002 Election.  
 
The main argument of this chapter is that the AKP’s legitimisation of its 
conservative identity is a precondition for its own political survival. One interviewee, 
Mustafa Balbay, agrees this view. Balbay was arrested on 5 March 2009 as an 
Ergenekon suspect in the Odatv case - which is related to the clash between the 
Kemalist/military bureaucracy and the AKP - and in August 2009 he was sentenced 
to 34 years and eight months in prison. Mustafa Balbay was elected as a 
parliamentary deputy for the Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP) even though he has 
been in prison in June 2011 election. Following the changes in Turkish law, he has 
been released and is now a parliamentary member of CHP in the Turkish Assembly. 
Balbay does not think that the AKP’s Islamist origins have been changed. He claims 
that if the AKP had tried to become more Islamist in 2003 or 2004, there would have 
been a huge reaction from the Turkish public and international actors against 
Erdoğan’s government. He uses the metaphor of a boiling frag: ‘If you tossed a frog 
into already-boiling water, it would leap out. But a frog placed into a pan of water with 
a low flame under it will slowly be boiled alive, the temperature change being too 
subtle for the frog to notice. The AKP has used the same method in order to raise its 
power and there is no resistance against the AKP’.31 Balbay’s metaphor explains why 
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the AKP did not become an Islamist party when it established in 2001 in light of the 
AKP’s political survival. 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
Based on the use of empirical evidence from elite interviews, party documents, 
public speeches, and developments and changes in the AKP’s policies this thesis 
argues that there are four independent variables within the AKP’s four terms as 
analysed in Chapter 2, 3, 4 and 5, the first being the legitimising of the AKP’s 
conservative identity (2002-2007). 
 
As seen in all these debates and explanations about the AKP’s establishment 
process and the AKP’s first term between 2002 and 2007, participants have 
explained two common points. First, the AKP could not identify itself as a purely 
Islamist party due to its founding members, establishment principles, the importance 
of the 28 February process, the lessons from Milli Görüş’ failure, the concept of 
conservative democracy, and other similar explanatory reasons. Second, the alliance 
or good relations between the United States and other Western powers like 
European Union during the AKP’s establishment and first term played a prominent 
role in explaining the AKP’s popularity in international affairs. This alliance had many 
advantages for both sides and this process was an important factor in legitimising the 
AKP’s conservatism in Turkish politics.  
 
Overall, Chapter 2 explores how the legitimising of the AKP’s conservatism is 
a pre-condition for ensuring AKP’s political survival. It is an important time-period for 
showing the AKP’s progression in Turkish democracy and for understanding the 
legitimisation of its conservative identity. On the one hand, there are important 
internal factors during the AKP’s founding such as its attitude to political concepts like 
conservative democracy and other events such as the 28 February coup (soft coup). 
101 
 
On the other hand, there are external factors such as the increasing support of the 
United States and Western countries in the international context of 9/11.  
 
This chapter aims to show the impact of these internal and external factors for 
understanding the legitimisation of the AKP’s conservatism in relation to debates 
about AKP’s political survival in Turkish politics. This legitimisation process is related 
to the AKP’s winning coalition and its political survival as outlined in De Mesquita’s 
selectorate theory. Following Chapter 2, Chapter 3 focuses on the second term of 
AKP rule between 2007 and 2011 in light of the AKP’s power struggle.  
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Chapter 3: The Second Term of the AKP’s rule (2007-11): The Power Struggle 
Between AKP and Kemalist Secular Elites  
 
1. Introduction 
 
All papers report Prime Minister Erdoğan and the main opposition CHP leader 
Deniz Baykal lashed out at each other during their party group meetings in the 
parliament over the 'Ergenekon' investigation. Baykal told his party group the 
prosecutor's case in the Ergenekon probe appeared to be similar to an indictment 
which had been filed by Prosecutor Ferhat Sarikaya on the Şemdinli incident (in 
which, in November 2005, two military officers were caught red-handed bombing 
a bookstore in the town of Şemdinli in the border province of Hakkari in southeast 
Turkey). He claimed a "false atmosphere" was created in the country before the 
indictment was unveiled. Baykal also slammed the prosecutor for "shaping the 
charges after finding some suspects." He also demanded evidence linking the 
Ergenekon suspects -- retired generals, daily Cumhuriyet editors Ilhan Selcuk 
and Mustafa Balbay, and Ankara Chamber of Commerce president Sinan Aygun 
-- to the attack on the Council of State. "If there is no evidence, you should step 
down at once," stressed Baykal. Baykal said Erdoğan was acting as a prosecutor 
in the Ergenekon lawsuit, adding, he thus had to play the role of attorney. 
Erdoğan, in reply, told his party group yesterday, ""I'm glad Baykal calls me the 
prosecutor of the case, because prosecutors are there for the people. Our main 
concern is to defend the rights of people." Erdoğan added Turkish people were 
fully aware of which party was standing in defense of the Ergenekon suspects 
and which against them.32  
 
This debate between Prime Minister Erdoğan and the pro-secular CHP’s 
(Republican Peoples Party) leader Deniz Baykal, was one of the most popular news 
stories in Turkey during the Ergenekon case in July 2008. The Ergenekon case was 
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one of the biggest in recent Turkish history, pitting Erdoğan's supporters in the 
Islamist-rooted AKP against the secularist military establishment. 
 
 Following the first term of the AKP’s rule outlined in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 
focuses on the second term between 2007 and 2011. This term is crucial to scrutinise 
how the AKP government began to change position since its establishment in 2001. 
There are some developments that demonstrate the AKP’s political survival in 
Turkish politics. At this point, De Mesquita’s theory remains valid. According to De 
Mesquita, leaders or political parties follow politics to narrow down coalitions to fend 
off threats to their political survival. However, they should keep a large nominal 
selectorate and gain the support of the mass vote. When the AKP struggled against 
the Kemalist bureaucracy, it had to propagate an even more Islamic line to keep the 
support of conservative voters in the elections. This policy change was a condition for 
the survival of the AKP. However, the party was supported by liberals, due to the 
decrease in military powers in Turkish democracy, who believed that the AKP was 
fighting secular opponents to improve egalitarianism. As a result, the real breaking 
point of the AKP’s anti-democratic governance occurred after the 2011 election. This 
chapter explores the first steps of the clashes between AKP and opponents, framed 
within the AKP’s political survival dynamics. The AKP’s power struggle with Kemalist 
elites was a condition for the survival of the AKP and it became the second 
independent variable of the AKP’s political survival. This argument is supported by 
empirical evidence from elite interviews, the AKP’s policy documents, changes in the 
AKP’s party structure, the documents of the constitutional clashes between the AKP 
and Kemalist elites, legal changes in Turkish politics, public speeches by the AKP’s 
politicians, and other documentary sources cited throughout Chapter 3. 
 
2. The Beginning of the Clash Between the AKP and Kemalist Secular 
Elites 
 
De Mesquita and his colleagues (De Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson and Smith, 
2002: 559-590) indicate that political succession, or rather its avoidance, is at the 
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heart of the decisions leaders make. Except for the rare incumbent who voluntarily 
steps down, leaders overwhelmingly act as if they want to hold on to power for as 
long as they possibly can. Unfortunately, for them, they face numerous threats to 
their tenure. In addition to the normal give-and-take of everyday politics, leaders risk 
deposition through coups or mass uprisings such as revolutions and civil wars. De 
Mesquita and Smith demonstrate that the threat of military coups is one of the 
important risks for the survival of leaders (De Mesquita and Smith, 2009: 167-197)  
 
Although the AKP legitimized its position in internal and external actors’ eyes 
with the EU accession and democratisation processes during its first term, there were 
serious concerns from the Kemalist military bureaucracy about the AKP’s identity and 
agenda. One important journalist who works on Erdoğan’s leadership and the Milli 
Görüş movement, Ruşen Çakır, indicates there has been a real transformation in 
Erdoğan, but the problem is that it is not enough for the Kemalist elites and military 
powers (Çakır and Çalmuk, 2001). This research claims that the real problem for the 
Kemalist and military bureaucracy is their loss of power in Turkish politics. The AKP 
has overseen many improvements through the EU accession and democratisation 
processes. Western countries and Western-style business organisations and liberals 
began to support the AKP due to its efforts on Europeanisation and democratisation. 
Although these actors collaborated with the Kemalist military powers against the Milli 
Görüş movement during the 28 February process, the situation was reversed during 
the first term of the AKP government (Çınar, 2016: 16-19). Interestingly, Kemalist 
elites began to criticize the EU accession process alongside Erbakan’s Milli Görüş 
movement. Larabee and Rabasa explain this shift between these political actors as 
follows:  
 
In the past, the Kemalists were the main proponents of close ties to the West and 
Western integration. In recent years, however, this role has increasingly been 
assumed by the AKP. Ironically, as the AKP has pressed forward with reforms 
designed to bring Turkey into conformity with EU norms and regulations, some 
sectors in the Kemalist establishment have begun to worry that EU membership 
and further democratisation could undermine Turkish security, as well as their 
own political role (Larabee and Rabasa, 2008: 98). 
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The AKP’s staff and Erdoğan were aware of the military/Kemalist elites’ 
concerns about them. As discussed before, the AKP had been very careful about 
sensitive issues such as the headscarf due to its political survival. However, there 
were some policy proposals from the AKP government which did not help the 
perception of party’s ideology such as its efforts in 2005 to outlaw adultery, the 
attempts by some mayors to create alcohol-free zones, the policy of creating 
loopholes to allow students at imam hatip schools (religious schools) to transfer to 
academic high schools before graduation, thus granting them preferential treatment 
when going on to non-theology majors in university (Ifantis, 2009: 128). Nevertheless, 
these attempts did not succeed and most of them had not been implemented during 
the first term of the AKP up to 2007. Indeed, the AKP discovered the use of human 
rights and democracy discourses as a means of protecting itself from authoritarian 
Kemalists and the advantages of speaking the language of democracy and human 
rights helped to enable the party to communicate with Western countries. As a result, 
the West has emerged as an ally of the AKP rather than the Kemalists or military 
powers. 
 
One of the interviews of this research was conducted with Suat Kınıklıoğlu33 
and aimed to explore the conflict between the AKP and Kemalist elites. Kınıklıoğlu34 
claims that the Kemalist’s criticisms of the AKP’s ‘hidden agenda’ are not totally 
correct. According to Kınıklıoğlu, the EU accession process was one of the most 
important agendas of the AKP’s foreign policy in their first term. He argues that EU 
institutions instilled a discipline in the AKP. However, following Sarkozy’s election as 
French president in 2006, Turkey’s EU accession process was slowed down due to 
Merkel’s and Sarkozy’s opposition to it. After these developments, Cyprus’ EU 
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accession undermined the AKP’s discipline in terms of the democratisation process. 
Kınıklıoğlu points out that the AKP changed its political position from conservative 
democracy to authoritarianism. Kınıklıoğlu accepts the first steps of the AKP’s 
authoritarianism in this period but there are reasons why the general public were not 
aware of this phenomenon. One million protesters marched in the centre of Ankara 
and protested against the possibility of Prime Minister Erdoğan or any other member 
of the Justice and Development Party standing in the 2007 presidential elections. 
Kınıklıoğlu argues that these protestors do not want to have a good relationship with 
the United States or European Union and the AKP tried to prevent the threat of 
Turkey’s marginalisation in international affairs during this clash. At the same time, 
this picture given by Kiniklioglu was also a great advantage in legitimising the AKP's 
conservative identity. Kınıklıoğlu says that the AKP is one of the more useful 
examples for the international actors in light of 9/11 and the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism in the Middle East. He argues that the military bureaucracy planned 
to take action against the AKP government after 2007. Kiniklioglu's views support De 
Mesquita's argument on risks to political survival as mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
 
Like Kınıklıoğlu, Alev Özkazanç thinks that the military coup was planned 
against the AKP government. Some illegal organisations like Ergenekon planned to 
engage in assassinations and cause chaos in society in order to overthrow the 
government. Özkazanç argues that some parts of society - like the military 
bureaucracy and the Kemalists - saw the AKP as ‘illegitimate’. Another academic, 
Alev Çınar,35 says that ‘one of the best policies for the AKP’s government is the fight 
against military elites in order to reduce its power in Turkish politics’.36 
 
As previously indicated in De Mesquita's selectorate theory, leaders or political 
parties may face multiple risks or political threats to their political survival. In fact, the 
AKP has encountered two important threats since 2007. This chapter attempts to 
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evaluate how these threats are realized and examine the AKP’s reactions to these 
threats with regards to the AKP’s political survival.  
 
2.1. 2007 Presidential Election 
 
The Kemalist and military bureaucracy stands against the AKP government as 
they believe that the AKP has a hidden agenda to establish a state which is regulated 
by Islamic Law. According to them, the AKP is an Islamist Party and will be a serious 
threat to secularism in Turkey. On this issue, there are two important developments 
that took place before and after the 2007 General Election in terms of the AKP’s 
history. The first was the E-Momerandum created by the military on 27 April 2007.  
 
Before this election, the military/Kemalist powers’ concerns about the AKP 
government mounted after Yaşar Büyükanıt’s selection as Chief of the General Staff. 
In one of his speeches in early October 2006, Büyükanıt said the country faced an 
Islamist threat that must be tackled, adding his voice to a growing chorus of secularist 
warnings (Balcı, 2015: 67-94). Other key members of the military, İlker Başbuğ and 
secularist President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, issued similar public warnings about 
Islamists, though Erdoğan denied any threat to Turkish secularism (Shambayati and 
Sütçü: 2012: 112). Furthermore, Başbuğ and Büyükanıt upheld the army's role as the 
defender of Turkish secularism despite European Union criticisms that it should stay 
out of politics. The roles of Kemalists and Islamists have been changed in light of the 
Europeanisation process. Ifantis points out that ‘secularism and liberal democracy 
are not viewed by the Kemalist establishment as necessarily complementary, as they 
are in West’ (Ifantis, 2007: 18). The military’s role is as guardians of the secular state, 
but it occupies the paradoxical position of ‘safeguarding’ democracy while at the 
same time being a major impediment to Turkey’s real democratisation (Heper and 
Güney, 1996: 623). Doğan Güreş, Chief of General Staff from December 1990 to 
August 1994, pointed out that in Turkey the duties of the military include 
‘safeguarding the modernistic and secular features of the Turkish republic... (and) 
defending the country against its internal and external enemies’ (Heper, 2011: 241). 
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With the rise of the Milli Görüş movement in the 1990s, the military bureaucracy 
would emphasize that the armed forces are the natural guardians of secularism from 
the legacy of the late-Ottoman and early Republican periods (Narlı, 2000: 119-120). 
However, after the AKP came to power, the process did not become like the 1990s. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, international actors did not support the Welfare Party 
during the 28 February 1997 military coup. The AKP, which has proven that it is not a 
continuation of the Welfare Party, was supported by external actors such as EU 
during the struggle with Kemalist military powers between 2007 and 2011 (Bardakçı, 
2013: 411-428). 
 
The 2007 Presidential Election was the first struggle between the AKP and the 
Kemalist elites. The main problem for Kemalists and the military powers is the 
possibility of a president coming from an Islamist tradition, with a wife wearing the 
Islamic headscarf. Parliamentary speaker and one of the AKP’s founding members, 
Bülent Arınç, said such objections are aimed at electing a civilian, religious and 
democratic president (Dinçşahin, 2012: 629). Arınç’s declarations increased the 
polarisation between secularism and Islamism in Turkish society. A sea of flag-
waving demonstrators poured onto the streets of Istanbul, Ankara and elsewhere to 
protest the possible presidential candidacy of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.  
 
On 14 April 2007, two days before the start of nominations for the presidential 
elections37, over one million protesters marched in the centre of Ankara chanting 
slogans such as ‘Turkey is secular, and it will remain secular’, and ‘We do not want 
an imam for President’ to protest against the possibility of Prime Minister Erdoğan or 
another member of the Justice and Development Party standing in the presidential 
elections (Polat, 2008: 137). However, the AKP government’s Foreign Minister’s - 
Abdullah Gül - candidacy for the Turkish presidential elections was announced by 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. After Abdullah Gül’s candidacy, most people in Turkey 
awaited the Armed Forces’ position on the election. Since Turkey's presidential office 
is regarded as the guardian of the country's secular system, the fact that Gül's wife 
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wears the Islamic headscarf, as well as his own history in political Islam turned the 
elections into a political crisis (Jenkins, 2008: 6-7).  
 
The E-memorandum is a controversial General Staff statement released on its 
website in 27 April 2007 weighing in on the Turkish presidential elections of 2007. 
Turkey's army warned against questioning the country's secular system after a 
disputed first-round presidential vote in parliament (Grigoriadis, 2009: 1205). It stated 
that:  
 
The problem that emerged in the presidential election process is focused on 
arguments over secularism. The Turkish Armed Forces are concerned about the 
recent situation. ... the Turkish Armed Forces are a party in those arguments, and 
absolute defender of secularism. Also, the Turkish Armed Forces is definitely 
opposed to those arguments and negative comments. It will display its attitude 
and action openly and clearly whenever it is necessary (Tambar, 2009: 527). 
 
This E-memorandum signalled the start of the 28 February coup process. 
However, the AKP government did not react against that e-memorandum in the same 
was as Milli Görüş’s Welfare Party. In response to these statements, government 
spokesman Cemil Çiçek made a speech and said that the General Staff ‘remains 
under the Prime Minister’s orders. It is inconceivable that, in a democratic State of 
law, the general staff (…) should make such remarks’, he pointed out, reaffirming the 
government’s commitment to secular principles (Eligür, 2007: 2). As seen in this 
speech, the AKP did not want to make the same mistakes as the Welfare Party 
government because the EU and Western powers had supported the AKP during this 
clash due to its improvements on the EU accession and democratisation processes. 
 
During this debate, the opposition Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP) applied to 
the Constitutional Court seeking the annulment of the first round of voting. Many 
scholars argue that the 27 April E-Memorandum by armed forces should also be 
seen as a message to the judges in the Constitutional Court to declare the vote 
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invalid and dissolve parliament (Gümüşçü and Sert, 2009: 960). As a result, on 1 
May 2007, the Constitutional Court declared that the parliamentary election process 
of the new president must be halted on the grounds that the initiation of the election 
process had violated the constitutional procedures stated in the standing orders of 
the Grand Assembly (Özdemir, 2012: 49). This decision caused a political crisis. The 
AKP used this crisis and, after unsuccessful attempts to restart the presidential 
election rounds, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called for an early general election. Under 
these circumstances, the AKP went to early elections on 22 July 2007 and won a 
sweeping victory, increasing its share of the vote from 34% to 46.6% (Yılmaz, 2009: 
53-64). Between the 2002 and 2007 parliamentary elections, the AKP increased its 
electoral base from nearly 10 million votes to some 16 million (Çarkoğlu, 2007: 512). 
This research argues that the presidential election crisis, the failure to elect a 
president in the first and second round, and the intervention of the military in this 
election affected the 2007 General Election. Indeed, the AKP successfully 
campaigned for right-wing voters, who were disturbed by the slogans of the Kemalist 
demonstrations not to allow a religious person to become the country’s president. 
This victimization of the AKP served the party well and was a contributing factor to its 
election. 
 
The voting survey which was conducted by the research organisation KONDA 
after the elections on July 22, 2007, was evidence supporting this argument. For 
example, one of the questions asked to the respondents after the election; 'Would 
you agree that in some cases the elected politicians should be replaced by the 
military regime?' While the per centage of those who answered NO to this question 
was 62%, 70% of the voters who voted for the AKP in the elections gave a NO 
answer to this question. Again, the issues of secularism and religious values that 
have begun to clash with Kemalism are in another question. A total of 64% of the 
respondents answered YES to the question of ‘Should the state support the 
development of the religious beliefs of our citizens?’, while 66% of the AKP voters 
say YES. These data are also an example of the fact that the General Staff's e-
military coup attempt and the crisis in the presidential election are events that the 
AKP can use them for consolidating the voters in this election. Çarkoğlu summarizes 
this situation as follows; 
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At the outset of the electoral campaign, the expectation was that the presidential 
election debacler threats to secularism would be used intensively by the parties. 
However, both issues were very divisive. The debate about threats to secularism 
and the protest meetings had the potential to alienate conservative circles. The 
presidential election issue could only help the AKP win votes by claiming that 
they were the wronged underdogs. The MHP and the DP, who were both trying to 
appeal to the AKP’s conservative constituency, did not dare touch these issues 
much. Remaining isolated on this matter, the CHP campaign was ineffective in 
expanding its vote on the basis of these issues. (Çarkoğlu, 2007:501-519) 
 
 
Despite the AKP’s victory in the 2007 General Election, it did not gain the two-
thirds majority needed to elect a president. However, the other main opposition party, 
the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), announced its decision not to boycott the 
elections. As a result, Abdullah Gül was elected as the eleventh President of the 
Turkish Republic. After the 2007 Presidential Election, Erdoğan and his government 
were met with an obstacle from the Kemalist bureaucracy and judiciary (Dağı, 2008. 
25-26). 
 
2.2. The AKP’s Closure Trial 
 
After the defeat of the military coup threat in the 2007 election victory, the 
second-most important of the AKP’s battles came in the form of its own closure trial. 
The real threat confronting the AKP from the beginning of Prime Minister Erdoğan’s 
second term was not the direct intervention of the military, but rather the decision by 
the judiciary to close down the party. On 14 March 2008, the Public Prosecutor, 
Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya, forwarded a 162-page indictment to the Constitutional 
Court, requesting the closure of the AKP (Yılmaz, 2009: 19). Supreme Court of 
Appeals Chief Prosecutor, Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya, requested the closure of the 
AKP and a ban on 71 of its highest-level officials from engaging in politics for five 
years, including President Gül (a former AKP member) and Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan (Yalçınkaya, 2008: 191-194). Yalçınkaya's indictment claimed that 
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‘all actions and rhetoric of the AKP is aimed at establishing an Islamic society in 
which Islamic rules and values have priority... and then carrying out legal 
arrangements to move toward Shariah’ (Topal, 2012: 8-10). 
 
It cited as evidence speeches and statements from President Gül, Prime 
Minister Erdoğan, and other AKP officials. Some authors, like Dağı (2008), 
Grigoriadis (2009) and Keyman (2010), criticize Yalçınkaya’s indictment heavily. 
According to them, this indictment does not have sufficient evidence to prove the 
AKP’s anti-secular activities. Indeed, Yalçınkaya’s claims focused on the headscarf 
debate. Before this trial, the AKP had tried to lift the headscarf ban in education with 
constitutional amendments and this debate played a prominent role during the AKP’s 
closure trial (Lancaster, 2014, p.1682). This research claims that, this case is the 
second attempt of Kemalist elites against the AKP government but they had not been 
successful on this issue. The closure request failed by one vote, as only six out of 
eleven judges ruled in favour, with seven required. However, ten out of eleven judges 
agreed that the AKP had become ‘a centre for anti-secular activities’, leading to a 
loss of state funding for the party (Özbudun, 2012: 46). 
 
It is perceived that these threats will cause the AKP to alter its outlook, 
especially towards the Kemalists and secular elites. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
according to De Mesquita’s selectorate theory, political survival can be threatened in 
some distinct ways. These include domestic challenges to the leadership or military 
coup attempts. Following the military coup attempt of 27 April 2007, the AKP faced 
domestic challenges in the closure trial. This is evident from the reduction of the 
military's power in Turkish politics with the Ergenekon and Balyoz investigations and 
the destruction of the Kemalists' judicial power with the 2010 constitutional 
amendments. This chapter will initially focus on these two reactions in order to 
indicate how they contribute to the causal mechanism between AKP’s power struggle 
with Kemalist elites and the AKP’s political survival. These two threats to the survival 
of the AKP would lead the AKP to open a new field of struggle with the Kemalist elite. 
This struggle would also manifest itself as the protecting of AKP’s political survival in 
Turkish politics. 
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3. The AKP’s Reactions against Kemalist Secular Elites 
 
3.1. Ergenekon and Balyoz (Sledgehammer) Investigations 
 
As discussed above, De Mesquita and his colleagues focus on the threats 
leaders face like military coup attempst or other similar issues in order to survive in 
politics. Erdoğan became more aware these risks after the military’s E-memorandum 
and the AKP’s closure trial initiated by the Kemalist judiciary. The AKP government 
under the Erdoğan’s leadership avoided opposing the military due to lessons it had 
learned from the fate of the Welfare Party. As such, they had to be careful about 
sensitive issues like the headscarf or other similar Islamic matters during the first 
term of the AKP. However, these attempts by military Kemalist elites changed the 
AKP’s position and its huge winning coalition in the second term of the AKP. 
 
The first important events of the AKP’s policy transformation were the 
Ergenekon and Balyoz cases against the military elite and the Kemalist section of the 
Turkish media and academia. One of the important cases that dominated the agenda 
of 2008, a year full of legal processes, was the so-called Ergenekon operation. 
Although the investigation was launched in 2007, the operation and the process 
accelerated and gained pace throughout the year. More than 100 people were 
subsequently charged with forming an illegal organisation which provoked a series of 
incidents that would pave the way for a military coup (Kurt and Toktaş, 2010: 397). 
Two retired generals, some former army officers, journalists and academics were 
among those included in the allegations (Balcı, 2010: 92). As noted above, Erdoğan 
supported this investigation and accepted the claim of his prosecutor’s position for 
this case.  
 
However, this investigation demonstrates the transformation from conservative 
democracy to the rise of Islamism and authoritarianism under AKP rule in light of the 
many problems with the rule of law in this case. In my fieldwork, one of the 
participants, Suat Kınıklıoğlu, a prominent member of the AKP between 2002 and 
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2007, mentioned Gareth Jenkins’ report about the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases. 
According to Kınıklıoğlu, although the military bureaucracy planned to take action 
against the AKP government after 2007, this plan was not put into practice. He 
discusses that the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases have many problematic issues in 
terms of the rule of law due to this reason. Following the arrest of journalists like 
Nedim Şener and Ahmet Şık38, he began to think about the reliability of these cases. 
Kınıklıoğlu indicates that the AKP’s authoritarian process started in these years but 
he and his liberal colleagues were not aware of this issue due to the clash between 
the Kemalist bureaucracy and the AKP. 
 
Kınıklıoğlu claims that the AKP and he did not pay attention to Jenkins’ report. 
Gareth Jenkins is a non-Resident Senior Research Fellow with the Joint Centre’s Silk 
Road Studies Programme and Turkey Initiative. He is a writer and analyst based in 
Istanbul, where he has been a resident since 1989. His special fields of interest are 
civil-military relations, the Kurdish issue, terrorism, security issues, and political 
Islam. The important point for Jenkins is that he is one of the researchers who read 
the whole Ergenekon indictment. Following his reading he wrote a report about this 
case, Between Fact and Fantasy: Turkey’s Ergenekon Investigation. Jenkins noted in 
this report:  
 
In fact, there is no proof that the Ergenekon organisation as described in the 
indictments exists or has ever existed. Indeed, the indictments are so full of 
contradictions, rumors, speculation, misinformation, illogical ties, absurdities and 
untruths that they are not even internally consistent or coherent (Jenkins, 2011: 
11). 
 
Bill Park (2009) also highlights Jenkins’ numerous judicial flaws surrounding 
the Ergenekon case: 1) the "evidence" often amounts to little more than hearsay and 
                                                          
38
 Since early 2011 it is the centre of the Odatv case of the Ergenekon trials, with Odatv accused of 
being the "media arm" of the Ergenekon organisation. The indictment accuses the defendants to be 
founders, leaders, members or supporters of the "armed terror organisation Ergenekon", to have 
incited to hatred and enmity, to have obtained secret documents etc. Ahmet Şık and Nedim Şener, 
neither of whom worked for Odatv, are charged with supporting Ergenekon. 
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is full of contradictions and inconsistencies; 2) a majority of the suspects seem guilty 
of little other than opposition to the AKP government; 3) the circumstances of many 
of the detentions are illegal; 4) the police raids have themselves not been carried out 
with due process; 5) there has been extensive and illegal leaking of information to the 
pro-government media.  
 
As seen in the Ergenekon case, Erdoğan and the AKP government began to 
fight against the Kemalist/military elites by illicit means. The second pillar of this 
struggle is the Balyoz (Sledgehammer) investigation which was launched in 2010. A 
total of 331 serving and retired members of the military were convicted in the Balyoz 
trial due to planning a coup at a military seminar in Istanbul on 5-7 March 2003. 
However, this case has many problematic issues due to the claims of this seminar 
meeting in 2003. Jenkins (2014: 1-2) points out that the metadata on the CD 
appeared to show that the documents containing the coup plot had been last saved 
on 5 March 2003 and were not subsequently amended. However, not only did the 
documents contain numerous anachronisms, contradictions and absurdities, but 
forensic analysis showed that they had been written using Microsoft Office 2007, the 
beta version of which was not available until 2006 (Martin, 2015: 169-200). 
 
The Kurdish Islamist politicians who supported the Ergenekon and Balyoz 
investigations within the AKP’s struggle against the Kemalist/military bureaucracy in 
the AKP’s second term argue why the AKP’s this power struggle was unsuccessful. 
One of these politicians is Ayhan Bilgen39, a Kurdish Islamist writer and politician. He 
claims that the decrease of military powers in Turkish politics should be the most 
important goal for political parties in Turkey and the AKP was successful in achieving 
this. However, this achievement has existed entirely to bring about the AKP's own 
Islamist and authoritarian governance according to Bilgen. Bilgen says that ‘if the 
AKP were sincere about democratisation and civilisation, it would continue to change 
the other anti-democratic bureaucratic institutions like the Higher Education Council 
                                                          
39
 Bilgen is a headperson of Islamist human rights organisation Mazlum-Der between in the 2000s. 
Following of this, he joined the People’s Democracy Party (HDP) in 2014 and he elected as a deputy 
of HDP in June 2015 Election. He was a spokesperson of HDP. He has been arrested as part of a 
terror probe on January 2017. 
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(YÖK) or the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet).’40 However, Bilgen cannot see 
the AKP paying attention to these issues.  
 
Another Islamist Kurdish politician, Adem Geveri, focused on the AKP’s 
agenda during the clash between the military and Erdoğan’s government. Geveri was 
the General Secretary of the Islamist Movement (Azadi Initiative) until 2014. In 2014, 
he joined the HDP and was elected as a deputy in the 2015 election. Geveri explains 
that the AKP’s real goal is not to reduce the military/Kemalist bureaucracy’s power in 
Turkish political life - Erdoğan and his colleagues simply tried to control the military 
forces in order to gain their support. De Mesquita's selectorate theory runs parallel to 
Geveri's view at this point. According to De Mesquita, leaders or political parties who 
eliminate threats start to form their own cliques. After the AKP deactivated Kemalist 
soldiers, it created a new military bureaucracy that had a close relationship with the 
AKP government. Moreover, Geveri claims that the support of the EU and the United 
States on this issue helped the AKP to dominate the armed forces. He argues that 
‘this is not success for democracy, only for the AKP’.41  
 
Like Kurdish Islamist politicians, some liberal/secular academics supported the 
AKP against military or secular elites. One of them was Professor Alev Özkazanç 
from Ankara University. She is a specialist on women’s and gender issues in Turkey 
in relation to Turkish political and social history. She does not agree that the 
Ergenekon case and the military interventions against the AKP government were not 
totally unrealistic. She says that she realised the military’s coup was a plan against 
the AKP government.42 Some illegal organisations like Ergenekon planned to engage 
in assassinations and cause chaos in society in order to overthrow the government. 
Özkazanç believes that some parts of society, like the military bureaucracy or the 
Kemalists, saw the AKP as ‘illegitimate’ and the AKP needed to fight against these 
groups. However, the AKP has complicated this issue within the concept of 
civilisation and democratisation. After 2011, according to Özkazanç, there were also 
some challenges to Turkey’s democracy under the Erdoğan regime. 
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 Interview with Ayhan Bilgen- Ankara/ 1st December 2015 
41
 Interview with Adem Geveri- Ankara/ 24th November 2015 
42
 Interview with Alev Özkazanç-Ankara / 27th October 2015 
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One of the other liberal academics interviewed as part of this study is İhsan 
Dağı,43 who supported the AKP during their second term. Dağı argues that although 
the AKP made several improvements in terms of democracy and human rights prior 
to 2007, its attempts to dominate the military have not receded. The military did not 
accept the democratisation process due to its belief in the AKP’s hidden agenda. 
However, Dağı does not claim that the AKP has a hidden agenda to establish an 
Islamist state in Turkey. He says that if the AKP has a hidden agenda, it is not 
possible to realise it with the EU accession process because the process has 
changed the economic and social structure of Turkish politics. The interview asked a 
burning question to Dağı: how we can understand the AKP’s shift and the rise of 
Islamism? According to Dağı, the AKP develops a step-by-step strategy for survival 
in Turkish politics. 44 
 
Another supporter of the AKP’s struggle against Kemalist domination of the 
military is Alev Çınar. Çınar is a Professor at the Department of Political Science at 
Bilkent University. Çınar says that ‘one of the best policies for the AKP government is 
the fight against military elites in order to reduce its power in Turkish politics’.45 She 
does not agree that these clashes and the Ergenekon and Balyoz investigations are 
unrealistic and argues that they are important for democratic consolidation in Turkey. 
However, the main problem for Çınar is that there are serious concerns for the right 
to a fair trial these cases as well as the prolonged pre-trial detention of some 
defendants, which have overshadowed the important contribution of these efforts to 
combat the impunity of the military, according to Human Rights Watch’s 2013 Report. 
 
The other important explanation to understand the power struggle between the 
AKP and the Kemalist bureaucracy is the centre-periphery theory. The group 
                                                          
43
 İhsan Dağı is an associate professor of international relations at Middle East Technical University in 
Ankara, Turkey, where he teaches courses on the place of human rights in international relations and 
the identity politics of Islamists. 
44
 Interview with İhsan Dağı- Ankara/ 22nd December 2015 
45
 Interview with Alev Çınar- Ankara/ 28th November 2015 
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interviews with students from Middle East Technical University (METU)46 explain that 
the AKP-Erdoğan connection is based on using Mardin’s interpretation of the centre-
periphery theory in the Turkish case. According to Mardin’s perspective, the Turkish 
attempt to bring about modernisation through Westernisation has not been supported 
by the masses in Turkey.  
 
Mardin (1973: 170-171) applies the terms ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ to Ottoman 
society and reaches the conclusion that this society consisted of city dwellers, 
including the Sultan and his officials and nomads. The centre included city dwellers 
while the periphery consisted of nomads. The integration of the centre and the 
periphery was not achieved (Berktay and Farouqhi, 2016: 202). For the rise of the 
ulema elites in the empire after the sixteenth century, Sunni Orthodox Islam 
represented the centre against the Sufi-heterodox Islam traditionally represented in 
the religious elements of the periphery (Mardin, 1973: 171). These two societal 
characteristics, namely the existence of the centre and periphery, and the absence of 
their successful integration, also existed in modern Turkish society and remains as 
the major duality in Turkey (Jung, 2006: 117-137). Moreover, Mardin argues the gap 
between centre and periphery continued during the process of Kemalist 
modernisation.  
 
Mardin claims that this modernity process failed to win the hearts of Muslim 
people in Turkey due to the state repression and the abuse of power by Westernising 
bureaucrats (Mardin, 1973). They also regard the AKP’s success as a historic victory 
of the periphery over the centre. In this context, the periphery is the cultural and 
political territory of the oppressed and marginalised majority - or put simply, the site 
of civil society - while the centre is the place of the state, the power of which is in the 
hands of a secular military-civil bureaucracy. This view claims that Erdoğan has 
taken the periphery’s support due to his lower-class mythology. One of my 
interviewees stated that although Erdoğan has a nationalist character, Kurdish 
                                                          
46
 The Political Science Student Club of the METU invited me to join their roundtable discussion about 
Islam and the AKP. A great majority of these students came from the Politics and International 
Relations Department. 
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people support him due to his struggle against the Kemalist state bureaucracy.47 
Çiçek (2016: 155) says that, the Kurds were struggling against the traditional state 
apparatus dominated by Kemalist cadres. The AKP has reached a serious level of 
support, especially among the Islamist Kurds with this struggle. Despite differences 
between the various Kurdish pro-Islamist groups, it is obvious that Islam constitutes 
the predominant frame of reference for their social consciousness. For most of the 
Kurds supporting the AKP, its pro-Islamist outlook is the most important reason 
behind their support (Çiçek, 2013: 159-162). However, Kurds no longer support 
Erdogan after 2015 as he did not keep his promises towards them. Bill Park (2016: 
463-464) states that, some reforms were introduced but the AKP government 
appeared inactive and increasingly insincere after 2015. Although the ceasefire 
partially held, sporadic violent incidents still occurred. Turkish security forces in the 
region were increased and their infrastructure improved. 
 
On the one hand, the Islamist Kurds and liberals supported the AKP, thinking 
that the AKP's democratisation will come from the struggle with Kemalism. On the 
other hand, the Kemalists and nationalists have argued that this struggle of the AKP 
is completely pragmatic. The fieldwork conducted other interesting interviews with the 
nationalist politician Mevlüt Karakaya 48 about these matters. According to Karakaya, 
the AKP used this struggle as a tool of victimisation rather than democratisation. 
Erdoğan and the AKP’s policy in these cases is pragmatist and uses religious 
discourse to appeal to conservative voters in the elections. Karakaya49 argues that 
the AKP always benefited from this discourse before the 2007 and 2011 general 
elections in Turkey and one of the best-known examples of this is the 2007 
Presidential election. He argues that Ergenekon, Balyoz and other cases became the 
AKP’s tools with which to manipulate and consolidate voters. This chapter 
concentrates on the AKP’s power struggle with the Kemalist elite, which is the 
second intervening variable of the causal mechanism between the survival of the 
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 Group meeting with METU Political Science Student Group- Ankara/9th December 2015 
48
 Mevlüt Karakaya is a Turkish politician from the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), who has served 
as a Member of Parliament for Adana since 7 June 2015, He also briefly worked at the World 
Bank between 1997 and 1998. He has taught at Gazi University, Hacettepe University, İzmir University 
of Economics as well as Başkent University. Having been active as a MHP member and serving as a 
member of the Party Executive Board for 10 years, he was appointed Deputy Leader of the MHP on 
19 June 2011 with responsibilities for party finance.  
49
 Interview with Mevlüt Karakaya- Ankara/23 November 2015.  
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AKP and the rise of Islamism. The Ergenekon and Balyoz (Sledgehammer) cases 
show how this intervening variable works in this context. After threats from the 
Kemalist bureaucracy to the survival of the AKP, the AKP wanted to erase the 
Kemalist segment from the state. This conflict is a condition for the survival of the 
AKP and it pushed the AKP towards more authoritarian policies against these forces, 
which have been the guardians of secularism since the Republican era. 
 
One of the victims of these cases is Mustafa Balbay, who has been in prison 
for three years due to the Ergenekon investigation. He says, ‘we started to write 
about the AKP’s authoritarianism and Islamism in 2007 and received a prize while in 
Silivri’ (a prison where the Ergenekon trials took place).50 Balbay argues that when 
Erdoğan wanted to engage in authoritarianism, he used these clashes to gain the 
support of external institutions such as the European Union and the United States. 
 
Some other academics are aware of the AKP’s rising authoritarianism after 
2007. One of them is Professor İlhan Uzgel.51 Uzgel thinks that, in terms of the 
democratisation process, the Kurdish peace process, and the EU accession process, 
all of these dynamics were started after 1999. As a result, these developments did 
not start with the AKP government, who just continued these already-existing 
processes. According to Uzgel, some leftist liberals and other groups see the AKP as 
a ‘redeemer’ and Erdoğan as a ‘deliverer’.52 Uzgel warned his colleagues about this 
issue in 2005 and wrote an article in the Radikal newspaper on this issue.53 He 
argues that most of the liberal scholars gave unlimited credit to the AKP government 
in the struggle against Kemalist military domination and they could not have been 
aware of the rise of AKP’s authoritarianism in Turkish politics. 
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 Interview with Mustafa Balbay- Ankara/ 1st December 2015 
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 Uzgel received his master’s degree from Ankara University’s International Relations Relations 
department after graduating from Uludağ University’s International Relations Department. In the year 
1993 he conducted research at London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) towards his 
PhD thesis. Receiving his MPhil degree from Cambridge University, to which he attended utilising 
Jean Monnet Scholarship, Uzgel completed his PhD studies at Ankara University in 1997. Professor 
Uzgel was currently teaching on International Relations Theories, the Balkans, US Foreign Policy and 
Turkish Foreign Policy at International Relations Deparment at Ankara University, where he started his 
academic career in 1988. He was dismissed from Ankara University by AKP’s executive order. 
52
 Interview with İlhan Uzgel- Ankara/ 22th October 2015 
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 http://www.radikal.com.tr/radikal2/akpyi-konumlandirmak-872203/ (Accessed Date: 01/09/2017) 
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A similar explanation has come from Professor Fethi Açıkel.54 Açıkel55 says 
that he doesn’t agree with the AKP’s identification as a ‘redeemer’ from Kemalism 
during their clash with military/secular powers. He points out that secularist or 
Kemalist elites were proved right about the AKP’s transition from democracy to 
authoritarianism in Turkish politics. Mustafa Şen, Associate Professor at Middle East 
Technical University in the field of the sociology of religion in Turkey, focuses on the 
slight chance of a military coup in Turkish politics during the 2000s. Şen56 indicates 
that the AKP were established within a huge coalition in Turkish domestic politics. 
About half of Turkish citizens voted for them in the election and there was 
international support for the AKP and Erdoğan’s government from institutions like the 
European Union. It was not possible for the military forces to find support against the 
AKP, which they were supported by internal and external actors in the 28 February 
military coup. As seen in the new developments in the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases, 
these trials are based on illegal evidence and Şen demonstrates why the AKP has 
not been fair in its struggle against military domination.  
 
The Ergenekon and Balyoz investigations led to two opposing views among 
politicians and academics. While one group believed that these investigations would 
primarily lead to the civilianization of Turkey, another group advocated that the AKP 
would move towards an authoritarian position.  
 
The last raid of Ergenekon investigation particularly focused on secular-oriented 
civil society associations, such as the Association for Supporting Modern Life 
[Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği], Modern Education Foundation [Çağdaş 
Eğitim Vakfı], pro-Atatürk Thinking Association [Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği], and 
’68 Foundation [68’liler Vakfı]. Among the arrests and detentions there were 
executive members and staff of these secular civil society associations, such as 
Professor Ayşe Yüksel; secular-oriented university presidents, such as President 
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 Açıkel is a professor of political sociology in the Faculty of Political Science at Ankara University. He 
has published articles in the fields of historical and political sociology, nationalism and Turkish politics. 
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 Interview with Fethi Açıkel, Ankara/ 8 November 2015. 
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 Interview with Mustafa Şen, Ankara/22 December 2015. 
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of Başkent University Professor Mehmet Haberal, President of Giresun University 
Professor Osman Metin Öztürk, former President of Ondokuz Mayıs University 
Professor Ferit Bernay, former President of Uludağ University Professor Mustafa 
Yurtkuran, and former President of İnönü University Professor Fatih Hilmioğlu; 
secular-oriented professors, such as Professor Erol Manisalı; and a number of 
students who received scholarship from the Modern Education Foundation. 
(Eligür, 2011: 274).  
 
As Eligür emphasized in this quotation, the AKP government not only fought 
with the Kemalist military powers who were behind the coup attempt against the AKP, 
but arrested authors and academics known for their secular identity in Turkish 
society. However, there were also those who saw the AKP as a democratisation 
movement. On the one hand, scholars like Keyman (2010), Özbudun (2009), and 
Grigoriadis (2009) thought that the AKP would give clear political signals of their 
intentions to respect religious freedoms and advocate a tolerant version of 
secularism. On the other hand, some, like Eligür (2011), Baran (2010), and Bogdani 
(2011), claim that the AKP won this war against secular forces and had the power 
alone in Turkey’s political area after 2007.  
 
Obviously, the AKP clearly increased the role of Islam in Turkish politics and 
public life with authoritarian policies for the post-2007 period. One of the scholars, 
Walter Posch (2007), claims that ‘Islamisation in Turkish everyday life is a fact and 
primarily affects small and medium-sized towns. The renaissance of religious 
consciousness is undeniable as people are more pious, at least outwardly, and the 
political discourse revolves much more around religion than was the case a few 
decades ago’. Bogdani (2011: 17-49) gives the following examples as evidence of 
increasing Islamisation in Turkey: boys and girls are separated in many public places, 
and women are covered from head to foot; a court punished a woman due to her 
wearing ‘improper clothing’ and a court claimed that it was ‘exhibitionism’; alcohol is 
harder to come by in the shops; many shops did not sell pork or pork products; 
newspaper advertisements are photo-shopped to lengthen sleeves and skirts; Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan has called on women to have at least three children and their party 
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has very few female members of Parliament and members of the Cabinet; the 
number of women in the workforce dropped by about 10% between 2000 and 2006. 
 
In March 2011, the Directorate of Religious Affairs launched the new so-called 
‘family imam’ project (Karakaya, 2015: 6). Along with other religious officials including 
the Mufti of certain regions, the imams would pay visits to citizens’ homes to listen to 
their problems, provide advice on resolving them, and warn society at large about the 
harms of using alcohol, cigarettes, and drugs (Eligür, 2014: 151).The other issue is 
the religious discrimination against secularists and minority groups. A February 2011 
report by the Istanbul-based Bilgi University entitled Discrimination Based on Religion 
and Faith in Turkey57 found that many victims of religious discrimination have bowed 
to Islamist pressure and opted to change their lifestyles. In August 2010, the 
government revised the National Security Policy Paper (NSPP) and removed Islamist 
“reactionism” or fundamentalism from the list of threats. Islamist reactionism and 
fundamentalist groups had been on the list of crucial domestic threats to the secular-
democratic Turkish state (Gürsoy, 2011: 293-308). In addition to these critical 
developments in Turkish domestic politics in relation to the rise of Islamism, there are 
crucial reactions in Turkish policy to this phenomenon. Banu Eligür (2011: 273) 
indicates that under AKP rule, Turkey’s establishment of close relations with political 
Islamist regimes like Iran, Hamas, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia should also be noted. 
This became even more visible during Israel’s military operations in Gaza during the 
winter of 2009. 
 
Another issue that highlights the smaller AKP’s winning coalition in light of its 
political survival is the change of the AKP’s coalitional party structure during its 
second term. The other coalition members of the AKP’s founding process began to 
withdraw their support for the AKP during the second term of Erdoğan’s government. 
Some of the AKP’s party members who are related to centre-right actors or non-Milli 
Görüş’ politicians left the AKP after 2007. Two of Erdoğan’s top advisers, Reha 
Çamuroğlu and Cüneyd Zapsu, who identified themselves as liberal, quit their posts, 
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while two other key figures of the party, Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat (who is a Kurdish 
politician), resigned after corruption allegations surrounded them, triggering concerns 
that the prime minister had lost the architects of his successful policies of the 
previous term (Hidayet, 2018: 68).  
 
As argued in Chapter 2, when the FP was closed down by the constitutional 
court in 2001 for being a centre for anti-secular activities, Erdoğan tried to persuade 
many people with no Islamic background to join the party in an attempt to reach out 
to wider social and political groups. As a result, liberal names continued joining 
during the election period, especially names from the centre-right like Erkan Mumcu 
from the Motherland Party, and Köksal Toptan and Mehmet Dülger from the True 
Path Party (Dagi, 2006). However, all of these political actors did not continue their 
political career with the AKP after its second term in government.  
 
The other political split with the AKP government came from Western-style 
business organisations, in particular TUSIAD. As discussed in Chapter 2, there is no 
serious conflict between the secular business community and the AKP because its 
policies have been extremely business-friendly. Nevertheless, Erdoğan and his 
colleagues knew that they needed to create their own oligarchs rather than TUSIAD’s 
Western economic actors such as Aydın Doğan. The Doğan case is therefore one of 
the most important examples of the AKP’s political survival during its second term. 
While the media outlets, most of which were acquired by pro-AKP businessmen after 
having been seized by the TMSF, were financed by government-run companies’ 
advertisement, their mainstream rivals were roughed up by seizures, tax audits, and 
severe penalties. In 2009, the Doğan Group, which once enjoyed an advertising 
share of 58 per cent in the printed media, was given a tax penalty of 825 million 
Turkish Liras, the group was forced to reduce its assets and shut down some of its 
media ventures (Irak, 2016: 345). 
 
Consequently, this study argues that the tension between Kemalist/military 
elites and the AKP was the first contributing factor for ensuirng AKP’s political 
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survival along with its decreasing coalition. The last breaking point for this 
phenomenon was the Turkish constitutional referendum in 2010.  
 
4. ‘Not Enough But Yes’ (Yetmez Ama Evet): 2010 Turkish Constitutional 
Referendum 
 
Turkey needs a new social contract, a brand new constitution. If it’s “yes,” the 
constitution process will be sped up and become a priority topic of the next 
elections due in 2011. If the package is rejected, the new constitution will be 
shelved for some time because the government’s hand will be weakened. And 
solutions to our arch-old problems, primarily the Kurdish question, will be delayed 
again. Make no mistake.58 
 
The quote from prominent liberal intellectual Cengiz Aktar, who joined the 
platform ‘Not Enough But Yes’ (Yetmez Ama Evet) for the Turkish constitutional 
referendum in September 2010 (Bali, 2010). This platform (initited in July 2010), 
which brought together well-known and self-declared liberal intellectuals such as 
Baskın Oran, Adalet Ağaoğlu, Osman Can, Ferhat Kentel, and Nabi Yağcı, declared 
that they were going to support the constitutional changes that were the subject of 
the referendum (Ciddi, 2011). The Turkish Parliament adopted a series of 
constitutional amendments in 2010. However, the amendments did not achieve the 
required two-thirds majority (67%) needed to immediately implement the changes 
and the amendments went to the electorate through a referendum (Oruco, 2011: 11). 
 
During the referendum process, two important members of the AKP’s coalition, 
the Gülen movement and some liberal intellectuals who established the ‘Yetmez Ama 
Evet’ platform, supported Erdoğan’s government and called for a ‘yes’ vote. They 
believed that the decision by Turkish voters on 26 amendments to the constitution 
would represent Turkey "coming to terms" with the coup d'etat of 12 September 
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1980. Başak Alpan points out that59 the constitution had been drawn up by a 
constituent assembly, appointed and supervised by the military leaders, and adopted 
by a nationwide referendum held under martial conditions. The AKP claimed that the 
26 amendments could be seen as ‘coming to terms’ with the coup is far from reality 
(Düzgit, 2012: 329-346). As discussed above, some of the liberal academics and 
politicians voted ‘yes’ in the referendum due to the AKP’s claim about 1980 coup and 
the democratisation process which was linked to EU accession (Duygu and Üstüner, 
2016: 406-428). They believed these changes were aimed at bringing the constitution 
into compliance with European Union accession process’ standards (Karaveli, 2010: 
85-102). However, these amendments have many problems in terms of the rule of 
law and democracy. Murat Sevinç argues that if consensus really matters for the 
ratification of the constitution, the amendments should be classified according to their 
content and voted upon separately by the voters.60 This research suggests that these 
changes harmed the principle of the separation of powers in the Turkish legal 
system. Most of the members of the Constitutional Court have been elected by pro-
AKP President Abdullah Gül and the anti-democratic structure of the Higher Board of 
Prosecutors and Judges (HSYK-Hakim ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu) has continued 
with these amendments (Bardakçı, 2013: 411-428). 
 
Indeed, most of the Turkish left ran a campaign for a ‘no’ vote in the 
referendum due to the threats to the rule of law and democracy. Nevertheless, the 
results showed the majority supported the constitutional amendments, with 58% in 
favour and 42% against. Some of the liberal academics and politicians from my 
participants in the fieldwork voted ‘yes’ due to the aim of the 
democratisation/civilisation process in Turkey but they have since become aware of 
the AKP’s authoritarianism in the third term of Erdoğan’s government, claiming, ‘we 
were deceived!’61 This research claims that they had not been deceived by the AKP 
because this alliance is related to the AKP’s political survival. Following of E-
Memorendum and the AKP’s closure trial in 2008, the AKP began to fight against 
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Kemalist/military powers and used the tool of democratisation in order to legitimize 
their struggle, although this struggle has many problems in terms of the rule of law 
and democracy. These liberal intellectuals and the Gülen movement are one of the 
Kemalist elites’ rivals and they supported the AKP in order to decrease the 
Kemalist/military elites’ power in Turkish politics. In this sense, the rule of law and 
democracy is not a particularly sensitive issue for their agenda.  
 
Gareth Jenkins summarises the AKP’s ‘real’ agenda with its coalition members 
during the beginning of this conflict as follows: 
 
At the time, what is commonly known as the Gülen Movement had formed an 
alliance of convenience with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In return for 
its support, Erdoğan had allowed the movement to establish a substantial 
presence in the police and the judiciary, which was then used to target their 
shared enemies, opponents and rivals – ranging from hardline secularists to 
military personnel, charity workers, journalists, lawyers, trade union officials, 
opposition politicians, Turkish nationalists and Kurdish nationalists. Thousands of 
people were charged and imprisoned and tens of thousands more were 
intimidated into silence for fear of meeting a similar fate.” (Jenkins, 2009: 1) 
 
This research supports Jenkins' arguments. The AKP ruled to protect its power 
by eliminating other actors in Turkish politics. Following the referendum, the size of 
the HSYK and the Constitutional Court was increased - from 7 to 22 and from 11 to 
17, respectively - and President Gül and the AKP-dominated parliament appointed 
pro-AKP personnel to these institutions (Özbudun, 2013: 293). In the October 
2010 HSYK elections, 11,000 judges and prosecutors voted for all 16 of the Justice 
Ministry-supported candidates, representing another major victory for the AKP. The 
ministry’s official representation on the board increased from two to five. In November 
2010, the new HSYK promptly approved the Justice Ministry’s annual appointment 
list of 190 high-ranking judges and prosecutors (Eligür, 2014: 151-175). Likewise, in 
December 2010, the HSYK elected chairmanships for its three chambers, which 
regulate promotions, appointments, duties of serving judges and prosecutors, their 
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expulsions, and admission of new judges and prosecutors to the profession. Three 
Justice Ministry-supported HSYK members were also elected as the chamber 
chairs. In the winter of 2011, the AKP continued to restructure the high judiciary. In 
February 2011, the AKP-dominated parliament passed a new regulation to increase 
the number of members of the Supreme Court of Appeals and the Council of State: 
The Supreme Court of Appeals’ membership increased from 250 to 387 and that of 
the Council of State from 95 to 156 (Eligür, 2014: 151-175). The AKP maintained its 
policy of increasing its control over the high judiciary by appointing pro-
AKP individuals.  
 
The power struggle with Kemalist elites mentioned at the beginning of the 
chapter has been shown as a democratisation movement. However, the AKP went 
far beyond its struggle with these threats, neutralizing all the Kemalist and secular 
elites in the state bureaucracy and Turkish politics. At the same time, this 
phenomenon would have forced the AKP to go towards a more authoritarian and 
Islamist position because of both its electoral base and intra-party dynamics. This 
chapter has explored how the beginning of the rise of authoritarianism was built 
throughout the AKP’s second term and how it depends on the AKP’s survival. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the AKP established itself in 2001 and won the 
elections of November 2002. When the party first assumed power in 2002, the 
winning coalition included both domestic and external supporters such as European 
countries and the United States, liberal intellectuals within Turkey, moderate Islamist 
groups like the Gülen movement, conservative citizens of Turkish society, centre-
right voters, faith-based non-profit organisations, Western-style business institutions 
like TUSIAD. However, this coalition started to shrink after the second term of the 
AKP 2007 and 2011. During this term, there was a serious clash between the AKP 
and the military/Kemalist bureaucracy in the form of investigations and trials such as 
Ergenekon and Balyoz. This chapter explored the dynamics of this power struggle 
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and the AKP’s power consolidation process in light of the causal mechanism of 
AKP’s political survival.  
 
The first independent variable of AKP’s political survival, the legitimisation of 
the AKP's conservatism, was examined in Chapter 2. In this chapter, the second 
independent variable of AKP’s survival, the power struggle of the AKP with the 
Kemalist elite, was explained. De Mesquita's selectorate theory, which was used as a 
political survival theory in this study, foresees threats to survival in particular. It 
argues that political leadership begins a far more comprehensive struggle to 
overcome these threats. In case of Turkey, the AKP government encountered the 
2007 coup attempt and the 2008 closure trial. The AKP has not only struggled with 
the forces that created these threats, but also tried to end the existence of all the 
Kemalist and secular elites in the state bureaucracy. At the same time, the AKP’s 
power struggle also contributed to preserve its political survival in Turkish politics. 
The Ergenekon and ‘Sledgehammer’ cases, the 2010 Constitutional amendments, 
and policy changes contributing to the AKP’s political survival in Turkish politics have 
been examined in this chapter as intervening variables clarifying this second 
independent variable. 
 
At Turkey’s general elections on 12 June 2011, the governing Justice and 
Development Party won 50% of the overall vote. This was the first time that a ruling 
party in Turkey has increased its vote in a third term. In Chapter 4, first the 2011 
elections will be analysed in detail and the AKP, which followed a populist and 
authoritarian path in the clash with the Kemalists in particular will examine how the 
voters consolidated in the 2011 elections with these policies. Thus, the direct causal 
link between populist and authoritarian policy instruments and AKP’s survival will also 
shape the post-2011 policies of the AKP. The causal mechanism between 
authoritarianism and populism and political survival of the AKP as the third 
independent variable in Chapter 4 will be explained by exploring policy tools used as 
intervening variables.   
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Chapter 4: The Rise of Populism and Authoritarianism during the AKP’s 
Third Term (2011-14) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
According to them we don’t understand politics. According to them we don’t 
understand art, theatre, cinema, poetry. According to them we don’t understand 
aesthetics, architecture. According to them we are uneducated, ignorant, the 
lower-class, who has to be content with what is being given, needy; meaning, we 
are a group of negroes (Ferguson, 2014: 77). 
 
AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s remarks during the Gezi Park protests 
and his political understanding of the populism have been used by the AKP during its 
third term in office. This chapter will focus on the AKP’s populism through 
authoritarianism in the AKP’s third term to understand the AKP’s political survival.  
One of the most important factors contributing to the survival of leaders or parties has 
been to keep the nominal selectorate (voters) as large as possible. During its second 
and third periods, the AKP broke that broad voting coalition on the basis of its 
founding philosophy and eliminated its partners one by one. The distinguishing 
feature of these coalition partners is that they defined themselves as specifically 
secular. As the tension with the secularists consistently grew from 2007, the AKP had 
to assume a more conservative identity in order to keep its nominal selectorate wide. 
This forced the AKP to produce a populist strategy over the Kemalists and secularists 
and this strategy has been carried out via authoritarian policies. This strategy is 
identified as a third independent variable of the AKP’s political survival, especially 
after 2011.   
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At this point, the AKP carried out a populist strategy between secular and 
conservative citizens in Turkey and consolidated the support of conservative voters 
for the AKP. This chapter uses empirical and statistical evidence, such as the 2014 
local and presidential election results, public speeches by Erdoğan and other AKP 
leaders, newspaper articles, and important developments and events in Turkish 
politics concerning the rise of Islamism through elite interviews with politicians, 
academics and student groups.  
 
As stated at the end of Chapter 3, the first factor that led the AKP to follow a 
populist and authoritarian policy after 2011 was the 2011 elections. In this context, 
this chapter will first examine the 2011 elections in-depth and explore the relationship 
between these elections, which contribute to the survival of the AKP, and the 
populism of the AKP. 
 
2. 2011 Parliamentary Election 
 
At Turkey’s general elections on 12 June 2011, the governing Justice and 
Development Party won 50% of the overall vote. What is perhaps most remarkable 
about the 2011 results, in comparison with the previous two general elections, is not 
only the AKP’s steadily rising share of the vote but also the sheer number of votes 
cast for the AKP. The AKP got 10.8 million votes (34.3% of all valid votes) in 2002, 
16.3 million in 2007 (46.6% of the valid votes), and approximately 21.4 million (49.8% 
of the valid votes) in 2011 (Çarkoğlu, 2011: 48). As such, over the course of nine 
years, the number of votes cast for the AKP has nearly doubled. This was the first 
time that a ruling party in Turkey has increased its vote in a third term and was 
extremely important for Erdoğan (Tombuş, 2013: 312-327). In the lead-up to the 
election, he had said that, while during his first and second terms in power he was an 
‘apprentice’ then a ‘foreman’, a third term would make him a ‘master’ (Selçuk, 2016: 
571-589). This statement of Erdoğan shows his increasing power in both the AKP 
and Turkish politics. Established with a large winning coalition (as per De Mesquita's 
theory), the AKP has consistently narrowed this coalition to protect its survival. At the 
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same time, this situation led to Erdoğan to increase his power in the party (Cornell, 
2014). Erdoğan's journey from ‘apprentice’ to ‘master’ must be understood in this 
way. As seen from this speech, Erdoğan’s style of government would change during 
his third term. 
 
Behind the success achieved by the AKP in these elections was the 
proliferation of populist and authoritarian governance that would be instrumentalised 
and targeted especially seculars and Kemalists that affected the 2010 Constitutional 
referendum. The 2010 constitutional amendment demonstrated that the AKP’s 
electoral supremacy had been transformed into political dominance, providing it with 
the ability to set the agenda and determine the frame of the debate. The AKP’s 
strategy for the general elections would be based on ‘framing the election as a vote 
for the continuation of the democratic processes’ and working towards winning at 
least 367 parliamentary seats to be able to make a new constitution (SETA, 2011). 
 
In 2011, the AKP’s electoral campaign was not particularly focused on the 
constitution issue; instead, a carefully crafted and administered campaign was built 
around the themes of the continuation of political and economic stability and 
development. Mega projects involving Turkey’s big cities were the most central part 
of its campaign. These turned out to be the most important theme of the election 
campaign in addressing moderate voters and capturing their imagination. The AKP’s 
election manifesto, ‘Turkey is Ready, Target is 2023’, outlined various objectives in 
democratization, and economic and social development (Akman, 2012, 83). 
Comprising sections on ‘advanced democracy, grand economy, strong society, 
liveable environment and brand-name cities, and a leading nation’, the manifesto 
detailed the policy achievements of the government such as economic stability and 
effective service delivery and social policies in education, health, transportation and 
housing, and put forward new objectives to be accomplished by the 100th 
anniversary of the Turkish Republic.62 As was the case in the 2010 referendum 
campaign, Erdogan’s ‘advanced democracy’ rhetoric served for projecting an image 
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of the 2011 electoral contest as another turning point in the struggle against ‘the age 
of tutelage in Turkey’, when ‘a handful of elites, gangs and the capital had wasted the 
resources of the country’.63 Erdogan’s frequent references back to the defunct 
Democratic Party of the 1950s, which, in his words, had replaced the elitist and pro-
military mentality of the CHP, were blended with populist verbal attacks on the early 
Republican period under the CHP’s single-party rule (Gürsoy, 2012, 191-211). 
 
This populist and authoritarian policy which the AKP has run against the CHP 
and the secular opposition has also made it possible to further consolidate its own 
constituency. One of the surveys that KONDA made before the election points to this 
situation. The proportion of participants who expressed their confidence in the AKP 
government's struggle against illegal organisations in the Ergenekon Case came 
close to 60% in this survey.64 The AKP government, which regarded the existence of 
such a rate as an opportunity, would push this campaign in a populist line to run a 
campaign of elections, especially through the opposition party CHP, in order to 
consolidate the conservative mass of voters. The election results also showed the 
achievability of this plan.  
 
The results of the 2011 general elections indicated the continuation of the 
trends from 2007. The elections produced a tri-partite division with four political blocs 
in the TBMM: the CHP, the Kurdish nationalist representatives and the MHP entered 
the parliament as the opposition, with a total of 223 seats. The AKP, CHP and BDP 
(the party established to succeed the Kurdish nationalist DTP) increased their votes 
compared to 2007, and the MHP vote fell from 14.3 to 12.9. per cent (Akman, 
2012:79) While the AKP won a comfortable majority (with 327 seats) to form the 62nd 
government on its own, it fell short of the minimum number of seats (330) required to 
enable it to pass constitutional amendments in the parliament followed by 
referendum. ANAP and DYP almost vanished at the ballot box, reflecting their 
institutional decline since the mid-1990s (Çarkoğlu, 2011). 
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The poll analysis that IPSOS65, one of the major public opinion research 
companies has taken place after the elections in 2011 confirms the relationship 
between the increasing AKP’s populism and survival of the AKP in light of the clash 
with Kemalists. 65% of the AKP voters who participated in the IPSOS voter survey 
believed that the AKP promised democracy after the struggle with Kemalist 
establishment in Turkish state. Moreover, 45% of the AKP voters said that they voted 
for the AKP on the basis of an investigation into the September 12, 1980 coup, under 
the name of reckoning with the Kemalist regime. This is also evidence of the AKP's 
contribution to its political survival with a pragmatic and populist rhetoric during the 
struggle with the Kemalist regime. 
 
Obviously, the 2011 general elections mark the emergence of a dominant 
party system in Turkey (Carkoglu, 2011: 43-62), with an essentially four-way party 
competition in the TBMM. Consistent increases in the government party’s share of 
the vote guaranteed the preservation of its parliamentary majority, and the 
consolidation of its power in the Turkish political system. At the same time, this 
political environment was a sign that the AKP government would go for a more 
populist and authoritarian policy, especially against the secular base, in order to 
sustain conservative voter support. 
 
This chapter will also show how the causal mechanism of the AKP’s survival in 
the party’s third term has been established. However, before delving into this 
question, Chapter 4 will examine the peak of the rise in populism and 
authoritarianism in Turkish politics after 2011. This review will be based on the 
speeches of AKP politicians, the party politics of the AKP, and changes made in the 
party’s structure during this period. 
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3. The Rise of Authoritarianism and Islamist Populism in Turkish 
Politics 
 
At Turkey’s general elections on 12 June 2011, the governing AKP won 49.9% 
of the overall vote. This was the first time that a ruling party in Turkey has increased 
its vote in a third term, and it allowed the AKP’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to continue 
as prime minister after nine years in power. However, a potential danger for the AKP 
at this juncture would be a heavier reliance upon the party leader’s authority to 
reshape the party organisation (Lancaster, 2014: 1683). Erdoğan took matters more 
into his own hands during the third term. The AKP’s coalition with independent, non-
party liberal democrats ended due to the rise of Erdoğan’s authoritarian leadership. 
Moreover, these groups identify themselves as ‘liberal and secular’ and Erdoğan and 
the AKP sought to become more conservative in order to polarise voters in Turkey 
(Özbudun, 2014: 157). The rapid increase of Islamism in Turkish politics in the third 
term of the AKP has been observed in many policy areas. One of these areas is the 
AKP’s education policies. 
 
 
During its third term in power, the AKP has focused on changing the education 
system in ways that favour the Islamist movement. In February 2012, Erdoğan stated 
that his government had initiated a “silent revolution” in Turkey and called for the 
raising of a ‘religious and revengeful youth’ (Tolunay, 2014: 49).  Despite the protests 
of both centre-left and centre-right secular sections of Turkish society, in March 2012, 
the AKP-dominated parliament amended the mandatory education system to favour 
the Islamist movement. The AKP’s education bill introduced a mandatory 12 year 
education that would be divided into three layers: four years of primary school, four 
years of secondary (middle) school, and four years of high school (Lüküslü, 2016: 7). 
The amended Education Law allows families the flexibility to choose among different 
types of secondary schools, including general and vocational schools and religious 
Imam Hatip schools (Grigoriadis and Gürçel, 2012: 300-322). The bill not only kept 
the mandatory teaching of the religion curriculum, but also introduced two additional 
elective religion courses - the Quran and ‘the Life of Our Prophet, His Majesty’ 
(Eligür, 2014: 167-168). Following the vote, Erdoğan declared that “the last trace of 
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the February 28 process has been erased” (Kaya, 2015: 57). After the passing of this 
bill, there were other regulations concerning Imam Hatip schools. For instance, in 
September 2012, the AKP announced that it had been working on a regulation 
allowing Imam Hatip graduates’ admission into military academies (Eligur, 2014: 168-
170). 
 
 
The visible increase of Islamist populism is not only limited to educational 
issues. Erdoğan has made very aggressive speeches about woman’s rights and 
secular lifestyles. For example, Erdoğan has referred to abortion as ‘murder’ (O’Neil, 
2017: 148-153). In May 2012, the AKP government prepared a draft law whose 
stated goals were to increase fertility across the country. The draft law aims to restrict 
women’s rights by imposing an abortion ban after the fourth week of pregnancy. The 
other important issue for Erdoğan is about alcohol. Although the law does not prohibit 
consumption of alcoholic beverages, it bans their advertisement in the printed and 
visual media (Özbudun, 2014: 157). Moreover, the AKP government stated that the 
new regulations prohibited the sale of alcohol after 10 p.m. On the one hand, some 
AKP politicians tried to justify the alcohol law on the basis of public health arguments 
while; on the other hand, Erdoğan defended it with reference to religious injunctions - 
‘Is there anything wrong with pursuing a policy ordered by religion?’ (Özbudun, 2014: 
157) 
 
 
The other example of AKP’s policy is his views on Turkish secular lifestyles. In 
November 2012, Erdoğan promised to end mixed-sex student residences, not only in 
dormitories but also private student residences and flats. Kaya (2015: 57-58) points 
out that many people, including the then prime minister, disapprove of mixed-gender 
living situations as counter to Islamic beliefs and laws. It was reported that, during a 
closed-door meeting, Erdoğan said that ‘this is against our conservative, democratic 
character…We witnessed this in the province of Denizli, an inland town in the 
Aegean Region. The insufficiency of dormitories causes problems. Male and female 
university students are living in the same accommodations. This is not being 
checked’ (Kaya, 2015: 58). The AKP's involvement in conservative women's politics 
and the lives of secularists is the strategic use of the Kemalist-conservative conflict 
137 
 
as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. By implementing this policy, the AKP is especially 
targeting the support of conservative voter. The AKP tries to maintain its survival by 
polarizing its own conservative supporters against the secularists. How it transforms 
this situation into a policy instrument will be examined in the next sections of this 
chapter.  
 
 
The other important agenda for Erdoğan is the Kemalist heritage of the 
Turkish Republic. The AKP has banned the celebration of national holidays, including 
the Republic’s foundation day (Seckinelgin, 2016: 272). It erased “the Turkish 
Republic” from official buildings and tried to intimidate citizens who protested the 
AKP’s policies by sending in riot police to disperse demonstrators. (Eligür, 2014: 151-
175). Erdoğan made a very provocative speech during this debate. Erdoğan implicitly 
called Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Ismet İnonu ‘drunken lawmakers’ (Çelik, 2016: 
215). 
 
The rise of Islamist populism in Turkish politics is not directly proved by 
Erdoğan’s speeches. Secularism has become one of the problems in terms of 
freedom of expression after the increase of Islamist populism in Turkish public and 
political life (Bogdani, 2011: 17-49). The case of Fazıl Say is a good example of this 
phenomenon. World-renowned Turkish pianist Fazıl Say had been given a 
suspended ten-month jail sentence for insulting Muslim values on his Twitter account 
in 2013 (Tunç, 2013: 153-163). Say is an important artist and he defends the values 
of secularism in the Republic of Turkey. Moreover, he has criticised some elements 
of Islam and has regularly received abuse as a result. In one of these cases in 2013, 
a İstanbul court found Say guilty over a series of posts on the social networking site 
Twitter. In one of the examples of his posts, he says: ‘I am not sure if you have also 
realised it, but if there's a louse, a non-entity, a lowlife, a thief or a fool, it's always an 
Allah-ist’ (Tunç, 2013: 159). Many artists and intellectuals believe that this view is 
only a non-violent criticism Islam. However, their critics have accused the governing 
AKP of undermining Turkey's secular values and pandering to Islamists (Szymanski, 
2015: 55). This study argues that the example of Fazıl Say is one of the important 
issues indicating the increasing progress of Islamist populism in Turkish politics. 
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This research argues that all these developments clearly demonstrate the rise 
of Islamist populism and authoritarianism in Turkish political and public life in many 
areas. As a result, the tension between secularists and the AKP has increased and 
finally resulted in mass anti-government demonstrations throughout Turkey. Turkey 
was particularly affected by one of the biggest and strongest protests in Gezi Park. In 
the beginning, a small number of environmentalists were camping out in protest 
against the AKP governments’ urban development plans to build a replica Ottoman-
era barracks and a mosque on Taksim Square and Gezi Park. Indeed, this protest 
was peaceful. However, in the early morning of 28 May and 31 May, police used tear 
gas against a small number of environmentalists to stop their protest and burned 
down their tents in order to allow construction to continue (Anisin, 2016: 415). As a 
result of these police attacks in Taksim Square, more than 100 people were injured, 
several of them seriously. After this event Turkey has been engulfed by a series of 
protests across many major cities, police turned Istanbul's busiest city centre hub into 
a battleground, deploying tear gas and water cannon against thousands of peaceful 
demonstrators (Karakayalı and Yaka, 2014: 118). 
 
Protesters included liberals, secularists, conservatives, centre-leftists, centre-
rightists, leftists, anti-capitalist Islamists, Turkish nationalists, Alevis, white-collar 
professionals, workers, and students (Damar, 2016: 207-222). All of these groups 
identify as ‘secular’ and criticized Erdoğan’s populist and Islamist speeches and the 
AKP’s authoritarian policies (Lancaster, 2014: 1684). It is clear that the Gezi Park 
protests revealed the deep polarisation that now exists in society but predominantly 
between liberals and secularists and Islamists and the urban and rural poor, who 
receive AKP incentives (Kaya, 2015: 52). Despite the mass protests, Prime Minister 
Erdoğan managed to consolidate his power, but these protests show that the conflict 
between the secularists and the AKP has reached a peak in terms of the rise of 
authoritarianism in Turkey. The AKP was seen as ostensibly micromanaging every 
aspect of people’s lives, from the number of children families should conceive to their 
practices as observant Muslims, from regulating their alcohol consumption patterns to 
discouraging caesarean sections and abortions (Abbas and Yiğit, 2015: 62-63). The 
Islamic line of explanations and policy aims referred to throughout this chapter have 
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caused a reaction, especially among secular and Kemalist citizens. One of the 
participants in the protests stated that:  
 
The last thing that happened was the remark from the Prime Minister who said that 
Atatürk and his best friend, Inonu, were ayyas (drunkards). This was so offensive to 
us and the second thing he said that we are capulcular (plunderers or looters). And 
also, he said in the past that all women should have three kids. Why? Why? Why? 
Then there is the abortion issue. And then they try to introduce fundamentalist Islamic 
sharia inside Turkey (Abbas and Yiğit, 2015: 67). 
   
Some of the slogans seen in the Gezi protests included: ‘cheers Tayyip’; ‘you 
banned alcohol, now we are awake’; and ‘do you want three more children like us?’ 
(Görkem, 2015: 589). The Gezi Park protests, which were initially born out of 
environmental sensitivity, were actually the reaction of secularists against the rise of 
Islamism, which continued to increase after 2011. The AKP government, on the other 
hand, continued to polarise its supporters with Islamist and populist arguments 
instead of counteracting this secular opposition. One example is related to the AKP 
government authorities’ allegation that the demonstrators drank alcohol in a mosque 
(Demirhan, 2014: 295). It was later revealed that demonstrators did no such thing.  
 
Another of the AKP’s claims was that during the Gezi Park protests a head-
covered woman was harassed by the protesters (Yılmaz: 150-171). Although this 
claim could not be verified, the AKP and Erdoğan used the headscarf story to 
polarise further polarise conservatives and secularists. He addressed his female 
supporters, many of whom are religiously conservative and cover their heads, 
warning that the occupiers of Gezi Park were threatening ‘our sisters in headscarves’ 
(Selçuk, 2016: 578). The AKP's acceleration of this populist strategy through 
secularism in order to increase support amongst conservative voters and the growing 
reaction of the secularists to it, also questioned the existence of a clash between 
Islamism and Europeanisation in Turkey at the same time. Özbudun summarizes the 
effect of the Gezi Park protests, in terms of Islamism and Europeanisation in Turkey, 
below: 
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In any case, the Gezi Park events exacted a heavy toll on Turkey. First, they 
deepened the already worrying degree of polarisation between the religious and 
secular sectors of society, i.e. between the supporters and opponents of the AKP. 
Secondly, they hurt Turkey’s international image as a prominent secular and 
democratic Muslim country with the potential to serve as a model for the rest of 
the Muslim world, particularly for the Arab Spring countries. As the President of 
the Republic, Abdullah Gul, put it succinctly, ‘an image that you strive to build in 
ten years, can be destroyed in one week’ Thirdly, and relatedly, the government’s 
strong reaction to the protesters invited criticisms from the EU, the Council of 
Europe, and many Western circles, creating further tensions in the already 
stumbling Turkey–EU accession negotiations (Özbudun, 2014: 158). 
  
In this chapter, it has been argued that the harsh and undemocratic reactions 
of the AKP government to events of Gezi Park indicated to the rise of Islamist 
populism combined with authoritarianism in the period after the 2011 elections. 
Following this explanation, how the AKP's populism and authoritarianism, which is 
the third independent variable of this research, clarifies the causal mechanism of 
AKP’s political survival as will be explained in the rest of this Chapter. 
 
 
4. The Dissolution of the AKP’s Large Coalition: ‘We do not need 
Liberals’ 
 
Those who were somehow [partners] of ours in the 10 years of our rule will not be 
partners for us in the next 10 years,” Aziz Babuşçu was quoted as saying by 
Anatolia news agency in Istanbul 2013 during a meeting of the Suriçi Group. 
“[This is] because in the last 10 years, there were partners of ours who were 
standing by what we did in a liquidation process and in defining freedom, the rule 
of law and justice. Although they cannot tolerate us, let’s say liberal circles, they 
have been partners of ours for some reason, but the future period of constructing 
will not be like that. The coming term will not be liberals’ “desire,” he said. 
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“Hence, those partners will not be with us. Those [liberals] who somehow walked 
with us will be the partners of those who are against us because the Turkey that 
is to be built will not feature a future that they accept or desire. That’s why our 
task is even harder.66  
 
As seen in Babuşçu’s speech, the AKP’s large coalition has rapidly dissolved. 
The AKP’s coalition with liberals and intellectuals faded away after the 2011 election 
because Erdoğan’s leadership is the most powerful term in the AKP’s history and he 
does not need the same level of support from the liberals or other ex-coalition 
members. As a result, Erdoğan needed to change his discourse and regularly 
criticised liberals, intellectuals, academics and elites. When he upped his criticism 
against these parts of society, other parts of society (especially conservatives) 
supported him more. Suat Kınıklıoğlu argues that, after the victory in the 2010 
referendum with 60% of vote, Erdoğan thought the Kemalists sustained the defeat 
against the AKP. He said they did not need legitimisation of AKP in Turkish politics 
and AKP controlled the whole country. As a result, Erdoğan and AKP changed his 
policy towards being more authoritarian and more populist, according to Kınıklıoğlu. 
Another ex- friend and colleague of Erdoğan, Abdullatif Şener, tried to summarise 
who Erdoğan is during the interview. Şener says that, ‘Erdoğan is a highly pragmatic 
and Machiavellian politician. He does everything for his self-interest in politics. He 
used the liberals in his first term and he commanded or praised them for this reason. 
When he felt short of support, he started to criticise liberals or intellectuals’.67 
 
The rise of populism and authoritarianism in Turkish politics between 2011 and 
2014 has been consolidated by changes in the AKP’s policies, actions, and party 
mechanisms. The main motivation for these changes was the political survival of the 
AKP, an assertion that was expressed at the beginning of this study. So, why and 
how has the AKP played a more populist and authoritarian role in Turkish politics for 
its political survival? 
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As previously mentioned, one of the most important factors for the survival of a 
political party is the support of the majority of voters. The AKP, which gained strength 
with the support of internal and external actors during its initial establishment, had 
been in danger of losing its mass base and nominal selectorate due to the elimination 
of its coalition partners. So how could the AKP continue to keep its voters?  
 
It was during this time that the AKP, with Erdoğan as its leader, carried out a 
populist strategy between the secular and conservative masses and ensured the 
support of the conservative voters for the party. This in turn led to more conservatives 
voting for the AKP and their ideas appeared in Erdoğan’s policies and discourse. 
This shift in the nominal selectorate has allowed the realisation of the developments 
mentioned above with regard to the rise of Islamist populism and authoritarianism in 
Turkish politics. 
 
 
5. The AKP’s Mastery of Populism 
 
So long as the AKP is able to maintain its policy of distributing material benefits to 
the urban and rural poor without taxing to pay for them, then the party is likely to 
preserve and even increase its voter base in the 2014 presidential and 2015 
general elections. Yet, as the nationwide Gezi Park protests have showed, even 
if the AKP wins elections for the fourth time, growing polarisation within society 
may prevent the party - and the nation - from maintaining the stability it has 
enjoyed for more than a decade. Indeed, Turkish citizens have become 
increasingly polarised and divided by the AKP’s Islamist agenda - with liberals 
and pro-secularists versus Islamists and the urban and rural poor who receive the 
AKP’s material benefits and incentives; Alevis versus Sunnis; and Turks versus 
Kurds. Prime Minister Erdoğan regards Sunni Islamism as the common bond of 
Turkish society. Having secured half of the Turkish electorate’s support over the 
past decade, he has been successfully pursuing the strategy of polarisation by 
using the rhetoric of “us” (pro-AKP voters) versus “them” (the others). By doing 
this, the JDP leadership forms unity among the AKP electorate and mobilizes it to 
vote for the party in the elections (Eligür, 2014: 175). 
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According to Banu Eligür, the AKP used a populist strategy via polarization of 
Turkish society in order to maintain its edge in Turkish politics. This strategy sought 
to deepen the gap between secularists and Islamists since the AKP had seen strong 
support from conservatives in past elections. This study argues that this strategy of 
encouraging polarisation affected Turkish politics and brought about the rise of 
populism due to this split in Turkish society. The rhetoric of ‘us vs them’ reached a 
peak during the Gezi Park protests. As discussed above, while the AKP described 
the protesters as çapulcu, they began to polarise their own mass of voters against 
these protestors (Göle, 2013: 12).  
 
The separation between the Kemalists and other secular parts of Turkish 
society and the conservatives is at the root of the populist strategy that has marked 
the AKP’s third term. The secular part of Turkish society was seen by the AKP as 
consisting of urban people with high levels of prosperity, intellectualism, and modern, 
Western lifestyles. On the other hand, people living in the rural areas of Anatolia were 
viewed as being anti-intellectual, anti-modern, anti-Western, Kemalist, and belonging 
to conservative families. Since the AKP knew that there were more of these people 
than their secular counterparts in Turkey, they put forward populist policies 
addressing the themes of anti-intellectualism, anti-Westernism, conservative 
family/culture policies, and lower-class myths in their political agenda. In Chapter 2, 
the legitimisation of the AKP's conservatism was emphasized as the first independent 
variable of the causal mechanism of AKP’s political survival. The intervening variable 
of this independent variable is the 28 February process and the EU process. In 
Chapter 3, the AKP's power struggle with Kemalist elites is examined as the second 
independent variable, and this variable was explored as a intervening variables of the 
Ergenekon and Balyoz cases and the 2010 Constitutional amendments. In this 
chapter, populist policy instruments such as anti-intellectualism and lower-class 
mythology will be examined as intervening variables of the AKP's polarisation 
strategy, the third independent variable. 
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5.1. Anti-Intellectualism 
 
Presidential elections were held on 10 August 2014 in order to elect 
the twelfth President of Turkey and the leading candidates, AKP leader Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan and - the CHP’s and MHP’s candidate - Ekmeleddin İhsanoglu clashed in 
this election. These two political figures are very different from each other. 
Ekmeleddin İhsanoglu has international experience and a background as an 
academic (Çarkoğlu, 2014: 4). Erdoğan focused on İhsanoglu’s high profile during 
the election campaigns. Thus, when Ihsanoglu was emphasizing his international 
experience (which was still not as compete as that of Erdoğan and his team), 
Erdoğan would reply that Turkey needs a president not a diplomat. When he 
highlighted he speaks three languages, Erdoğan easily debunked and dismissed the 
argument by saying ‘Oh, he speaks three languages? That's great, but you see, we 
are looking for someone to run the country here and we already have plenty of 
translators’68, making the poor Ihsanoglu feel both sorry and silly (which this skilled 
sophisticated man is not). When he would try capitalise on his diplomatic 
background, Erdoğan would mock him by calling him ‘mon cher’, a French 
expression used to make fun of ‘cocktail party diplomats’ and their supposedly 
mundane life, making Ihsanoglu look arrogant, elitist, and cut off from the people 
(Kalaycıoğlu, 2015: 163) ‘They ask a candidate whether he will address the issue of 
roads (construction) if elected. He replies he has nothing to do with roads ... They are 
mon cher but we are servants,’ Erdoğan told thousands of supporters in a rally in the 
eastern province of Erzurum.69  
 
Obviously, Erdoğan’s educational background is very low-profile compared 
with most of Turkish politicians. Following his childhood, he went to an İmam Hatip 
school to study Islamic sciences along with the regular curriculum. Hakan Yavuz 
(2003: 121-128) demonstrates the importance of İmam Hatip schools in opposing the 
Westernisation process in the early Republican period - the teachers in such schools 
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would always criticise alternative lifestyles and attack the country’s Westernisation 
project. Due to their Islamic character, the schools promote and encourage the 
Islamic lifestyle as the only moral way of living. Erdoğan once observed: ‘I owe 
everything to the İmam Hatip school I attended. My life was predestined in that 
school. I have learned patriotism, love for fellow human beings, service for the 
country, worship of God, environmental sciences, spirit of solidarity, and wishing for 
others what I want for me’ (Heper and Toktaş, 2003: 163). 
 
Erdoğan believes that Western academics have underestimated the Anatolian 
people and Anatolian traditions. There are some interesting events to show 
Erdoğan’s reaction against academics during the last term of AKP rule. One of them 
is the youth protest against Erdoğan during his visit to the Middle East Technical 
University. At the time, about 3,600 police protected Erdoğan against 300 student 
protesters. This was six months before the Gezi protests. Erdoğan condemned not 
only the students for “terrorising” the campus, but also the academics for 
supporting their right to protest. He suggested that these academics should 
quit academia and join the protesters, since an academic’s job is simply to teach 
students valuable information, like how to use a computer. He said ‘I condemn all 
academics who support these protests. We do not need teachers like this.’70 
 
Another of Erdoğan’s populist and authoritarian reactions against academics 
was on the issue of the conflict with Kurdish minorities. Before 2011, most liberal 
academics supported Erdoğan’s government due to his attempt at a civilisation 
process against the role of the army and a peace process for Kurdish issue. 
However, after the collapse of this coalition, Erdoğan has increased his criticisms 
against academics. Current recent example of this came on 11 January 2016 when 
an initiative from Turkey, Academics for Peace, released a petition signed by 1,128 
academics which called on the Turkish government to end state violence and prepare 
negotiation conditions with the Kurdish political movement (Öney, 2016). There are 
many discussions and criticisms of this initiative in addition to Erdoğan’s reaction. 
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However, Erdoğan’s reaction was mostly directed at academics. Erdoğan referred to 
academics as ‘lumpen’, ‘half-portion intellectuals’, and ‘crappy so-called’ and said 
that;  
 
There is no old Turkey anymore where a handful of lumpen calling themselves 
intellectual, academics rule. Half-portion enlightenment, same circles have never 
changed. These lumpen circles once again have showed their true faces. They 
ripped off their mask. They have directly showed the terror propaganda they have 
been conducting indirectly for years by means of the declaration. They can 
struggle as much as they want. There is no old Turkey anymore where those self-
proclaimed wise, calling themselves intellectual, academic used to rule.71 
 
The other members of the AKP government supported Erdoğan’s anti-
intellectualism as part of his polarisation strategy. Environment and Urbanisation 
Minister, Mehmet Özhaseki, claimed that most ‘traitors’ – the word for anyone 
accused of being involved in the July 2016  failed coup attempt – come from the 
ranks of university graduates: ‘Look at the traitors in this country. Most of them are 
university graduates… The intellectuals are like man-eating cannibals (yam-yam), 
they say anything bad about Turkey both from overseas and at [home]’.72  
 
Anti-intellectualism in the AKP government cannot be proved only by the 
statements of Erdoğan or the AKP alone. This situation is also understood through 
the use of policy tools. The government has clamped down on the independence of 
the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey and the Turkish 
Academy of Sciences. Most significantly, there has been a significant increase in the 
number of foundation/private universities (Birler, 2012: 139-150) following the AKP’s 
third term. This neo-liberal restructuring of the higher education sector was inevitably 
complemented with the articulation of conservative/Islamist symbols as the basis of 
social construction (Ercan, 2012). The AKP's pressure on the universities will also 
lead to the presence of Islamists close to the AKP in university administrations. The 
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AKP has maintained an anti-intellectual line of polarisation in the academic world by 
making an ‘us and them’ dichotomy. The academics – ‘them’ - who supported the 
Gezi Park protests or the peace campaign on the Kurdish issue mentioned above 
have been oppressed, fired or arrested. Another factor that this chapter has focused 
on is the Imam Hatip schools. After 2011, the AKP continued its policy of polarisation 
by increasing support for Imam Hatip schools. Since 2010-2011, 1,477 general high 
schools were shut down. The increase in Imam Hatip schools is 73% (Kandiyoti, 
2012: 513-531). Vocational high schools have increased by 23% and Anatolian high 
schools by 57%. The fact that one school type has increased its numbers by 73% 
reveals the political and bureaucratic will behind opening Imam Hatip schools (Özgür, 
2011: 569-585). There is a positive discrimination applied by the AKP government to 
Imam Hatip schools across the country. This situation cannot be generalised as the 
AKP's Islamist populism created through religious education will directly lead to anti-
intellectualism. However, this strategy has not lead to an improvement in the field of 
education due to the role model of Imam Hatips as an alternative to secular schools. 
For instance, the number of Turkish 15-year-olds who scored below average on the 
triennial PISA test, which is conducted by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), is three times more than the number of 
students who scored below average in more successful countries, according to test 
results (Tansel, 2015: 1-28). 
 
The second important issue for Erdoğan’s conservative education policy is the 
denial of any Ottoman legacy in the educational system against the Kemalist 
modernisation process. According to Erdoğan, the Kemalist Westernisation process 
has damaged the notion of the Ottoman-Arabic legacy in education.  
 
Erdoğan said in December 2014 that, due to the alphabet reform that brought 
in the use of Latin letters conducted by the modern Turkish Republic’s founder, 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, in 1927, the quality of the Turkish language had regressed.  
‘Although we had a very rich (Ottoman) language that was highly convenient for 
doing and producing science, we woke up one day and we realised that it was gone. 
People were forced to forget thousands of words and concepts, as they were 
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removed from the dictionaries,’ he said, arguing it was not possible to study 
philosophy with the current Turkish vocabulary. ‘You will either rely on Ottoman 
words or concepts from French, English or German. But we have to overcome all of 
these problems.’73 Following this logic, Turkey’s National Education 
Council introduced mandatory Ottoman language courses at the country’s influential 
religious high schools and are electives in secular high schools (Lüküslü, 2016: 1-14). 
 
This recent rise of anti-intellectualism, characterised by a rejection of 
commentators as well as institutions like universities and the media that traditionally 
disseminate knowledge, requires renewed attention. Yet, this is not a new 
phenomenon. Indeed, the dynamics of anti-intellectualism go as far back as ancient 
Rome, and tracing its historical roots can offer clues to its rise in world politics today. 
Erdoğan and the AKP government have been successful representatives of this 
rising trend in world politics by using anti-intellectualism as a means of polarising 
Turkish politics with populism. 
 
5.2. Anti-Westernism and Anti Kemalism 
 
When you look at memories from particularly the 1940s, you see the deep 
contradiction between celebrations of the republic holiday and the nation’s state 
of mind and life. While on one side, the republic holiday celebrations are held with 
frocks, waltzes and champagne, a nation who is trying to survive with no shoes 
and no jackets to wear and is half-starved is gazing around at this picture. 
Following a lengthy struggle, we have eliminated this picture in which the republic 
is on one side and the public is on the other side because a public exists all 
together. There is no discrimination among the public,” he said. “Just like today, 
we are all together here,” he added, in his speech reminiscent of his well-known 
rhetoric concerning the single-party rule of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) 
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in the early years of the republic, which he once described as “a dark past filled 
with brutality and oppression”.74  
 
Erdoğan’s 29 October celebration speech highlighted the above topics. 
Especially after 2011, the main axis of the AKP’s populism was also a reaction to 
Kemalist Westernisation and the modernisation process. The AKP and Erdoğan’s 
enemy is Kemalism, secular political parties, and the CHP’s mentality and ideology. 
Therefore, it is logical that the AKP would use this perception of the Kemalist enemy 
when seeking support from the masses. Aykan Erdemir75 concentrates on this issue. 
Erdemir thinks that Erdoğan’s phobia of Kemalism played a prominent role in the 
AKP’s third term. Erdemir talks of another well-known speech from another AKP 
deputy, Tülay Babuşçu (who is the wife of Aziz Babuşçu). After Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan received Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas with an Ottoman-style 
ceremony in 2014, Babuşcu wrote on her Facebook account that '90 years of adverts' 
had come to an end and the Ottoman Empire was beginning to resume. Her 
statements received huge controversy for referring to the Turkish Republic 
(established approximately 90 years ago in 1923) as '90 years of adverts after 600 
years of the Ottoman Empire'.76 This emphasis on the Ottoman heritage is also linked 
to the concept of Ottomanism mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3. Ottomanism is 
presented as an alternative model against Kemalism which is located on the opposite 
side of politics. Erdemir discusses that Erdoğan and his group of AKP staff increased 
his speeches against Kemalism and the CHP mentality in order to control and 
consolidate their power in the whole country and these attempts are pragmatic from 
Erdemir’s point view77.  
 
Along with the criticisms of Westernisation by the AKP and Erdoğan within this 
anti-Kemalist framework, it has turned to traditionalism in order to keep the 
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foundations of its populist strategy. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan delivered a searing 
address at the Turkish Green Crescent Society’s International Drug Policy and Public 
Health Symposium in Istanbul. Erdoğan made several headline-making 
statements during the speech. One highlight was his reference to a European Court 
of Human Rights ruling that called on Turkey to halt compulsory 
religious education and moral values courses (Orozco, 2016: 67). Erdoğan criticized 
the decision as follows: ‘You will never see a debate over compulsory physics, 
mathematics or chemistry lessons, but for some reason, religion classes are always 
debated. If you lift compulsory religion and ethics classes, drugs, violence, and 
racism will fill the void.’ He added, ‘If you are asking for compulsory religion classes 
to be abolished, then you should not be complaining about drug addiction, violence, 
anti-Semitism or Islamophobia.’78 
 
As seen in Erdoğan’s speech, habits like drugs or alcohol are argued to be the 
cause of the lack of moral values in Turkish society. He believes that this moral 
degeneration stems directly from the Westernisation process in Turkey. According to 
Erdoğan, the real solution to this problem is raising the traditionalist Turkish youth on 
Islamic moral values. In a speech to Turkish graduate students going to study 
abroad, Erdoğan made some controversial remarks that met with strong reactions in 
Turkey’s mainstream media. Erdoğan said, “The poet who penned the Turkish 
national anthem (the Islamist Mehmet Akif Ersoy) said that we should compete with 
the art and science of the West, but unfortunately we adopted the West’s immoralities 
that are contrary to our values.”79 The main institution in charge of youth policies is 
the Ministry of Youth and Sports, which was re-established during the AKP’s third 
term. The third AKP government focused on grand symbolic projects and ideological 
policy changes geared towards the normalisation of Islamist norms and the rewriting 
of Turkey’s national identity (Coşar and Yeğenoğlu, 2011: 555-573). One of the first 
changes in youth policy in 2011 was to transform mixed summer camps, organised 
annually by the Ministry’s predecessor, the Directorate for Youth Affairs, into gender-
segregated camps. Apart from these policies, the Ministry has set up three wars as 
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alternatives to the War of Independence (Kurtuluş Savaşı), the greatest narrative of 
the Kemalist era, and organised celebrations for young people: Malazgirt, Sarıkamış 
and Çanakkale. Lüküslü (2014: 641) says that these projects aim at creating a new 
social identity by generalising these new historical markers and by mobilising large 
numbers of young people. These projects all are characterised by the passive rather 
than the active participation of young people in their preparation and realisation. 
 
As a result of the AKP’s and Erdoğan’s conservative traditionalism and anti-
Western perspective, there were some developments on this topic between 2011 and 
2014. The National Education Council made the following decisions: The proposal to 
end obligatory education did not make it onto the agenda. The council’s general 
assembly rejected the proposal for obligatory Ottoman-language classes, but 
eventually moved ‘one step forward’ by adopting the proposal for compulsory religion 
classes to start in first grade (Eligür, 2014, 168-169). Also adopted was the proposal 
to ‘teach values’ in kindergartens, which calls for children aged 36-72 months to be 
taught ‘the concepts of paradise and hell’ imbued with ‘love for Allah.’ (Lüküslü, 2016: 
6-7). Other relatively smaller steps were also adopted. One of them pertains to the 
obligatory commemoration in schools of ‘Holy Birth Week’ to mark the birth of the 
Prophet Muhammad (White, 2014, p.9). Since 1989, Turkey has been the only 
country where this occasion is marked by state-sponsored commemorations. Another 
recommendation calls for students memorising the Quran to be exempt from school 
for two years, rather than one year as it is at present. Another noteworthy 
recommendation envisages the scrapping of the “alcoholic beverages and cocktail 
preparation” course in vocational schools training personnel for the tourism sector.80 
 
The main argument of this chapter is to increase the rise of populism by using 
policy tools such as anti-Westernism to ensure the survival of the AKP. The question 
is; what role did the AKP's survival play in this cause-and-effect mechanism? As 
stated, the AKP survival is directly related to keep the nominal selectorate large. The 
increasing of anti-Western sceptics in the Turkish citizens was the reason for the 
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understanding of AKP’s popoulist strategy from Anti-Westernism. For instance, public 
support for Turkey’s EU membership declined dramatically. The decline became 
even steeper as the accession talks began. While the per centage of Turkish citizens 
who support membership was above 70 per cent in 2004, it dropped below 50 per 
cent in 2012 (Çarkoğlu and Kentmen, 2011: 368). Specifically, the Turkish people no 
longer believe that Turkey will ‘benefit from being a member of the European 
Community. The Eurobarometer surveys, which include this question, report that 
while 62 per cent of respondents thought that membership would be good for Turkey 
in 2004, in 2012 only one third still considered it a good thing (Bilgin, 2017: 193). 
Bilgin (2017: 193-194) states that, those who no longer believed EU membership 
would be good for Turkey did not move to a grey area such as ‘neither good nor bad’ 
or ‘don’t know’; by 2012, the ratio of people who believed it would actually harm 
Turkey had tripled. The AKP turned this rising trend of Anti-Westernism into a 
populist strategy for the elections in Turkish politics.  
 
5.3. Conservative Family and Culture Policy 
 
For years, this country has been encouraging birth control; the CHP is doing the 
same thing now because of the CHP and Kemalist’s mentality in the early 
Republican period. West is collapsing now because the population is aging. You 
should not be deceived; you must have at least three children. We take all 
precautions as a state.81 
 
Erdoğan and the AKP placed the image of a traditional Turkish woman and a 
conservative family structure against the image of a Western and modern Turkish 
women from the Kemalist regime. After Erdoğan’s speech made in 2011, which 
criticized the Kemalist regime’s women and family policies, the AKP accelerated its 
policing policy, especially through the image of women and families. 
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One of my interviewees, MHP’s Vice-President, Ruhsar Demirel, strongly 
criticised Erdoğan’s discourse on these matters. Erdoğan spoke at a UNDP 
conference on population and development at the United Nations in 2012, and he 
said ‘there is no difference between killing a baby in its mother's stomach and killing 
a baby after birth. I consider abortion to be murder. No one should have the right to 
allow this to happen’ (Ünal and Cindoğlu, 2013: 21-31). Demirel was at the same 
conference due to her profession as a doctor. She said, ‘I have never seen such a 
banal and vulgar speech before. Abortion is not a birth control method, but it is 
necessary in order to reduce maternal mortality. I have been working in the Health of 
Ministry for 17 years on this matter and I am very unhappy to blow up our efforts on 
this issue’.82 She claims that Erdoğan and his government damaged the gains of 
women’s rights made during the Turkish Republic and that he has done it using 
Islamic values. Indeed, abortion is just one of the controversial issues on this matter. 
Government officials’ statements on a woman’s right to an abortion in the event of 
rape have caused outrage. The Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors 
suggested in September of 2011 that women who are rape victims can marry their 
rapists. On 30 May 2012, Health Minister Recep Akdağ stated that ‘The state can 
look after the babies of the raped women if necessary’. The very next day, Ayhan 
Sefer Üstün, Chairperson of the National Assembly’s Commission of Human Rights 
and an AKP legislator, claimed that abortion was a crime worse than the rape itself 
and suggested that women who had been raped should just give birth to their 
children (Tolunay, 2014: 49). A permit from the state prosecutor allowing an abortion 
is often demanded from rape victims, even though it is not legally necessary for the 
doctor to perform the procedure. Due to the elongation of the bureaucratic process, 
there are cases in which the twenty-week legal abortion period since the rape was 
committed is exceeded and so the abortion cannot be performed (in many countries 
this period is 24 weeks) (Yılmaz, 2015: 150-171).  
 
A radical change is observed not only in health policies but also in women's 
policies, especially after the 2011 elections. At the root of this change is the 
substitution of the concept of 'family' instead of the image of modern women being 
among the chief actors of Kemalist modernisation policies. ‘Our party is a 
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conservative democratic party. The family is important to us’, told Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, at a press conference held on 9 June 2011 for the 
announcement of the newly-established ministries, where he declared that the 
Ministry of Women and Family Affairs was to be replaced by the Ministry of Family 
and Social Policies, prior to the general elections that would take place on 12 June 
2011 (Nas, 2016: 168). Erased from the name of the Ministry, women’s affairs were 
reduced to a department under the ministry. While Kemalist modernisation was 
aimed at increasing the independent role of women in society, the AKP focused on 
the role of women in the family only after 2011. The AKP elite in this regard tended to 
implement certain policies under the name of ‘social policy’ which were indeed 
reduced to ‘family policy’ with a bold emphasis on a ‘strengthening the family’ 
discourse (Yazıcı 2012: 116). This family discourse reasserts women’s traditional 
gender roles under patriarchal society (Yılmaz 2015: 382). Nas (2016: 16-170) points 
out that the establishment of ‘family advice centres’ and ‘family education programs’ 
throughout the country under AKP rule illustrates the ways in which political webs of 
power are being established to function as the technologies of power attaining the 
AKP’s grand narrative of the family. 
 
Another issue of conservative family policy is the lifestyle of Kemalist and 
secular Turkish people who have not established a family. The AKP government has 
responded to falling marriage and birth rates due to urbanisation by encouraging 
marriage and pregnancy through incentives such as giving a 10,000 Turkish Lira 
interest-free loan to young married couples between 18 and 24 years of age 
(postponing the repayment if the woman gets pregnant during the first year of 
marriage), writing off the education debts of the university students, and providing 
free dormitory rooms if they get married while studying at university (Tolunay, 2014: 
49). Just after the government announced these incentives, however, Erdoğan stated 
that they wouldn't allow male and female university students to stay in the same 
house because that was ‘against society’s values’ (Kaya, 2015: 57). He said that ‘this 
is against our conservative, democratic character…. We witnessed this in the 
province of Denizli, an inland town in the Aegean Region. The insufficiency of 
dormitories causes problems. Male and female university students are living in the 
same accommodations. This is not being checked’ (Kaya, 2015 :58). The day after 
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that statement, police raided an apartment in Manisa and imposed fines for 
"disturbing the environment" on five university students (three women who rented the 
apartment together and two men who were guests there) (Tolunay, 2014: 50). This is 
a taboo that can be seen in all conservative societies. However, the element that 
differentiates the AKP example is that the AKP acts strategically. The AKP is much 
more liberal on this kind of gender issue before 2011. Following the 2011 elections, 
the AKP has shifted to a more Islamist line by polarising the issue of gender in order 
to sustain the support of the mass of voters. In the general election polls in 2015, 50 
out of every 100 women living in Turkey voted for AKP.83 The increase in the female 
electorates of AKP’s third term is also proof that why the AKP has followed a 
polarization strategy with a conservative family policies. 
 
Another important issue for the rise of populism in Turkish politics is the 
location of art and culture in Turkish society. The AKP and Erdoğan have made 
Western culture, art, and artists tools of their strategy. The AKP and Erdoğan 
openly targeted artists and celebrities who backed the mass anti-government 
protests in 2013, vowing ‘to bring them to account’ (Saleem, 2017: 71). Erdoğan has 
routinely sued satirists, with his fury recently crossing borders. While government-
friendly musicians, actors and writers are frequent guests at Erdoğan’s palace, those 
critical of him and the AKP are never invited. After his 30 March 2014 Election 
victory, artists spoke out about the censorship of social media that continues 
unabated. There are many important events that help to understand Erdoğan’s 
conservative reaction to the arts in Turkey. One of them is about the situation of state 
theatre in Turkey. While they are funded by the nation’s money, Erdoğan reasons, 
the theatre community cannot go against the nation’s will, i.e., scripts should be 
conservative enough for all audiences (Aksoy and Şeyben, 2015: 187). Erdoğan has 
said he will privatise the state and city theatres. ‘We’ll sponsor plays if we like the 
script,’ he said (Kösemen, 2016: 70-93). The cultural politics of the AKP is to steer 
the country’s public culture towards a conservative position, in direct opposition to the 
established instituted secular cultural and identity. ‘What is being described as 
conservative democrat in the political sense’, general secretary to President Abdullah 
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Gül, Mustafa İsen asserts, ‘should establish the norm for conservative aesthetics and 
conservative art’ (İsen, 2013: 13-20). 
 
 
As a result of this pressure, the AKP government’s authoritarian attitude and 
censorship continued in the field of culture and arts in a widespread manner in 2014. 
The AKP is trying to ban and prevent any kind of cultural and artistic studies that do 
not comply with their own political and cultural values. The application of censorship 
to documentaries, movies and theatres is gradually increasing. The AKP also 
implements censorship on reading classical literary works that are contrary to ‘Islamic 
values’ (Aksoy and Şeyben, 2015: 189-190). Ercan Karakaş has also noted that 135 
cultural events were affected by the repression and censorship applied in the year 
2014.84 Following of the AKP’s conservative family and cultural policies, this chapter 
will finally review Erdogan's lower class mythology through the White Turks-Black 
Turks dichotomy in light of the AKP’s populist and authoritarian strategy which is the 
third independent variable of the AKP’s political survival. 
 
 
5.4. Erdoğan’s Lower-class Mythology: White Turks vs. Black Turks 
 
The president’s backers often cite three main reasons for his popularity and that 
of his party, the AKP. The first is social: Erdoğan is perceived to be a man of the 
people, a representative of the lower and lower-middle classes, who felt ignored 
by his predecessors. ‘The thing is, before Erdoğan the presidents didn’t value 
people,’ said a man who called himself Ismail, waving an AKP flag. But Erdoğan 
cares about them. That’s the main thing. We see him as one of us.85  
 
As seen in this report by the Guardian, citizens from the lower-classes in 
Turkey have supported Erdoğan because they believe that they share some kind of 
kinship with him. Erdoğan honed his discourse and speeches for the lower-classes to 
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gain their support and has been very successful in realising this goal. The most 
important notion of Erdoğan’s lower-class mythology is the dichotomy of White Turks 
versus Black Turks. White Turks have come to be associated with an urban 
cosmopolitan identity, modern feminism, and secularism, while the Black Turk stands 
for the traditional, the conservative and the lower classes (Çalışkan and Waldman, 
2017: 10-11). One columnist, Burak Bekdil claims that Erdoğan’s success story is 
precisely the victory of the Black Turks over the white Turks and illustrates the point 
with an anecdote about one of ‘Tayyip’s’ supporters: 
 
I saw one of the crowd of paper-tissue-seller-boys at the scooter's seat, 
pretending to ride it fast. I had to buy a few packs of paper tissues to convince 
the boy to leave the seat to me. An initial conversation on motorbikes and 
scooters quickly turned into a ‘political chat' with my new, nine-year-old friend.  
“How much do you earn?” “It depends. Sometimes 5 lira a day, sometimes even 
25!” “Fine, but you can't sell paper tissues for all of your life. Any plans for the 
future?” “Yes, abi; I'll fight infidels like you and join ‘Uncle Tayyip's' party”. 
“Infidels like me?” “Yes, abi, I saw you drinking wine at the café”… One day, the 
boy said, he would become an MP. I wished him the best of luck. “What does 
your father do for living?” “No job, abi”. “Any brothers and sisters?” “We're 12!” 
“But what makes you so fond of your ‘Uncle Tayyip?'” “He is a good Muslim, and 
he sent us food, toys and other things”. “Why do you want to become an MP?” 
“Because they are rich and powerful, and I can better fight the infidels”. “Infidels 
like me?” “Like you, abi.”86  
 
Bekdil’s reminiscence regarding this child is useful to understand Erdoğan’s 
polarisation strategy and his popularity among the lower-classes. Gallup’s survey 
supports Bekdil’s anectode in light of the AKP’s populist strategy. This survey 
indicates that, about six in 10 Turkish adults (59%) interviewed in May and June 2014 
approved of the way current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan -- the front-runner 
in 2014 presidential election -- is handling his job (Zehra, 2015: 15-20). Majorities in 
nearly all major sociodemographic groups are satisfied with Erdogan's job 
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performance -- with the exception of university graduates (34%) and the wealthiest 
Turks (48%). The prime minister's approval rating rises to about two-thirds among 
Turks with the lowest household incomes (66%) and among residents of rural areas 
(68%).87 
 
 According to De Mesquita’s selectorate theory, leaders in authoritarian 
regimes should redistribute wealth to maintain their supporter base and should pay 
their followers just enough to support them. Although there is an increase in poor 
people from the lower-classes in Turkey, these people have continued to support 
Erdoğan’s leadership. Even though Turkey’s $800 billion economy is among the 20 
biggest in the world, the IMF recently warned that ‘it is not built on a sustainable 
model and remains too vulnerable to dangers outside its borders’ (Eligür, 2014: 173-
174). Likewise, Standard & Poor’s noted that the boom in consumer credit had 
become a serious risk for Turkish leaders. Indeed, following the U.S. Federal 
Reserve’s announcement of a scale back in its stimulus programme in May 2013, 
foreign investors were reluctant to lend to emerging markets such as Turkey, and the 
Turkish lira lost a quarter of its value as a result. Turkey, which has one of the biggest 
current-account deficits in the world - 7.9%% of GDP in 2013 - was particularly 
vulnerable. By way of comparison, the current account deficit of South Africa is 
5.3%% of GDP, Brazil is 3.6%% of GDP, Indonesia is 3.3%% of GDP, and India is 
2.6% of GDP (Eligür, 2014: 174-175). But this worsening economic picture actually, 
led to an increase in support for the AKP government. Gallup surveys show that 
many poor Turks have seen improvements in their living standards under Erdogan's 
watch, a likely factor in his high popularity among this group. While living standards in 
Turkey have generally improved since 2008 thanks to a quick recovery after the 
global economic crisis, the poorest 20% of Turks are particularly likely to have grown 
more satisfied with their living standards -- possibly related to considerable spending 
on social assistance programs under Erdogan's AKP government. In 2008, 28% of 
the poorest Turks were satisfied with their standard of living, rising to 48% in 2014.88 
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 People who could not find a job and whose living standards were dropping 
voted AKP in the elections. One of the cases of this phenomenon was the March 
2014 local elections. Deniz Derviş who volunteered as a ballot monitor in Okmeydanı 
for the 30 March 2014 local election reported:  
 
I volunteered as a monitor in Okmeydanı (a poor, mixed district of Istanbul). The 
ballot box I monitored had 120 AKP votes, 95 CHP (main opposition) and 53 
HDP (leftist, pro-Kurdish opposition). Yes, there may well have been vote rigging 
during these elections, in particular in Ankara. But I don’t think the total rigged 
votes could exceed 1% for the whole country. So we are faced economic 
problems with Gezi and the 17 December corruption tapes at least 40% of people 
are still happy with the AKP. We should also note that the voter-turnout was 90%, 
whereas it was 85% in 2009.”89  
 
This situation also continued at the 2014 presidential elections, the end point 
of this research. Although all the opposition parties nominated candidates against 
Erdoğan, Erdoğan was elected President with a result above the numbers votes the 
AKP had received in 2002, taking 52% of the votes. Many scholars asked the same 
question: ‘Who still supports Turkey’s AKP’? Academic, Pınar Tremblay says that, 
‘uneducated poor masses vote for the AKP because they still feel they belong to the 
AKP and believe in Erdoğan’.90 CHP İstanbul Deputy, Eren Erdem supports this 
argument. Erdem thinks that the power of Erdogan came from his charisma and 
popularity with Anatolian rural people. Erdem says that ‘if you are a hit with rural 
people in Anatolia, they will support you. Erdogan is very successful in this, but CHP 
is not’.91 Erdem argues that CHP and other leftist political parties have excluded 
Anatolian people’s religious beliefs for many years, and Erdogan was aware of this 
and changed his discourse to raise his power. 
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This research agrees with Tremblay’s view and aims to explore the reason of 
this phenomenon. It argues that the main reason for this support is the notion of the 
AKP’s and Erdoğan’s policies with his lower-class metaphors and the perennially 
useful Black Turks-White Turks dichotomy. This situation provided for the survival 
and electoral success of the AKP. Data from an exit poll conducted during the 30 
March 2014 local elections demonstrates a negative relationship between income 
and support for the AKP. Those in the lowest income group (less than 700 Turkish 
Lira per month) voted AKP over the CHP by a 42% to 18% margin. However, 40% of 
those in the highest income bracket (more than 3,000 Turkish Lira per month) voted 
CHP, compared to 30% for the AKP (Tillman, 2014: 4). In short, the conservative 
AKP relies heavily on support from lower-class voters, while the self-described social 
democratic CHP relies on support from middle-class voters. On the one hand, White 
Turks and the middle-class are concerned about the AKP’s Islamist style of 
governance. On the other hand, the AKP’s supporters, who are the members of 
lowest income group in Turkey, considers a victory against the White Turks polarise a 
victory against the enemy. At the same time, this polarisation also obliges the AKP to 
take a more Islamist position so that it can survive and not lose voter support 
(Çalışkan and Waldman, 2016: 10-11). The 'zenci' (Black Turks) metaphor that the 
AKP and leader Erdoğan used against ‘White Turks’ plays an important role in the 
AKP’s polarisation strategy. 
 
Erdoğan uses the term ‘zenci’  in most of his speeches and always claims that 
he is proud to be a zenci like other lower-class citizens in Turkey. Following the 
AKP’s second term, Erdoğan began to treat uneducated people as ‘Black Turks’, like 
himself. White Turks are seen as the well-educated, well-to-do Kemalist elites 
fashioning themselves on (some of) Atatürk’s ideas. They are often associated with 
state bureaucracy and the military. Black Turks are those who the White Turks 
despise as poorly-educated, lower-class and either still peasants in Anatolian or rural 
areas or unable to shake off their peasant heritage (Demiralp, 2012: 511-512). 
 
Peasants or people who live in Anatolian villages are complete ‘Black Turks’ in 
Erdoğan’s classification because these people were pressurised by Kemalist elites 
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during the early Republican period. ‘White Turks’ and Kemalist elites have always 
mocked them due to their uneducated/conservative identity. This article gives an 
example of Erdoğan’s mukhtar (local head person in villages) meetings for 
understanding this phenomenon. Since January 2015, President Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan has delivered monthly speeches to mukhtars, invited in groups to his 
presidential palace in Ankara. At the first meeting he said that; 
 
They were mocking me and all my mukhtar brothers by saying 'He cannot even 
be a mukhtar'. However, this nation elected me deputy, made me the Prime 
Minister and then elevated me to the office of Presidency by making me the first 
directly-elected President of the Republic of Turkey. I would like to sincerely 
express that being elected by the nation is one of the highest, greatest honors of 
this world. Being honored by the trust of this nation is really the highest rank of all 
whether you are a mukhtar or a mayor or a deputy or the President. Our mukhtar 
brothers, who are elected by the people, are in an extremely important office. The 
vision to become a great state begins with the local administrations. If the 
perspective and direction of the country does not match with the perspective of 
our smallest administrative unit, our villages and neighbourhoods, we cannot 
achieve a healthy growth.92 
 
Overall, Erdoğan’s lower-class mythology helped to consolidate and polarise 
his voters especially after 2011. Moreover, it also contributed to his success at the 
Presidential Elections in 2014. Indeed, the lower-class population is far larger 
numerically than the upper classes in Turkey and Erdoğan is well aware of this. He 
has used both conservative and traditionalist discourses addressed to the lower-
classes in such a way as to maintain the loyalty of the mass electorate. 
 
Use of this strategy to ensure the survival of the AKP and to protect its voter 
base also increased the appearance of populism and authoritarianism in Turkish 
politics. Throughout the chapter, we have examined the populism that the AKP has 
increased in an authoritarian manner. It is not wrong to say that conservative policies 
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have increased visibly in this period as populism, especially on the Kemalist and 
secular sectors. This study, however, does not consider this situation as the rise of 
Islamism. The policy tools we use primarily as intervening variable's are a product of 
a direct populist policy understanding rather than an Islamist policy understanding. 
Also, one of the arguments alleged in this study is that the AKP's conservative 
rhetoric of this period does not match the Islamist policy line in the true sense. One of 
the most important evidence that will support this argument is the Islamists' line of 
interviews with politicians. 
 
So what did those who regard themselves as Islamists think when confronted 
with this picture? In fact, many Islamists’ opinions are that current Islamism has been 
damaged by the AKP’s pragmatic and populist approach to religion. Interviews with 
some Islamist politicians suggest that Islamism has been used by the AKP 
hypocritically for its own survival. 
 
 
5.5. The Rise of Hypocritical Islamists in Turkey 
 
A theatre academy founded by a Kemalist artist, Müjdat Gezen, was set alight 
in Istanbul in 2017, adding to the atmosphere of fear and intimidation in the build-up 
to the constitutional referendum. Gezen, an outspoken critic of the ruling Justice and 
Development Party, has long been a target for Islamists and conservative supporters 
of the government, with Yeni Akit, a conservative pro-government newspaper, 
reporting the attack as a ‘huge shock to pimp Gezen’ on its Twitter account. After 
being detained by the police, it emerged that the suspected arsonist was also a 
strong supporter of President Erdoğan, regularly posting content with religious and 
conservative themes on social media. But with little sense of irony, he claims to have 
little memory of the crime, which he says was carried out under the influence of 
alcohol.93 
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This profile is typical of a certain brand of ‘hypocritical’ Islamism that has 
emerged in recent years under the AKP. Despite the explicit prohibition of both 
drinking and hate speech in Islam, opponents of the government can be drunkenly 
attacked and denounced as ‘pimps’ by those who are loudest in their so-called 
religious devotion.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the AKP learnt important lessons from Milli Görüş’s 
difficult history. Rejecting the Welfare Party’s anti-Western ideology, the party’s 
leaders instead emphasized individual rights and freedoms in the Western mould. 
Such efforts to ‘modernise’ the movement were initially welcomed by many Islamists. 
However, this began to wane after the AKP’s victory in the 2011 elections. With the 
party’s political position was secured in the face of little opposition, it began a move 
away from an emphasis on individual rights and democracy, and then Prime Minister 
Erdoğan began to exert control over the party in a way that began to increasingly 
resemble Erbakan’s domineering leadership. Interestingly, this did not mean that the 
AKP returned to the Islamism of its Milli Görüş roots, according to my interviewees 
from Islamist politics. Rather, it created a seemingly new kind of Islamism that 
increasingly resembled crony capitalism, leading to serious criticism from within the 
Milli Görüş tradition (Gürhanlı, 2014: 1-6). 
 
Before examining the views of these Islamist politicians on the AKP’s 
hypocritical Islamism, this research will present an interview conducted with a group 
of students who are interested in politics. This meeting included around 20 students 
from many departments94. The two radical Islamist students at this meeting did not 
accept the idea of ‘Erdoğan’s leadership in the Muslim world’. They criticised the AKP 
and Erdoğan’s policies in terms of Islamic values. They said that if the rise of 
Islamism has been realised by Erdoğan, the Turkish state would ban alcohol or 
punish adultery. If Erdoğan were faithful to his religion, he would not try to create 
good relations with Israel or the United States, according to them. 
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One of the students mentioned quotes from Erdoğan’s speeches such as ‘girls 
and boys should not live together’ and he believes that these speeches are only 
pragmatic arguments for Erdoğan. He indicates95 that they have never seen any 
regulations about this matter or about banning alcohol even though Erdoğan is 
against its use. Another gave an example of Erdoğan’s speech in Egypt96. In 2011 
Erdoğan called on Egyptians to adopt a secular constitution, noting that secularism 
does not mean renouncing religion. This student claims that, on the one hand, 
Erdoğan has made many speeches against secularism in the past and present, but 
on the other hand he has made many others about the importance of secularism. He 
points out that Erdoğan’s discourse has many dilemmas and contradictions within it 
due to his political interest in both domestic and foreign politics. 
 
Some of the students had a different perspective about this issue97. One of 
them worked in the one of the AKP’s youth branches before and had left the AKP 
due to the setting up of the AKP’s own cadre in public office. Another student claims 
that if you do not prostrate yourself in prayer (secde), you cannot work in public 
office. One student related his memory of the Canadian ambassador, who said to 
him: “the Turkish ambassadors in foreign countries do not go to meetings due to the 
AKP’s pressure”.98 Although there are negative developments concerning the rise of 
conservatism and authoritarianism in Turkey, these students were not sure that there 
is a strict conservatism or ‘real Islamism’ in Turkish society. However, one of the 
female students focused on a very important issue. She pointed out that there has 
been no quantitative increase of conservative/religious people in Turkish society, but 
instead that the conservative people in Turkey have become more Islamic and more 
authoritarian due to Erdoğan’s Islamist and authoritarian profile.  
 
Despite the AKP’s remarkable record of gaining and holding political office – 
an achievement that most Turkish Islamists would have once considered impossible 
– there are those in the movement who have argued that such success is no longer 
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advancing ‘real’ Islamism. Much of the Welfare Party’s support was built in the rural 
areas of Anatolia and in the shanty towns of newly-arrived immigrants in the big 
cities, where it benefited from popular discontent after a series of economic crises as 
well as the growth of Islamic revivalism against the authoritarian secularism of the 
preceding decades. It had a strong message of social and economic justice. 
 
One important Milli Görüş figure, Mehmet Bekaroğlu, asked in the interviews; 
‘If there is a 13-year Islamist government in Turkey, how can we explain non-Islamic 
civilisation and urbanisation in the big cities? The AKP has built huge blocks and big 
malls in the cities rather than functional buildings’.99 According to this view, Erdoğan 
increasingly uses Islamism as a tool for his personal political interests, paying lip 
service to religious ideals only when it suits him. Another Milli Görüş politician, 
Abdüllatif Şener, who was once a leading member of the AKP, expressed his 
disappointment; 
 
I prepared for the AKP party programme to make my dreams come true in 
Turkish politics, as I’d like to show the compatibility between Islam and 
democracy in Turkey from their vieRPoint. However, Erdoğan has not been 
successful on this goal. There are many corruption scandals among the AKP 
government. So, I ask, how can you explain these corruption scandals if you use 
Islam or Islamic values? Because of this, I left AKP in 2007, although Abdullah 
Gül and Erdoğan would like to see me in AKP’s staff. I consider the AK Party not 
as an Islamic party but as a party which collect votes by using Islamic discourses. 
Just like this, I do not consider Erdoğan as a person thinking by Islamic way, I 
also do not believe that he has Muslim susceptibility. His way of policy making fits 
neither Islam nor humanity nor national interests.100 
 
After the 2013 corruption scandal, some of Erdoğan’s supporters defended 
their leader using religious logic, appealing to the Islamic principle of free will. An 
AKP parliamentarian, Metin Külünk, argued on the pro-government television channel 
Habertürk TV that: ‘individuals have (various) areas of freedom; Allah has given man 
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the freedom to sin … Allah says, I created human beings able to commit sins and 
repent. You are interfering with the freedom of people to commit sins’ (Gürcan and 
Peker, 2015: 141-160). With little space for opposition even within the Islamist 
movement itself, society is becoming increasingly dominated by government 
loyalists, whose lifestyles are often contrary to Islamic values, but who suppress the 
freedoms of others in the name of Islam. 
 
As seen in Şener and Bekaroğlu’s criticism against Erdoğan’s hypocritical 
Islamism, there have been many negative developments for Islam under the AKP’s 
rule. CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu summarised this phenomenon in his one of the 
group meetings in the Turkish Assembly:  
 
Leaders have a duty. Presidents have a duty. Ministers have a duty. They have 
to set a model for society. If you give up setting a model for the society and 
dissociate it, then you leave the society face to face with this degeneration. If the 
president of a country doesn’t abide by the oath that he took, then he cannot be a 
model for the society and he nourishes the degeneracy in the society. They have 
nourished the degeneracy in society for 13 years in this way. They talked about 
religion and faith. In which religion does morality have a second-class position? 
Why have suicide cases increases? There has been a 33% increase. Drugs that 
have spread in last 13 years have become trouble for Turkey. Increase in drug 
addiction is 678%. The increase in those jailed for drug trade is 355%. There is 
790% increase in prostitution. More than 300,000 women are being held by 
prostitution gangs like slaves. What is this Justice and Development Party is 
doing, can you tell me? Where is justice here? Where is the development 
here?101  
 
The abuse of Islam in this way also affected Turkish society in a similar way. 
HDP Diyarbakır Deputy, İmam Taşçıer, gives an example to demonstrate this view. 
On the friendly football match between Turkey and Greece, chants of 'Allahu Akbar' 
were reportedly heard in Istanbul as some Turkey fans shamefully booed a pre-
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match minute's silence for the victims of the Paris terrorist attacks.102 Like Taşçıer, 
another HDP deputy and Kurdish Islamist politician, Hüda Kaya, was aware of this 
event. According to Kaya, Erdoğan identifies himself as ‘a leader of Muslim 
people’.103 As a result, Erdoğan’s supporters take courage from his mission and most 
of the conservative people in Turkey have become more Islamicised like Erdoğan. 
Kaya believes that Muslim identity was always abused by Erdoğan and the AKP 
government.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Chapter 4 focuses on the third term of the AKP, which is a real turning point in 
the rise of populism in Turkey. This chapter examines how the AKP’s populist 
strategy influenced the cause of the survival of the AKP. As we have already 
mentioned, De Mesquita’s selectorate theory is limited as a means of explaining the 
connection of causality between the AKP’s survival and the rise of Islamism, 
especially in the party’s third term. Although the condition of keeping the nominal 
selectorate large is relevant to the AKP’s survival and the rise of Islamism, Turkey 
has not evolved into a typical dictatorship as postulated in De Mesquita’s case 
examples. Moreover, the lack of political actors’ leadership skills or motivations and 
De Mesquita’s explanations of political survival from a more economic perspective 
are the weaknesses of his theory in this case. At this point, the rise of populism 
between 2011 and 2014 is connected to the survival of the AKP and the support of 
the electorate. 
 
Hence, the impending question is how the AKP gained the support of the 
majority of voters. The answer to this question also shows the third independet 
variable of the AKP’s political survival. Chapter 4 focuses on the AKP’s populist 
strategy which can be further expressed as the third independent variable to reveal 
the causal mechanism of the AKP’s survival in Turkish politics. At this point, the AKP 
carried out a populist strategy between secular and conservative citizens in Turkey 
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and consolidated the support of conservative voters for the AKP. The bridge between 
these two variables – the rise of populism in Turkish politics and the AKP’s political 
survival - is established with various policy tools such as anti-intellectualism, anti-
Westernism, traditionalism, and lower-class mythology. 
 
In this chapter, the period between 2011 and 2014 was explored in detail with 
the cause-and-effect relationship between AKP’s populism and its political survival. In 
this respect, the example of how this populist point of view contributed to this, while 
was succeeding at the point of ensuring the survival of the AKP with the March 2014 
local elections and 2014 Presidential Election. In particular, the results of the 2014 
Presidential Election prompted the AKP government and leader Erdogan to demand 
the adoption of a new political line-up in the post-2014 period. As emphasized in De 
Mesquita's selectorate theory, the nominal selectorate from one side was kept large 
while the winning coalition from the other was getting smaller. The results of the 2014 
presidential election demonstrated that the Fethullah Gülen Movement and the 
Kurdish movement were no longer possible in the position of two important forces in 
the winning coalition of the AKP. In order to be able to carry out this conflict with 
these two actors on a political level, the AKP would put forward a combination of 
Islamism and nationalism, leading to a much more nationalist streak of political 
struggle. The next chapter, Chapter 5, explores how this transformation takes place 
and how this Islamist-nationalist combination affects the cause of AKP’s political 
survival in Turkish politics between 2014 and 2018.  
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Chapter 5: The Instrumentalisation of Islamism and Nationalism under 
Erdogan’s Leadership (2014-2018) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, this study examines that the first steps of a populist 
authoritarianism have begun with the AKP's third period after 2011. It is an 
undeniable fact that this process continues in the post-2014 period. Nevertheless, 
there are two significant differences in analysing the political survival of the AKP 
between the post-2014 period and the period of 2011-2014. Firstly, the Kurds and 
Fethullah Gulen movement, which took place in the AKP’s winning coalition until 
2014 were eliminated from Turkish politics by AKP after 2014. The second factor is 
the Erdogan’s leadership, which seeks to take over the power of the AKP in the party 
structure and control the Turkish politics with the presidential system after April 2017 
referendum.  
 
These two factors have led to another cause-and-effect mechanism developed 
by the AKP to protect its political survival. As mentioned earlier in De Mesquita's 
Selectorate Theory, it was necessary to consolidate the voters' base to keep the 
nominal selectorate as large as possible. After the AKP lost the Kurds and Fethullah 
Gulen Movements’ support, it would begin to pursue a policy combination of Islamism 
and nationalism in the framework of Erdogan's leadership. The positive results of this 
policy would also be taken during the November 2015, April 2017 referendum and 
last June 2018 elections, and the political survival of the AKP would have been 
preserved in the recent period. 
 
 
Chapter 5 will first examine the AKP-Gulen Movement conflict and the AKP-
Kurds conflict, whose relations were collapsed after the 2014 presidential elections 
and the 2015 elections. In this context, how the Kurdish movement and the Fethullah 
Gülen has affected the AKP’s political survival until 2014 will be examined in this 
chapter. In the chapter, AKP-Kurdish movement conflict and AKP-Gülen movement 
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conflict will be examined in two separate sub-sections, and the effect of this conflict 
on the survival of AKP will be analysed in light of the elections after 2014. In this 
context, it will be examined on how the AKP has formed a coalition of ideas as a new 
winning coalition in the plane of Islamism and nationalism, acting with the ideology of 
‘native and national’ (yerli ve milli), and how this understanding contributes to the 
protection of AKP’s political survival. 
 
 
2. The Clash of Islamists: AKP vs Fethullah Gülen Movement 
 
In the previous chapter, this research tried to summarise the relationship of the 
AKP with Fethullah Gülen Movement without getting into details. In this context, it 
was stated that the AKP established in 2001 had a close relationship with the 
Fethullah Gülen movement in the context of founding staff and ideology of the 
establishment. This position of the Gülen movement could also be considered as a 
member of the large winning coalition in the early period of the AKP. This strategic 
partnership between the AKP and the Gülen movement lasted between 2002 and 
2012, and in 2013 and beyond, this coalition was collapsed and an unrelenting 
struggle between the Gülen movement and the AKP began. Although this study has 
described the previous chapter as a period between 2011 and 14 and discussed the 
beginning of the AKP-Gulen conflict in this process, we believe that this conflict would 
accelerate and affect the political survival of the AKP after 2014. Before doing this 
review, it would be useful to give a summary of where and how the Fethullah Gülen 
Movement was born. 
 
2.1. The History of Gülen Movement 
 
Fethullah Gülen was born in the village of Korucuk (Bakar, 2005: 359-372), of 
Erzurum (what is Eastern Turkey) on April 27, 1941. He received a Quranic 
education from his parents early on in his life. His mother first taught Gülen the 
Quran, and his father taught him Arabic, as well as the works of Islamic scholars 
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(Saritoprak and Griffith, 2005:329-340). Along with the education from his parents, 
Gülen also studied under Qadiri Sufi sheikh Muhammad Lutfi Efendi, who is said to 
have profoundly shaped Gülen’s life and outlook on Islam (Saritoprak and Griffith, 
2005). Also, Gülen and his movement also came out of the influence of Said Nursi 
and the Nursi movement. 
 
In 1958, Gülen began working as a vaiz (state-paid religious imam) in the city 
of Edirne. After having worked in this role for many years, in 1966 he was given the 
job of being the DIB preacher (The Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs) in Izmir. 
Along with serving in this role, he also devoted time to the Kestanepazari Qur’an 
School in the city (Yavuz, 2003:181). Specifically, he began educating students on 
his ideas about Islam, the role of community, as well as civic engagement. Here he 
ran summer camps where children would be taught secular as well as religious 
subjects. These camps functioned as much more than small classrooms for the 
dissemination of knowledge. As Yavuz (2003) explains,  
 
…[o]ne sees the process of deepening private religious consciousness and the 
development of new and narrow Islamic fraternization among the participants of 
the camps. The students lived together within an atmosphere of sincerity and 
were tutored in a shared language of Islamic morality to form a common map of 
action. These camps… were spaces for deepening inner consciousness for 
public use and were the networks of the formation of a powerful sense of 
religious brotherhood in order to bring Islamic values into the public The first 
generation followers of Gülen internalized Islamic values of responsibility, 
selfsacrifice,and dedicating oneself to the collective good of the Muslim 
community” (Yavuz, 2003: 182). 
 
Thus Gülen began to educate a group of students who – following their 
education with him – would go onto dispersing such ideas in civil society (Yavuz 
2003: 182).While he was actively teaching these students, the politics of the state 
affected him; during the 1971 coup, he, along with many other followers of Said Nursi 
were arrested for “the violation of article 163, which criminalizes ‘unwanted’ religious 
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expression and association” (Yavuz, 2003b:182–183). While he was not found guilty, 
he did end up spending seven months in jail, until the verdict was reached. After his 
arrest, he continued to focus on his message of education. He did this by organising 
the “Foundation of Turkish Teachers”, as well as the “Foundation of Middle and 
Higher Education” in Akyazi in 1976. He also concentrated on writing. In 1979, his 
Sızıntı magazine was first published (Yavuz, 2003b:183), and the newspaper Zaman 
came out beginning in 1986 (Yavuz, 2003b). However, Gülen found more freedom to 
operate in the 1980s, when he began working with politicians (such as Prime Minister 
Halil Turgut Özal) on education, as well as social and cultural issues in Turkish 
society. And in 1983, the opening of the education system allowed the Hizmet 
movement to increase their education-based activities. This, coupled with support 
from Özal (who removed the arrest warrant for Gülen years back) (Yavuz 2003a: 37), 
allowed Gülen to increase his activities in education (Yavuz 2003b: 183). 
 
With the movements increasing popularity in society, despite Gülen’s attempts 
to not weigh in on controversial issues (Yavuz,2003b), to not minimize the role of the 
state in the country (Yavuz, 2003a), as well as having the increased support by 
President Demirel, along with Prime Minister Ecevit (Yavuz, 2003a: 43), nevertheless 
the movement attracted the attention of some members of the military, as well as 
some secular currents in the state. Specifically, in 1999, Gülen was a major concern 
for some members of the military, as well as some of the secularists, when they 
began to see some of Gülen’s recordings being played on national television. 
Overall, there were some concerns with Gülen and the Hizmet movement by the 
military and others, which Özdalga (2005) summarizes as follows: 
 
i. Fethullah Gülen is trying to infiltrate important state institutions like the 
judiciary, the police and the military. 
ii. The purpose behind that is to prepare the ground for a seizure of state 
power. 
iii. The struggle for the final takeover of the state has been going on for a 
long time and takes place in great secrecy. 
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iv. Fethullah Gülen’s strategy is to pretend that he and his adherents fully 
favour Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the existing regime, while in reality 
he is preparing himself and his followers for an Islamist revolution. 
v. What is so disturbing about Gülen is that he has been so skilful in 
hiding his real purposes from the public. 
vi. Fethullah Gülen controls “gigantic” (korkunç) sums of money. How and 
where these resources are appropriated is unknown. Since he lives in 
the United States, it is hinted that he is supported by this superpower 
(allegedly to undermine the interests of his native Turkey). 
vii. In the schools, dormitories and home-like student houses (ıßık evleri) 
set up in the name of Gülen, students are pressured to accept his 
teachings (brainwashed). 
viii. Gülen and his adherents constitute a greater threat to the regime than 
either the Kurdish “terror organisation” PKK and Abdullah Öcalan or the 
Welfare Party and its most militant demagogue Íevket Yılmaz. The fact 
that the Welfare Party functions openly must count in its favour 
compared to Gülen’s secretiveness” (439–440). 
 
The discussion or examination of whether all concerns or criticisms of the 
Gülen community that Özdalga mentions is true or not may be the subject of another 
research. However, the aim of the Gülen community to have influence in the state 
administration is an undeniable fact in relation to the AKP’s political survival. Hakan 
Yavuz expresses this situation as follows;  
 
The Gülen followers evolved through three major stages of development: a 
communitarian network of piety [cemaat]; education-cum-media global movement 
[hareket], and a secret religiopolitical configuration commonly referred to as a 
‘parallel structure of the state’ [parallel yapı], with the goal of controlling the 
mechanisms of the state.The Gülenists gradually shed their faith-oriented 
activities, involving themselves in conquering secular spaces by articulating a 
new Islamic discourse, which stressed ‘service’ [hizmet] to humanity, rigorous 
educational standards for a new generation who eventually would rule the 
country, and involvement in strategic economic sectors to leverage new financial 
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and market power. These complex networks in the movement operated less upon 
generally accepted standards of ethical communication and advocacy than on a 
winner-takes-all political objective. The Gülenist attempt to control the state 
bureaucracy was also supported by a large segment of conservative Turkish 
society, which regularly complained about the heavyhanded policies of the state 
bureaucracy. The Gülen movement penetrated state institutions, gaining control 
only by the will of the AK Party. (Yavuz, 2018: 20). 
 
As Yavuz mentioned, a strategic partnership was established between the 
AKP and the Gulen community, on the one hand, to provide the survival of the AKP, 
and on the other side to reinforce the Gulen community within the state. How this 
partnership in this chapter will affect the survival of the AKP by 2014 and how it has 
succeeded in keeping the nominal selectorate large by the policies followed by the 
AKP along with the conflict that emerged in the post-2014 period. 
 
2.2. A strategic alliance of necessity between AKP and Gülen Movement 
 
As you know I have read and always shared the ideas of Said Nursi and I 
am a follower of the Risale-i Nur. The Gülen movement also evolved out of the 
Nur movement. When I became minister, we did not have any supporters in the 
bureaucracy except the Gülenists. So they helped us to get to know the ministries 
and run them because the secularists and nationalists were using every means to 
show us as incompetent. The only group we had to rely on was the Gülenists. 
Thanks to them we survived the siege of the Kemalists and secured the 
constitutional referendum. (Yavuz, 2018: 23) 
 
These statements were published by Hakan Yavuz's interview with the former 
minister of education, who observed and approved the efforts of the Gülenists to 
control the ministry. In Chapter 2, which this study has discussed in the first period of 
the AKP, it has stated that the AKP has developed close relations with the Fethullah 
Gülen Movement during its establishment. In this regard, the intellectual connection 
between the AKP and the Gulen movement can be illustrated through the Abant 
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Platform meetings, a forum in which invited academics, civil society leaders, and 
politicians gather to discuss issues related to the Turkish society, international affairs, 
and Islam (Demiralp, 2016). Past meeting topics have included “Islam and 
Secularism,” “Religion, State, and Society,” and “Pluralism and Social Compromise” 
(Muedini, 2015: 99-122). An official we interviewed from an affiliated Gülen 
organisation, the Journalists and Writers Foundation (Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfi, 
GYV) explained the informal connection between the Gülen Movement and AKP; 
 
The first Abant meeting was about Islam and secularism. Because it was the first 
time people from different sectors came together, there were intense debates. 
The intensity reached a point where there was almost a fight. But everyone took 
advantage of each other’s knowledge. Many people who were founding members 
of the AKP attended these meetings, and they openly declared that they learned 
a lot from these experiences. Some people say that if a radical Islamist party has 
moved to the center today—a party like AKP—in this, the Abant meetings have 
been influential. As far as I know, there are seven or eight ministers in the 
cabinet, also the president, Abdullah Gül, who have attended our meetings more 
than two or three times. Also Professor Mehmet Aydın, the Minister of State, was 
the Secretary General of the Abant Platform, and then he was the President of 
the Abant Platform for six years (Özler and Sarkissian, 2009: 22). 
 
From this point of view, the coalition between the AKP and the Gulen 
Movement started in 2002. However, it should not be forgotten that in the first period 
of the AKP, which was established with a large coalition, Fethullah Gülen Movement 
was a small part of this coalition. Of course, the results of the AKP and Gülen 
partnership in this period also reflected in Turkish politics. On 25 August 2004, the 
military-dominated National Security Council (MGK), which included then Prime 
Minister Erdoğan and select AKP cabinet members, signed an advisory ruling on 
‘measures needed to be taken to counter activities by the Fethullah Gülen Movement 
and asked the government to draw up an action plan (Taş, 2018: 1-19). Specifically, 
in 2005 and 2007 AKP rejected two notices of motion given by the main opposition 
party, the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), to investigate 
what it coined ‘F-type Organisation’, with F referring to Gülen’s first name (Taş, 2017: 
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1-8). This formidable alliance was capable of stifling legal manoeuvres aimed at 
finishing off each group. Following the institution of EU-oriented liberal changes to 
the Counterterrorism Law on 5 May 2006, the Ankara Criminal Court acquitted 
Fethullah Gülen of subverting the secular regime (Muedini, 2015). Hakkı Taş explains 
why and how this alliance’s necessity is important for both actors; 
 
Despite the public perception that there was an inherent partnership between 
AKP and the Gülenists in this period, the relationship could be best described as 
a strategic alliance in pursuit of mutual benefits. The newfound political and 
strategic affinity enabled both groups to set aside their differences. First, 
declaring a clear break from its predecessors, AKP (as the Gülenists did) 
refrained from antagonizing the state elite with challenges to secularism. Second, 
both actors now shared a pro-Western agenda that sought to promote Turkey’s 
European Union membership process and market liberalization. Third, AKP and 
GM combined their complementary forces as a means of surviving the hostile 
secular environment. While AKP benefited from GM’s educated human capital in 
state bureaucracy, GM found the opportunity to expand further across social, 
economic, and bureaucratic fields (Taş, 2017:3). 
 
As the Hakkı Taş stated, the needs of both actors were at the same time 
forming a coalition. This coalition began to build its first building blocks between 2002 
and 2007, and after 2007, this coalition would begin to move on a different footing. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, De Mesquita predicts that Selectorate Theory faces 
various threats or risks to the political survival of leaders or political parties. In this 
context, the AKP faced two threats after 2007. AKP survived the military’s indirect 
intervention on 27 April 2007, known as the ‘e-memorandum’, and the 2008 closure 
case in the Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, unlike the 28 February Process, the 
AKP was more confident this time and carried out a counter-offensive policy to 
ensure its political survival.  
 
As De Mesquita mentioned, the AKP's winning coalition began to shrink, and 
at the same time, Fethullah Gülen Movement became a very critical member of this 
coalition by directly protecting the AKP from these two threats. As mentioned in 
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Chapter 3, the AKP has taken action to eliminate especially the Kemalists from 
Turkish politics. In this context, the biggest contributor of the AKP's policies would be 
the Fethullah Gülen Movement because it would become an important opportunity for 
the movement to gain power in the Turkish state. The first attempt in this context 
would be the Ergenekon investigation. 
 
Gülenist Prosecutors, supported by leading members of the governing Justice 
and Development Party (AKP), have accused military officers and their supposed 
civilian accomplices with membership in a secret network, dubbed the ‘Ergenekon 
terror organisation’ after an ancient Turkish myth. The prosecutors have charged 
them with crimes ranging from bombings to intimidation of religious minorities and 
coup plots. The Ergenekon investigation along with an alleged coup plot codenamed 
Sledgehammer has ensnared hundreds of current and retired Kemalist military 
officers, journalists, academics, and lawyers, as well as a chief prosecutor and even 
a former mayor of Istanbul (Rodrik, 2011: 99-109). 
 
As explained in Chapter 3, the illegality that has taken place during the 
Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials and the pressure of the AKP has started to 
build on the Kemalist and secular segments of society in particular. At this point, the 
Fethullah Gülen Movement would feel more power in Turkish politics by managing 
the struggle directly with the Kemalists, and it would target the names of opposition 
figures. Ruşen Çakır (2012) and Dani Rodrik (2011) convey the different roles of the 
Gülen Movement in this process with the examples. 
 
In this respect, the first example to be given is the former police chief, Hanefi 
Avci. Avcı was a nationalist-conservative Chief of Police who specialised in the 
intelligence part of the fight against terrorism. He was considered to be somebody 
who is not distant from the Gülen movement. However, Avcı, as an insider, put 
forward very strong claims for the organisation of the community within the Turkish 
National Police by giving names and describing events. As a result of this, his book 
was a best-seller in a concise time. However, even though Avcı had been fighting 
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against terrorism for years, he was arrested and put on trial for being affiliated with a 
radical leftist movement, called “The Revolutionary Base”. Following this, he was also 
included in the OdaTV case and it was claimed that he had a relationship with 
Ergenekon (Çakır, 2012: 19). To a large extent, it can be said that the public thinks 
that Avcı had been silenced through investigations and trials by exactly the same 
people against whom he was fighting. Indeed, after a while, the journalist, Ahmet Şık, 
known to be preparing a book on the organisation of the community within the police, 
was also taken into custody and the police confiscated copies of the work-in-progress 
on different computers. Despite this, the book was published on the Internet, 
temporarily entitled ‘The Army of the Imam’, and following this, it attracted a lot of 
attention when it was published with the title, ‘Whoever Touches it Burns’ (Dokunan 
Yanar) (Rodrik, 2011: 100). 
 
Another journalist, who was arrested on the same day as Şık was Nedim 
Şener, who had researched and shed light on the negligence of the state officials in 
the murder of the Armenian journalist, Hrant Dink. Therefore, he had disturbed some 
of the chiefs of police that were suggested to be affiliated with the Gülen movement 
(Çakır, 2012: 19-20). After his arrest, it was claimed that this hostility was present 
behind it, and, therefore the Gülen movement. In the course of events, during the 
Ergenekon process, this was the second big break after the incident of Prof. Türkan 
Saylan, Director of The Support for Modern Life Association. Namely, it was thought 
that Professor Saylan was included in the investigation mainly because she was 
running a rival educational establishment to that of the Gülen movement 
(Kuzmanoviç, 2012: 171-185). In other words, this investigation was seriously 
clouded with the possibility that highly influential members of the Gülen community 
were, at the same time, settling up their own accounts in the cases of Professor 
Saylan, Şık-Şener during the Ergenekon process. 
 
Apart from these examples; the manifestation of the links between the 
prosecutors carrying out the investigations with the Fethullah Gülen movement and 
the manipulative news of the media organisations connected to the Gülen movement 
during the Ergenekon-Sledgehammer investigations show how the Gülen community 
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contributed to the survival of the AKP in this process. As a result of these operations 
in the 2nd term of the AKP, Gulen Movement was going to the important partner of 
this coalition, while TÜSİAD, some western actors, some sections from the centre-
right were leaving AKP's winning coalition. In this process, the Gülen support in the 
2010 constitutional referendum would play a much more crucial role in the AKP's 
survival. 
 
The alliance peaked during the constitutional referendum of 12 September 
2010, which altered the composition of the judicial bodies and ultimately broke the 
secularist hold on the judiciary. With Fethullah Gülen personally campaigning for 
Turkish citizens to cast affirmative votes in the referendum, Erdoğan extended 
gratitude to those ‘beyond the ocean’ (okyanus ötesi), an intra-community reference 
to Gülen (Taş, 2017: 4). As discussed above, after the 2002 national elections, the 
Gülen community and the AK Party gradually merged, with the Gülenists working 
more than as mere functionaries of the AK Party branches in provinces across the 
country. By 2010, the Gülenists became the dominant group within AK Party. Hayati 
Yazıcı, an AK Party deputy, said; ‘The 2010 referendum was key for many reasons. 
This referendum showed the extent to which the Gülenists had become the most 
powerful force. The AK Party relied on the Gülenists for the referendum campaign 
and used the Gülenist media to disseminate its position’ (Yavuz, 2018: 21). 
 
Hakan Yavuz summarizes this period in light of the AKP and Gülen Movement 
alliance; 
 
The coalition with the Gülen movement served to assist, at least initially, 
Erdoğan’s larger aims. The Gülenists provided him manpower for bureaucracy, 
media outlets such as Daily Zaman and Samanyolu TV became the AK Party’s 
outlets. The stability and the current state of the republic were now in question. 
When Erdoğan came to power, the Kemalist establishment, along with its 
supporting Doğan Media outlets, exercised various legal, political, and economic 
means to get rid of the AK Party, which fought back by aligning itself with the 
Gülen movement. The Gülenists have pushed the army back into barracks 
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through fabricated court cases and have placed their strongest sympathizers in 
various departments of bureaucracy to control the state institutions. The struggle 
between the Kemalists and the AK Party culminated in the 2010 constitutional 
referendum, which empowered the government to restructure state institutions, 
especially the constitutional court. Thus, the 2011 national elections represented 
a new era in which the Kemalist bureaucracy was subordinated and the 
Gülenists, not the AK Party, became the domineering force within the state 
system. (Yavuz, 2018: 22) 
 
During the period 2011-2014, the harmony and coalition between the AKP and 
the Gulen Movement began to deteriorate on the one hand, and Gezi Park Protests, 
another threat to the survival of the AKP on the other hand, was an important 
evidence of Gülen Movements' support to the AKP’s political survival. The Gülenists, 
with firm control of the state bureaucracy in hand, targeted the AK Party in the 
parliament and asked Erdoğan to allocate more than 100 elected positions in 2011 
election for Gülen movement followers. But, the Gülenists in Ankara wanted more 
power than they represented. Erdoğan and his closest circle of advisers and aides 
were never comfortable with the expanding mass of unchecked Gülenist power in the 
bureaucracy and they worried about the consequences of Gülenist cooperation with 
the United States, Israel, and European powers. Yalçın Akdoğan, who was once 
among Erdoğan’s closest associates and who scheduled secret meetings with 
Kurdish groups but was then later pushed aside, said the following in an interview 
with the author, which took place in his office in the parliament: 
 
We made too many mistakes and the biggest one was to rely totally on Gülenist 
intelligence. Some of the ministers did not run their departments but allowed the 
Gülenist bureaucracy to run it for themselves and they just sought to accumulate 
wealth. Yes, unfortunately, the Gülenists were a state within the state. In other 
words, a ‘parallel state’. It was the Gülenists who also thought about how to take 
and give bribes. The coalition with the Gülenists destroyed the morality of the 
party and I am sorry to say it now but the AK Party is neither ‘ak’ [pure] anymore 
nor is it moral. I cannot even recognize the party myself.(Yavuz, 2018:21). 
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The reflections of such a conflict of interest between AKP and Gülen 
Movement also surfaced at various times during this period. As noted above, on the 
eve of the June 2011 general elections, Erdoğan’s refusal to include up to one 
hundred pro-Gülen candidates in the party list led to further tension. However, the 
definitive rift occurred with the so-called ‘MIT (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, Turkish 
National Intelligence Organisation) Crisis’ on 7 February 2012 when Sadreddin 
Sarıkaya, a ‘pro-Gülen’ public prosecutor, subpoenaed Hakan Fidan, the 
Undersecretary of the MIT and Erdoğan’s confidante, to account for conducting 
secret talks with the PKK in Oslo and overstepping his authority (Taş, 2017:4-5). 
Among rumours about Fidan’s impending arrest, Erdoğan shielded him from the 
further legal process through an immediate legislative manoeuvre. Without naming 
them, Erdoğan referred to the Gülen affiliates in the judiciary and security behind this 
event as a ‘state within a state’. 
 
The second major disagreement involved the wiretapping of Erdoğan’s office 
and home in 2012. In fact, numerous police officers who worked for Erdoğan, 
including his former chief bodyguard, were convicted of placing electronic bugs in 
various locations inside the prime minister’s office (Yavuz and Koç, 2016: 139). This 
wiretapping scandal destroyed Erdoğan’s faith in the Gülen movement, forcing the 
AK Party government to curtail its effective force by going after its recruitment and 
financial sources. In November 2013, Erdoğan moved to cripple the movement’s 
financial and human resources by closing the Gülen-run ‘prep schools’. Gülenists 
were operating a quarter of those cram schools, which were not only a financial 
source for the movement, but also channels for recruiting new, young members 
(Hendrick, 2014: 131-144). Hence, this was widely perceived as a move to cripple the 
movement.  
 
Despite the increasing tension, it is not possible to say that the AKP ended the 
coalition partnership with the Fethullah Gülen movement completely in the 3rd period 
of AKP. As mentioned in Chapter 3, after the 2010 Constitutional amendment, the 
Gülen Movement took power at the state level, especially in the Turkish judiciary. The 
direct fighting with such a strong structuring of Gülen Movement was also a threat to 
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the survival of the AKP. This tension should be passivated by the AKP due to the 
continuity of AKP’s survival. Hakkı Taş describes this situation as follows; 
 
While exercising great caution to avoid targeting Gülen directly, pro-government 
figures began suggesting that Gülen was being misled by his inner circle and 
whether the hardliners, especially the Gülenist clique within the security forces, 
were gaining the upper hand in the community (Küçük, 2012). The phrase ‘Gülen 
is good, but his inner circle is bad’ (‘Hoca iyi, çevresi kötü’) was common in pro-
government circles. Still, both sides were keeping this confrontation behind the 
scenes. In June 2012, Erdoğan even attended the Gülenist-organised Turkish 
Olympiads and invited Gülen back to Turkey, saying ‘We want this yearning to 
end’.(Taş, 2017: 5) 
 
In parallel with this point of view, it would not be wrong to say that the 
Fethullah Gülen Community is in the side of the AKP, especially in the Protest Park 
protests, in order to ensure the survival of the AKP. As once again stated, the Gezi 
Park Protest was a civil uprising example, one of the threats to political survival that 
De Mesquita mentioned. At this point, Gülen Movement's support in the AKP's 
winning coalition will play a crucial role. It was important to end this protest in terms 
of the Gülen Movement because the Protest was created by the secular-conservative 
conflict and the Kemalist sector played a dominant role during this protest. At this 
point, the Gülen Movement's supportive situation to AKP is important for 
consolidating the conservative electoral base in light of the AKP’s power and survival 
in Turkish politics. 
 
During the Gezi Protest, Fethullah Gülen Movement’s newspaper, Zaman 
gave a large margin of pages expressing the damage protestors caused in the area 
more than any other newspapers. The terms like ‘us and them’, ‘çapulcu’ considered 
as tools of symbolic violence are equally presented in the articles of each newspaper 
regardless of their political opinions. Furthermore, Zaman newspapers, on the 
contrary to other newspapers such as Cumhuriyet and Hürriyet, had focused on the 
headlines indicating the negotiation effort of government to settle down the 
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movement, especially coming from President Abdullah Gül and Deputy Prime Min-
ister Bülent Arınç (Öztoprak and Subay, 2014: 93). 
 
Another example is coming from Karakatsanis (2013). He also noted that; in a 
recent episode of the series called 'Ekip 1' (Team 1) broadcast by Fethullah Gülen 
Movement’s Saman Yolu channel TV, a reference to the Gezi Park protest was 
included. The difference was that all reality in it was undone to a surrealistic, almost 
amusing degree. Gezi Park protesters appear using ‘disproportional’ violence against 
the peaceful defending police; they attack ‘innocent civilians’. Then ‘leftist guerrillas’ 
appear in the scene attacking the defenceless police with guns while conspirators 
with foreign accents orchestrate the scene of civil war while watching from a nearby 
cliff. Of course, the special forces intervene, kill the provocateurs and save the 
country (Karaktsanis, 2013: 8). 
 
As can be seen, the support of Gülen Movement in the elimination of Gezi 
Park Protest, which is the biggest threat to the survival of the AKP, although the 
tension between these two actors seems to be increasing in this period. But this 
would probably be the last major political event that the AKP-Fethullah Gülen 
Movement partnership has maintained. 
 
By the end of 2013, tensions escalated into all-out political war between the 
AK Party government and the Gülen movement. The Gülenists struck back against 
Erdoğan and his supporters by exposing corruption within the government extending 
all the way to the Prime Minister himself. On 17 December 2013, the Istanbul Police 
Department’s Financial and Anti-Corruption Unit detained 47 people, including the 
sons of three ministers: Barış Güler (the son of the minister of interior), Kaan 
Çağlayan (the son of the minister of economy) and Oğuz Bayraktar (the son of the 
minister of environment and urban development) (Ulusoy, 2015: 69). Also detained 
were Mustafa Demir, the mayor of the Fatih district of Istanbul; high-ranking officials 
of the Housing Development Administration (TOKI); Süleyman Aslan, the general 
director of the state-owned Halk Bank; and Iranian businessman Rezza Zarraf. In 
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addition, Egemen Bağış, the minister of EU affairs, was suspected of bribery in 
association with Reza Zarrab and Babak Zanjani, both wealthy Iranian businessmen 
(Yavuz and Koç, 2016: 140). In fact, this was the most extensively investigated 
corruption case in Turkish history.  
 
The period between 2011 and 2014, while explaining the survival of the AKP, 
specifically addressed a populist authoritarianism against the Kemalists in Turkish 
politics. At this point, this authoritarianism continued as a result of the conflicts with 
the Gülen Movement and the Kurds in the post-2014 period. Fighting its former ally 
deeply entrenched in the state apparatus; the AKP government resorted to 
unconstitutional measures and bypassed the rule of law as it set to eradicate the 
Gulenist cadres from the state. The power struggle between former allies further 
undermined civil liberties, independence of the judiciary (or whatever was left of it), 
and the rule of law. The government banned Twitter and YouTube prior to 2014 local 
elections; reshuffled thousands of police officers and prosecutors; passed new 
legislation to redesign the supreme judicial council; denied access to the satellite 
systems for pro-Gulen TV stations; seized the property of leading businessmen; and 
appointed trustees to companies, foundations, universities and newspapers with links 
to the Gulen movement following the graft probe of December 2013 (Gümüşçü, 2016: 
9). 
 
The Gülenist psyche, driven by its own political ambitions and threats, became 
more emboldened in the aftermath of the 2013 corruption probes and Erdoğan’s daily 
threats against them, which may have hastened and amplified feelings and 
expression of radicalization. Yavuz (2018: 25-26) claims that part of the discussion 
should be focused on how negative emotions—fear, anxiety, suspicion, rage and 
panic—have constituted the psychological background regarding incidents of 
Gülenist violence. A sense of grave panic seems to have prevailed throughout the 
Gülen movement’s security establishment, immediately prior to the scheduled military 
council meeting of August 2016, a potentially critical event at which governmental 
officials would decide who among the military’s senior-level officers would be 
promoted, demoted, forced to retire or resign, or subjected to criminal investigation 
(Yavuz, 2018, 26). The fear of forthcoming arrests, torture and purges swept every 
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Gülen network by word of mouth, as the movement’s followers were convinced that 
Erdoğan was about to destroy them. 
 
For all these reasons, the Gülen Movement planned to overthrow the AKP 
government. In this context, the acting Ankara-based military team of Gülen 
Movement made a coup attempt on July 15, 2016. Although the coup attempt was 
not successful after the failure, the Gulen community claim that they did not attempt 
the coup d'état. However, it was clear evidence that the Gülen Movement was behind 
the 15 July coup attempt. Five civilians; Adil Öksüz, Harun Biniş, Kemal Batmaz, 
Nurettin Oruç and Hakan Çiçek have been captured at Akıncı Air Base, known as the 
main base of coup attempt and these civilians have organic relationships with the 
Fethullah Gülen Movement according to indictments (Josseran, 2017: 77-92). 
 
Adil Öksüz, who was the leader of 15th July Coup Attempt, is a civilian-
theology lecturer in Sakarya University. According to CHP’s report on 15 July Coup 
Attempt, Oksuz has a close relationship with the high figures of Gülen Movement in 
academia104. One of the individuals included on Öksüz's doctorate panel was Prof. 
Dr. Suat Yıldırım, at the time Dean of Sakarya University Faculty of Divinity. Suat 
Yıldırım, whose name had been touted as a potential future leader of the brotherhood 
after Fethullah Gülen, is today on the run. Another person on the jury, however, Prof. 
Dr Davut Aydüz, was detained following the coup.  
 
Despite holding a minor academic position at an unremarkable university, 
Öksüz clocked up air miles at a serious rate, being a regular visitor to Europe and the 
United States and even taking a fact-finding trip to South Africa according to the coup 
indictment. It also indicates that he visited the United Kingdom in December 2015 
and the United States for three days in March 2016, five days in June, and three 
days in July, arriving back in Turkey just two days before the coup attempt began. It 
is unknown where in the United States he went. According to the indictment, he had 
financial dealings with U.S.-based companies linked to the movement and he may 
                                                          
104
http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/english/899148/CHP_s_FETO_report_exposes_continued_AK
P-FETO_relationship_after_15_July.html (Accessed Date: 25/09/2018) 
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well have been fulfilling some contract. But Butler argues that; he went to 
Pennsylvania to visit Fethullah Gülen himself or an intermediary – despite Gülen 
claiming Öksüz had been to the compound only ‘a few years ago’. 105 
 
His trips sometimes coincided with travel by some of the other four civilian 
Gülenists found at Akıncı Air Base that night—Kemal Batmaz, the former CEO of 
publishing giant Kaynak Holding which is one of the Gülen Movement’s company; 
Nurettin Oruç, a film producer accused in the press of being the group’s Gendarmerie 
imam; Harun Biniş, an out-of-work electronic engineer; and Hakan Çiçek, the owner 
of a chain of Gülen Movement’s schools and allegedly the Land Forces imam—
although all four told the court they had never met Öksüz106. Between the November 
2015 elections and the military coup attempt, the indictment says, Öksüz also drove 
12 times into Kazan, the district of Ankara province in which Akıncı Air Base is based. 
 
Yavuz, who has been working on the Gülen Movement for years, explains how 
the Gülen Movement is carrying out this coup attempt in light of the movements’ 
motivation: 
 
The coup was carried out with the support of Ankara-based Gülenist networks. In 
Ankara, there are several characteristics of the Gülen movement that must be 
clarified and understood. As the movement became a major coalition partner for 
the AK Party government, it also became an enemy of civil society, in effect 
revoking the principles of equality, diversity and a free, entrepreneurial market 
that also valued non-discrimination. The movement’s lack of transparency and its 
secretive organisational structure have persistently thwarted the scholarly efforts 
to make sense of the movement’s peculiar dual nature dynamics: religious but 
political; statist yet civil society oriented; vertical yet horizontal; local yet global. 
But, the movement’s duality and its forward and backward-looking faces were 
exposed fully during the 15 July 2016 coup (Yavuz, 2018: 26).  
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As mentioned above, it is observed that in this period of AKP, authoritarianism 
continues without losing its momentum. After the July 15 coup attempt, this 
authoritarian process was felt especially at the point of conflict with the Gülen 
Movement. The coup attempt on July 15, 2016, according to the AKP, was the 
Gulenists’ final attempt to take over the government. Killing 240 people and injuring 
more than 2000, the coup attempt allowed the government to declare emergency law 
sidelining the European Convention of Human Rights and the constitution. In a series 
of executive decrees, President Erdogan and the cabinet suspended 88,056 civil 
servants, including 27,715 teachers, and expelled more than 40,000 civil servants, 
including 7,669 police officers, 3,390 judges and prosecutors, and 4,451 military 
officers for their alleged connections to the coup. 
 
Democratic backsliding gained further momentum under the emergency law, 
which extended detention period up to 30 days for more than 40,000 people placed 
under detention. Of those detained, 20,355 have been arrested, 105 of whom are 
journalists awaiting trial. In the meantime, the government shut down 170 TV 
stations, newspapers, magazines, and news agencies, including pro-Kurdish, pro-
secular and left wing media. The decrees also closed down 35 health care facilities, 
934 schools, 109 dormitories, 104 foundations, 1125 associations, 15 universities 
and 19 trade unions. In an attempt to redesign the institutions of higher education, an 
executive decree issued on October 29 cancelled rector elections in public 
universities and expelled more than 1,200 academics from their positions. 
Businesses were not immune to this crackdown as the courts appointed trustees to 
94 companies, with alleged ties to the Gülen movement, by the end of July; the 
ministry of finance placed injunction on the property of more than 100,000 individuals 
in the month following the coup attempt (Gümüşçü, 2016: 9). As confirmed by the 
deputy prime minister on October 19, more than 115,000 people have been subject 
to post-coup investigations. Taş (2017: 8) says that; these far-reaching arrests and 
dismissals came at such a dizzying speed and gave the impression that the coup, 
which Erdoğan called a ‘gift from God’, was a pretext and catalyst to purge the pre-
existing lists of profiled public employees and re-engineer the state’s structure. 
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On the other hand, this authoritarian process of the AKP over the Gülen 
Movement, especially with the consolidation of the conservative mass of voters, 
creates question marks at the point of keeping the nominal selectorate large. In this 
context, the conflict between the AKP and the Kurds again creates problems about 
the support of the mass of voters. Both the Kurds and the Gülen Movement were 
among the AKP's winning coalition between 2007 and 2014. These two actors were 
out of this coalition meant that the AKP had to build a new paradigm, especially on 
the voters’ preferences. For this reason, the AKP government under Erdogan's 
leadership has developed a new policy mechanism against both the Gülen 
Movement and the Kurds, trying to combine Islamism and nationalism with a forced 
marriage. Nationalist voters have been designated as the target of the AKP as a 
substitute for votes lost by Gülen's supporters or conservative Kurds.  
 
This strategy has become the most important factor in the survival of the AKP 
in 2014. Especially in the last part of the chapter, how the 'native and national' (yerli 
ve milli) discourse under Erdogan’s leadership, and how the combination of Islamism 
and nationalism influenced the elections between 2014 and 2018 will be examined in 
detail. But at this stage, the conflict between the AKP and the Kurds in the post-2014 
period and how it affects the changing paradigm of the AKP will be explored. 
 
3. The Conflict Between AKP and Kurdish Movement 
 
Before examining the extent of the relationship between the Kurds and the 
AKP, the Kurdish problem will be explained on how it takes place in the history of the 
Republic of Turkey. The root of this issue lies not in the 2000s like the Gülen 
Movement, but on the contrary to the founding years of the Turkish Republic.  
 
Under the revolutionary leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the new Turkish 
republic sought to establish a strong nation state by embracing a coercive 
ethnocentric nationalism. Since Kurds constituted roughly twenty-per cent Turkey’s 
population at that time, the Turkish government viewed Kurdishness as a potentially 
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grave threat to Turkish nationalism (Yıldız, 2005: 7) Thus, the Atatürk government 
introduced a program of Turkification which was ‘aimed at eradicating non-Turkish 
allegiances and suppressing non-Turkish culture and expression’ (Yıldız, 2005: 14). 
This program specifically targeted ethnic Kurds and outlawed all forms of Kurdish 
culture and language. In response, the Kurds launched more than thirty separate 
revolts beginning in 1925 and ending in 1937. 
 
From 1940 until the early 1970s, the government continually excluded the 
Kurds from public life and refused to recognize their existence, referring to them as 
‘mountain Turks’ (Lundgren, 2007: 46). Although the repression of the Kurds had 
softened during the 1950s and 60s, extreme political unrest in the 1970’s and a slow 
rebirth of Kurdish nationalism prompted the creation of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK). Founded and led by Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK sought an autonomous 
Kurdistan and ‘called for a national revolution to overthrow the Turkish state’ (Marcus, 
2007: 46). Although displaced by the heightened repression following the coup of 
1980, the PKK flourished in northern Iraq and Syria, and in 1984 it initiated a full-
scale civil war against Turkey. The Turkish military responded with devastating 
violence, routinely burning Kurdish villages and indiscriminately massacring militants 
and civilians. 
 
From 1984 until the beginning of the peace process in 2009, the Kurdish issue 
underwent various stages of escalation and de-escalation; however, there was not 
much disruption to the dominant narratives outlined above. The post-1999 EU 
candidacy and accession process empowered advocates of a liberal, rights-based 
solution; however the limited cultural rights granted to Kurds in the EU accession 
process did not generate a significant degree of ontological insecurity among Turks, 
mostly because the reforms were undertaken within an individual rights rather than a 
group rights framework (Kirişçi, 2011). On the other hand, Kurds continued to 
experience ontological insecurity stemming from the non-recognition of their claims to 
difference, and the piecemeal reform process undertaken to fulfil EU criteria fell short 
of securing this recognition (Kirişçi, 2011). 
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 A detailed effort was not made on the Kurdish question because the AKP tried 
to legitimise its identity in order to provide the first target of survival between 2002 
and 2007. In the post-2007 period, there was a direct relationship between the AKP 
survival and the AKP-Kemalism struggle. At this point, the AKP government wanted 
to take the support of the Kurdish movement, which was in direct conflict with 
Kemalism. With this move, the support of conservative Kurds will be ensured in 
Turkish elections and the support of the Kurdish elite will be obtained in the fight 
against the Kemalist elite (Çiçek, 2016). 
 
As a result of these reasons, the AKP launched the Kurdish opening in 2009 
as an important step for openly addressing the Kurdish issue in Turkey. The ‘Kurdish 
opening’ (Kürt acılımı), later renamed the ‘democratic opening’ (demokratik açılım), 
was the first instance of openly challenging the traditional official state policy of non-
recognition of the Kurdish problem and approaching the problem beyond the 
conventional security framework (Köse, 2017: 139-166). The reform steps involved 
the establishment of Kurdish studies centres at universities, the renaming of Kurdish 
villages with their original names, the use of languages other than Turkish in courts 
and the establishment of a public Kurdish-language television channel (TRT Şeş) 
(Grigoriadis and Dilek, 2017: 4). In October 2009, 34 PKK members crossed the 
Habur border from Northern Iraq into Turkey in combat uniforms. The PKK indicated 
that it organised the crossing as a gesture for the Opening, referring to these 
members as ‘Peace Ambassadors’ (Çelik and Rumelili, 2017: 288). However, 
prosecutions of Kurdish political activists continued on terrorism charges, and in 
December 2009, the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum 
Partisi – DTP) was banned by the Constitutional Court (Grigoriadis and Dilek, 2017: 
4). The ‘democratic opening’ was suspended, and armed conflict resumed.  
 
Although the process, which focused primarily on legal and political reforms, 
proved to be very short-lived, AKP’s attempts for Kurdish question helped to ensure 
its political survival in the second term in light of the elections. At this point, the first 
stage would be the 2010 Constitution referendum. In this referendum presented with 
the aim of combating Kemalist tutelage, opposition parties CHP and MHP 
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campaigned for 'No'. The BDP, the representative of the Kurdish political movement 
that expressed some concerns about the amendments in the constitution, would 
have boycotted the referendum (Satana, 2012: 170). Such a boycott decision 
ensured that the AKP government, which held the Yes campaign in the referendum, 
succeeded by nearly 60%.  
 
Another benefit of this AKP’s Kurdish initiative for its political survival was in 
2011 Election. In the 2007 elections, the first election in which the AKP expanded its 
nominal selectorate, the number of AKP MP’s in the southeast region increased 
unexpectedly. While the pro-Kurdish party, DTP won over 20 parliamentary seats, the 
AKP doubled its vote from around 26 per cent to 53 per cent in the Kurdish southeast 
region surpassing the votes of the ethnic Kurdish DTP in 2007 Election (Satana, 
2012, 175-176). Rabia Karakaya Polat (2008) argues that the granting of cultural and 
identity rights and freedoms, as well as economic welfare to the Kurdish population in 
AKP’s first term (2002–07), are the causes of this success. The AKP and the DTP 
have competed against one another in the southeastern cities in the 2009 local 
elections and the DTP increased the number of municipalities under its control to 99 
(Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu and Şenatalar, 2005: 547-566). According to Ekrem 
Güzeldere, the AKP has long ignored the DTP-ruled municipalities and after these 
elections. In the entire southeast region, the AKP is still the strongest party, but 
compared to the outstanding results there in the parliamentary elections in 2007, with 
52 per cent, the new 38.34 per cent (for the AKP in 2009) total marks a significant 
drop (Güzeldere, 2009: 292).  
 
One of the explanations of why the AKP has been strong in Kurdish-populated 
areas may be that most Kurds were indifferent to the Kurdish nationalist discourse 
and due to their religiosity; they have preferred to vote for conservative parties such 
as the FP and the AKP. This line of argument contends that only democracy and 
Islam can keep Turkey integrated. However, there are counter-arguments on 
religion’s value in solving the Kurdish issue. Skeptical of the unifying nature of Islam 
for the Kurds in Turkey, Zeki Sarıgil (2010: 533-553) argues, “According to the AKP, 
the secular nature of the Republic is the main cause of the Kurdish problem in 
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Turkey,” while Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Ozcan (2006: 105) blame the AKP for 
polarizing the Turkish society with the party’s ineffective discourse based on religion. 
 
When it came to the 2011 elections, the picture was partly different from 2007 
and 2009. While the electoral pressure on the rise of the MHP in this period, the AKP 
had to develop a nationalist discourse on the one hand and the democratic initiative 
on the other side to maintain the electorate support in the Southeast. Nevertheless, 
the involvement of the democratic opening process will lead to a relative decline in 
the AKP's power for the southeast region in the 2011 elections. In only 15 
predominantly East and Southeastern Anatolian provinces the AKP incurred a loss 
compared to its vote share in 2007 (Çarkoğlu, 2011: 53). 
  
Indeed, the AKP’s strategy of combining its rhetoric on conservative values 
with a more nationalist stance on the Kurdish issue also seems to have fared well for 
its electoral success in these elections. Not only did it increase its vote share in 
regions like inner Anatolia and the Black Sea, known for the strength of their Turkish 
nationalist constituency, but it also encountered only a modest loss of votes in east 
(by three per cent) and southeast (by two per cent) Anatolia. Nevertheless, the party 
incurred significant losses in certain highly Kurdish-populated provinces in the region 
(like Hakkari, Diyarbakır, Mardin and Van) which contributed to the success of the 
independent candidates in capturing seats from the AKP (Düzgit, 2012, 341). 
 
However, this situation did not create a danger for the AKP’s political survival 
in Turkish politics. On the contrary, with the democratic opening (demokratik açılım), 
it has prevented the loss of significant Kurdish votes in the 2011 election with the 
AKP’s positive image on the Kurds. Çarkoğlu (2011, 55) says that; ‘although the 
independent candidates supported by the BDP have expanded their support, this 
expansion came primarily in the smaller Eastern and Southeastern Anatolian 
provinces where the AKP was still able to hold on to a significant electoral support’. In 
other words, the East and Southeastern Anatolian region, which are predominantly 
Kurdish, is represented by the BDP and the AKP. 
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3.1. From the ‘Kurdish opening’ to the ‘resolution process’ 
 
Following the AKP victory in the June 2011 elections, it was uncertain whether 
the ‘democratic opening’ would continue. Consequently, 2012 turned to be the most 
violent year in the fighting between the PKK and the Turkish army since 1999. While 
the clashes in the following 18 months took hundreds of lives, the police and the 
judiciary pursued a relentless policy of pressure on Kurdish politicians. Thousands of 
Kurds, including BDP mayors, politicians, journalists, and trade unionists were 
arrested in almost two years with the charge that they were working for the KCK 
(Yeğen, 2015: 157-184). Nevertheless, AKP would try the second attempt of peace 
process with PKK due to the electoral pressure of Kurds in the future elections. 
 
In March 2012, the signs for the start of a new policy for the solution of the 
Kurdish issue were given by the then President Abdullah Gul. On December 28, 
2012, the Turkish government announced the most recent attempt at resolving the 
Turkish-PKK conflict. Prime Minister Erdoğan stated in a TV show that the talks 
between state officials and Öcalan were going on (Yeğen, 2015: 157-184). It was not 
the fact that the talks were going on, but that the prime minister had wanted to state 
this on TV indicated that there was something new about the process after the 
bloodshed of the previous 18 months. Only a few days later, Ahmet Türk and Ayla 
Ata Akat, the two deputies from the BDP visited Öcalan at Imralı Prison (Önürmen, 
Temel and Utkan, 2015: 23). 
 
The following developments proved that both sides were determined to take 
the steps to open a new round. While Erdoğan announced on 12 February 2013 that 
he was ready to take all the political risks to achieve peace, the AKP group in 
parliament enacted a law enabling defence in one’s mother tongue in the courts107. 
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The new process was launched in early 2013 under the name ‘resolution 
process’ (çözüm süreci) and marked unprecedented steps regarding the Kurdish 
issue on many grounds. One unprecedented move was the inclusion of the 
imprisoned historic leader of the PKK Abdullah Ocalan in the talks and relatedly, the 
formation of a group by the pro-Kurdish party deputies as a channel for 
communication between Ocalan and the PKK administration in the Kandil mountains 
(Grigoriadis and Dilek, 2017, 5). Following of these positive developments, Öcalan 
drafted a new proposal for peace and resolution and this new proposal was 
announced to the public on 21 March 2013 at the Newroz celebration of Diyarbakır, 
attended by hundreds of thousands of Kurds. Öcalan publicly announced that the era 
of armed struggle was over and it was now time for political struggle. He also 
underlined the Islamic brotherhood of Kurds and Turks not only in Turkey but in the 
Middle East, meaning that he was in some ambiguous way sharing the regional 
vision of the AKP government (Tocci, 2013: 73). Öcalan also called for a ceasefire 
and the withdrawal of PKK militants to Iraqi Kurdistan.  The PKK accepted Öcalan’s 
new proposal and announced a unilateral ceasefire on 23 March 2013. 
 
It is important to note that in the third period of the AKP, reconciliation and 
coalition efforts with the Kurdish movement are also an important factor in trying to 
ensure the survival of the AKP at the same time. In the third period of the AKP, it was 
expressed in Chapter 4, where a populist authoritarianism could be maintained by 
removing the opposing forces and turning the AKP’s coalition into a small winning 
coalition. Nevertheless, the two important actors in the AKP’s winning coalition, such 
as the Kurds and Fethullah Gülen Movement, had not clashed with the AKP in this 
process and this situation would also help protect the AKP's power in this term. 
 
This study mentioned above how the Fethullah Gülen Movement was acting in 
favour of the AKP during the Gezi Park Protests, one of the most important threats to 
the survival of the AKP. In the same way, the Kurdish movement and the PKK have 
made a vital contribution to AKP’s political survival by not taking a position against 
the AKP government in the Gezi Park protests in light of the ongoing Kurdish peace 
process. 
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As outlined in Chapter 4, the populist authoritarianism process that the AKP 
government has pursued since 2011 has created a serious polarisation against the 
secular mass of the Turkish society. The biggest result of this polarisation was the 
Gezi Park Protest in June 2013. One of the most important events expected by the 
public at this point was how the Kurdish movement would approach these protests. 
As stated in the previous chapter, the Gezi Park protests spread all over the country 
in a very short time. But in the south-eastern region where the Kurds live intensively, 
the protesters were at a very low density compared to the other regions. The Kurdish 
political activist, Mehmet Kaya, explains the reasons of this phenomenon;108 
 
“Kurdish people have abstained from supporting and legitimising of this protest 
because there is a belief that a nationalist understanding in the West (Western 
part of Turkey) that violently suppresses the Kurds, fight against the Kurds and 
rejects the Kurds... Secondly, Kurdish politics has set up a road map with AKP 
government and is walking together on that road.” 
 
It is possible to explain from the PKK's side how the solution process carried 
out with the Kurds at this point contributed to the survival of the AKP. The minutes of 
the negotiations between the leader of the PKK, Ocalan and the AKP, were 
published in 2016 as a book under the name Notes From İmralı (İmralı Notları). 
There was no detailed analysis of the Gezi Park Protests by Ocalan regarding the 
talks between AKP-Kurdish politicians and Öcalan in June 2013 in this book. At the 
same time, Ocalan's points on Gezi Park protests show that he is uncomfortable with 
the role of secular mass and the CHP in these protests.  
 
On 7 June 2013 Öcalan said; ‘... This CHP is the classical coup d'état party ... 
Do not give any opportunity to CHP. You should not give any opportunity to secular 
nationalists, the CHP and the MHP.’109 and he demonstrated clearly in his attitude on 
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Gezi Park protests. On another occasion following the Gezi Park protest, Ocalan 
claimed that he had rescued the Prime Minister and the AKP government politically, 
and he said; ‘They said; Öcalan changed his position in June 2013 (during Gezi Park 
Protest). I also said that I changed my position. If I did not change, the Prime Minister 
(Erdogan) would have gone as far as now’.110 
 
As discussed above, the AKP’s peace process with the Kurds has provided 
considerable advantages in the protection of survival, especially in the 3rd period of 
AKP government. However, it is observed that the 2014 local and presidential 
elections were followed by the breakdown of the peace process and the conflict was 
again settled.  
 
Although the BDP failed to break the 7 per cent mark, the party managed to 
win a number of new districts in the region. Prior to the elections, the BDP controlled 
8 municipalities (one metropolitan area and seven cities). On March 30, the party not 
only won the same districts once again but also emerged victorious in two new 
districts, increasing the number of its municipalities to 10. As such, the BDP currently 
controls three out of 30 metropolitan areas (Diyarbakır, Mardin and Van) as well as 
seven out of 81 provinces (Batman, Siirt, Mardin, Şırnak, Hakkâri, Bitlis and Iğdır) in 
addition to 86 out of 970 districts (Coşkun, 2015: 66).Simply put, the BDP managed 
to win local races in a fairly large region which is home to 15 per cent of the country’s 
entire population and 72.6 per cent of the Kurds, who constitute roughly 15 per cent 
of the total population. 
 
Although the BDP and Kurdish politics are likely to create a problematic 
situation in terms of the political survival of the AKP and the electoral support for the 
region, the solution process would not lose its momentum. Immediately after the local 
elections of 2014, the AKP amended the law of the National Intelligence Organisation 
(MIT) and granted the MIT the authority to meet and negotiate with “terrorist 
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organisations” and those who are imprisoned.111 Likewise, KCK convicts began being 
released at around the same time and almost all were released by the end of 2014. 
This was followed by a more radical step: the AKP enacted a “framework law” for the 
resolution process in June 2014. Entitled “Law to End Terror and Strengthen Social 
Integration,” the framework law authorised the government and bureaucracy to 
determine the necessary steps to be taken and prepare the regulations needed to 
end terrorism and ensure social integration (Yeğen 2015, 170). Practically, the law 
was broad enough to specify all military, political, and legal steps needed to ensure 
disarmament and resolve the Kurdish question. The law also authorised officials to 
contact ‘terrorists’. 
 
 The most important issue in determining the agenda of Turkey in 2014 would 
be 2014 Presidential Election. This election would also be the first signs of a major 
change in the AKP government's view of the Kurdish issue. Apart from AKP 
candidate Recep Tayyip Erdogan and CHP-MHP candidate Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, 
Selahattin Demirtaş will be the third and the most prominent candidate for the 
Kurdish political movement. The results of the election would be concluded with great 
success in terms of the Kurdish movement. The Kurdish political movement, which 
gained about 6% of votes in the elections until 2014, would begin to become an 
important actor in Turkish politics because Selahattin Demirtas, who was nominated 
as President of the Republic, received a vote close to 10%. 
 
This situation became a serious threat to the AKP's political survival. The 
existence of a new party, which would force to pass a 10 per cent electoral threshold, 
would be a serious problem for the AKP. Indeed, it wants to secure majority in the 
Parliament because it has triumphed from the presidential election but has not been 
fully transitioned to a Presidential system. Erdoğan, who was elected as the 
President, was aware of this threat in terms of political survival and thought that he 
needed to change a new discourse in terms of the Kurdish issue. The developments 
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in Syria will be another indication that the AKP government will change its peaceful 
policies towards the Kurdish issue. 
 
Moreover, the resolution process experienced a serious crisis only a few 
months later from 2014 Presidential Election. On 6-8 October, the Kurdish people 
poured into the streets to protest against the week-long siege of Kobani in Syria by 
the IS and the government’s “apathy” towards or even “contentment” with the siege 
and the possible fall of Kobani. Almost a civil war, the Kobani events resulted in the 
death of more than forty civilians, most of whom were HDP supporters (Yeğen, 2015: 
173-175). 
 
Although the tension between the two actors had reached the peak due to 
Kobani Events, the AKP government continued the resolution process with Kurdish 
movement after Presidential Election. AKP mentioned the resolution process in the 
program of the new government, established by Ahmet Davutoğlu, who became the 
chairperson of the AKP and the new prime minister after Erdoğan became the 
president in August 2014.112 The program underlined the government’s determination 
to take the necessary steps for the resolution process. As a result of this positive 
initative, Öcalan’s call for disarmament and his 10-article draft for negotiations were 
announced to the public in a meeting attended by members of the government and 
the HDP on 28 February 2015 (Jongerden, 2018: 75). While the members of 
government carefully avoided giving the impression that they approved Öcalan’s draft 
for the negotiations, the very form of the meeting was important as it indicated that 
there were two formal sides in the process and that there was a ground for 
negotiations.  
 
While this process continued, on the one hand, Erdogan, who considered 
Kurdish electoral pressure on the other hand, began to change his attitude in the last 
months of this process. Before the elections of June 2015, he began to give the first 
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signs of a more nationalist line frame in his rhetoric. Erdoğan, who publicly criticised 
the Dolmabahçe talks conducted by the Davutoglu government in February 2015, 
would make some critical statements to resolution process until the June elections. 
Erdogan mainly criticized HDP and its leader, Demirtaş, for calling for peace in the 
west of Turkey while promoting violence in the east (Canyaş, Canyaş and Gümrükçü, 
2016: 81). This was an attempt to secure the conservative Kurdish vote to prevent 
HDP passing the 10 per cent electoral threshold. It was important because, if HDP 
failed to pass the threshold, its seats, especially in the east, would be redistributed in 
a way that favoured AKP, granting it enough parliamentary seats to change the 
constitution unilaterally without the need for a referendum. 
 
Erdogan's efforts will not be enough for the June 7th elections, and for the first 
time, the AKP will lose the majority in the Assembly with HDP's surpassing the 10 per 
cent electoral threshold. Erdogan believes that, this situation would completely 
destroy the survival of the AKP in a short period of time. According to Erdoğan, AKP 
should completely defeat the solution process with the Kurds and draw his politics by 
targeting the nationalist voter base. How this AKP government combines Islamism 
and nationalism under this Erdogan leadership, how it uses 'native and national' 
policy discourse while making this combination and how this policy change feeds the 
conflict with Kurds and Fethullah Gülen Movement will be determined in this chapter. 
In this way, the cause-and-effect relationship between the AKP's Islamic-nationalist 
policy and its political survival will be made more clear in the next part of this chapter. 
 
3.2. Native and National (Yerli ve Milli) Coalition  
 
‘On Nov. 1 [parliamentary elections] I want you to make a historical decision; I 
want you to make a historical effort. I hope this noble nation will vote without listening 
to threats. I want you to send 550 homegrown, national deputies to Parliament who 
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will work with their heart and soul for this country irrespective of which party they are 
affiliated with.’113 
 
These statements were made by Erdogan before the early general elections 
held on 1 November 2015. As mentioned above, after the AKP lost the majority of 
parliament in the 7 June 2015 elections, an early general election was again held by 
AKP and Erdogan because no party could establish a government after the elections. 
At this early general election, Erdogan was aiming to combine the AKP's continuing 
conservative and Islamist political stance with a nationalist policy in terms of the 
Kurdish issue. The most important argument used at this point was the idea of being 
'native and national' as mentioned above.  
 
This last part of the chapter will examine how this Islamist nationalism under 
Erdogan’s leadership, and its clash with the PKK-Fethullah Gülen movement, has 
had a positive impact on AKP’s political survival. The most important events and 
evidence to explore the cause-and-effect relationship between these two variables at 
this point will be the 2015 elections, the July 15 coup attempt, the 2017 Presidential 
Referendum and the 2018 elections. First of all, this research focuses on the 7 June 
2015 elections, which is the first time this AKP’s policy transformation has started.  
 
4. 2015 Parliamentary Elections 
 
The first test of the AKP in ensuring political survival during the fourth period of 
power would be the June 7, 2015 elections. As mentioned in De Mesquita's 
Selectorate Theory, political parties or leaders had to narrow the winning coalitions 
from one side to eliminate risks, while keeping the nominal selectorate as large as 
possible. The AKP has managed to stay in power by implementing this survival rule 
and by increasing nominal selectorate further in every election. Before the June 2015 
election, the winning coalition of the AKP has narrowed again with the Kurds and 
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Fethullah Gülen Movement. At this point, in order for the AKP to keep the nominal 
selectorate large, it needed a voter support that could protect the majority of the 
votes, especially in the parliament, despite these two actors. As a result of this, it is 
part of the most important factors that will determine the AKP's agenda in the 7 June 
elections as it would be the Kurdish issue. 
 
A major AKP strategy in the election campaign was to keep the HDP from 
crossing the ten per cent electoral threshold and to obtain the seats that otherwise 
would have been gained by the HDP. If the HDP failed to cross the ten per cent 
electoral threshold, then the AKP would likely obtain enough seats to change the 
Constitution and deliver its promised change to a presidential system. The best 
option for Erdoğan would be to obtain the requisite quorum of 367 seats (two-thirds 
of the total number of seats in the 550- strong Parliament), which would allow the 
AKP to change the Constitution without going to a referendum, but if that was not 
possible, a secondary option would be to obtain the minimum number of 330 seats 
(three-fifths of the total number of seats in the 550-strong parliament) required to put 
the constitutional change to public vote (Bardakçi, 2018: 7). Accordingly, it was 
toward the HDP that the AKP levelled its most severe criticisms. To achieve this 
objective, the AKP put forward the argument that the HDP was unable to dissociate 
itself from violence, and accused the HDP of using violence to pressure the public 
into voting for its candidates through its association with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK).114 The AKP also sought to take advantage of the 
liberal stance of the HDP on religion, which could deter some of the more 
conservative Kurdish voters and attacked the HDP’s commitment in its election 
manifesto to dismantle The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, 
Diyanet).115 
 
In response to the aggressive policy of the AKP to HDP, the HDP would also 
change its strategy. Thus, HDP was aimed to reduce the AKP's popularity in the 
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Kurdish regions and to address broader communities in the Turkish society in light of 
the electoral base. While before 2015 it had generally focused on courting the vote of 
ethnic Kurds by adopting a programme addressing only the grievances of the Kurdish 
population, in the June 2015 election campaign it rebranded itself. By declaring itself 
a ‘party of Turkey’ (Türkiye Partisi), it aimed to distance itself from its monothematic 
legacy (Grigoriadis and Dilek, 2017: 11). This marked a move from an introvert 
Kurdish nationalism to a more liberal and extrovert Turkiyelilik agenda.  
 
The AKP’s strategy would not go as planned on 7 June 2015 Election. The 
AKP continued to be the largest party in Turkey following the June 7, 2015 elections, 
although seeing a drop in support of nine per cent, from 49.8 per cent in 2011 to 40.9 
per cent in 2015 (Canyaş, Canyaş and Gümrükçü, 2016: 81-84). AKP leader and 
Prime Minister Davutoğlu set the vote target very high at 55 per cent, and so what 
was achieved was way below the desired figure, much to the frustration of the AKP. 
This corresponded to a decrease in the number of seats won by the AKP from 327 in 
2011 to 258 in 2015, with significant losses seen in all regions of the country 
(Grigoriadis and Dilek, 2017). Its most severe losses were in eastern and 
southeastern Anatolia, where support for the AKP in terms of numbers of votes cast 
fell from almost half of the total in 2011 to one-third in 2015. In contrast, the HDP saw 
its votes double between the two elections, rising from 6.6 per cent in 2011 to 13.1 
per cent in 2015. Having more than doubled its seats from 35 in 2011 to 80 in 2015, 
the HDP won as many seats as the MHP (Bardakçi, 2016: 8-9). 
 
 In comparison to the 2011 general elections, the HDP increased its votes in 
all regions, with the largest swing seen in HDP votes in the eastern and southeastern 
Anatolian regions, where the HDP replaced the AKP as the largest party. As a result, 
the HDP entered the National Assembly as the fourth party, and effectively put an 
end to the single-party rule enjoyed by the AKP since 2002.  
 
On the other hand, Erdogan's goal of getting votes from the MHP with this 
nationalist comeback on the Kurdish issue would not work on 7 June. The MHP 
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managed to increase its votes from 13 per cent in 2011 to 16.3 per cent in 2015, 
which resulted in a swing in the number of its seats in Parliament from 53 in 2011 to 
80 in 2015. In comparison to the 2011 general elections, in 2015 the MHP increased 
its votes across Turkey as a whole, with the largest jump in MHP votes coming from 
the nationalist electorate in the Black Sea, Aegean and central Anatolian regions, 
who were dissatisfied with the AKP’s solution process to the Kurdish issue (Bardakçi, 
2016, 8-9).  
 
One of the key evidence to support this argument would be post-election polls. 
It is the poll by IPSOS which is a globally recognised organisation which has 
achieved results that support this argument. In the questionnaire survey, voting 
preferences in 2011, especially those of the upsetting HDP and MHP voters, should 
be examined. According to IPSOS findings116, about 30% of the voters who voted for 
the MHP on 7 June voted for the AKP in 2011, while 22% of the voters who voted for 
HDP on 7 June in 2011, also voted for the AKP. These findings indicate that, while 
the AKP's nationalist discourse of pre-7 June did not have a significant effect on the 
MHP elector, on the contrary, it led the majority of the Kurdish voters who voted for 
the AKP to give their reaction votes to HDP in 7 June election.  
 
In the aftermath of the June 7 elections, the political parties came together to 
discuss potential coalitions after no party was able to garner enough of the vote to 
form a single-party government. This would have been the biggest threat that the 
AKP has experienced since 2002 for its political survival. The main opposition party, 
the CHP, along with the two smaller ones, the MHP and the HDP, collectively won 
292 out of 550 seats (or 53 per cent) and a coalition government formed by the three 
opposition parties could have had a relatively comfortable parliamentary majority with 
16 surplus seats (Sayarı, 2015: 265). Hence, the outcome of the June 2015 
parliamentary election handed the opposition parties that have been excluded from 
access to governmental positions since 2002 a golden opportunity to replace the 
AKP in power.  
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However, the opposition parties had not used this opportunity. The most 
important reason for this situation was the very different ideological positions of the 
three opposition parties. Sayarı (2015: 265) claims that the political opposition was 
divided into three parties in Turkish politics. More importantly, the ideological distance 
between them was large, since they each represented different cleavages in the 
party system. According to Sayarı, the CHP has been the traditional representative of 
the centre in the centre–periphery cleavage that has sharply divided the secularist 
and Islamist political and social forces in Turkey. The MHP has drawn much of its 
electoral support and ideological inspiration from its unyielding defence of Turkish 
nationalism along with its strong opposition to Kurdish nationalism. The third 
opposition party, the HDP, is the product of the Turkish–Kurdish ethnic cleavage and 
has sought to represent the Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey while 
maintaining close ties with the PKK. The fragmentation of the political opposition and 
the ideological distance between the CHP, the MHP and the HDP were obstacles to 
the formation of a coalition government (Sayarı, 2015: 266). 
 
This failure of the opposition parties would also be an important opportunity for 
the AKP, which is at risk for survival. As mentioned above, Erdogan would act to turn 
this situation into his own advantage. Erdoğan was determined to hold a snap 
election which, he believed, would reinstate his party’s majority in parliament. He was 
apparently convinced that the outcome of the June vote did not reflect the AKP’s real 
electoral strength and that a new round of balloting would enable the AKP to recoup 
its losses (Sayarı, 2015: 268). Moreover, he wanted a new election and the re-
establishment of single-party majority rule under the AKP to realise his goal of 
transforming Turkey’s parliamentary system into presidentialism. His expectation was 
based on an accurate reading of the public mood as well as the findings of an 
IPSOS’s opinion poll that was conducted on 8 June, one day after the election117. 
When asked, ‘If you had seen the results of the election before the voting took place, 
which party would you have voted for?’ 22 per cent of the respondents who had 
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voted for the MHP and four per cent each of HDP and CHP voters stated that they 
would have chosen the AKP (İPSOS 2015).  
 
The AKP and Erdogan's request for early general elections would be 
supported by the MHP, which strengthened these elections because the MHP did not 
want to take part in any coalition, especially by the opposition parties. Within a few 
hours after the votes were counted on 7 June, Bahçeli announced that the MHP 
would not participate in a coalition government and that the new government should 
be formed either through a partnership between the AKP and the HDP or one that 
included the AKP, the CHP and the HDP (Canyaş, Canyaş, and Gümrükçü, 2016: 
77-89). He also declared that the MHP was ready to become the main opposition 
party and that he would also support holding an early election if the coalition 
negotiations did not produce a government. When Erdogan's calls for early general 
elections, it was also supported by the MHP and the possibility of forming a new 
government would be completely cut off and a new early general election would take 
place on November 2015. 
 
In this early election, which was finalised on 1 November, Erdogan's main goal 
was the AKP's loss of votes in the 7 June election. At this point, there would be two 
options in front of the AKP; Votes from AKP to MHP or HDP on 7 June. Taking back 
votes from HDP would not be easy after June 2015 for the AKP. Since the AKP's 
resolution process with the Kurds would completely collapse during this period. The 
November election took place in the shadow of escalating political violence and 
terrorism. In this respect, there was a major difference between the elections in June 
and November. The balloting in June took place in an environment of growing 
political polarisation in Turkey. The increasing authoritarianism of the AKP’s 
governance in general and Erdoğan’s effort to change the parliamentary system into 
presidentialism in particular contributed to increased polarisation in party competition 
(Kemahlıoğlu 2015: 445-464). However, this polarisation did not involve political 
violence. 
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The environment in which the elections took place five months later was 
radically different. Between June and November, Turkey witnessed a sharp rise in 
political violence and terrorism as a result of the renewal of the fighting between the 
PKK militants and the security forces in the southeast and two major terrorist attacks 
by ISIS (Çelik and Rumelili, 2017: 279-296). On 20 July, an explosion triggered off by 
an ISIS suicide bomber at an HDP election rally in the southeastern town of Suruç 
claimed 27 lives and over 100 wounded. On 10 October, only three weeks before the 
election, an even more massive explosion caused by two suicide bombers belonging 
to ISIS at another HDP election rally in Ankara killed 95 people and wounded more 
than 200.  
 
These attacks and the clashes between the Turkish soldiers and the PKK in 
the Kurdish region would also enable the AKP's entire strategy to draw a nationalist 
discourse. The AKP capitalised extensively on the escalation of violence. While 
condemning ISIS terrorism, the government reserved its strongest criticisms for the 
PKK. It held the PKK responsible for the breakdown of the peace talks and reopening 
the cycle of violence in the southeast. The government’s strong military response to 
the PKK was accompanied by increased pressure on the Kurdish nationalist 
movement, including the removal of 22 mayors elected with the HDP and the arrest 
of 20 others.118 In effect, the AKP government appeared to be seeking to delegitimise 
the HDP because of its close affiliation with the PKK. In its decision to start the 
military campaign against the PKK and to target the HDP extensively in its election 
campaign, the AKP sought to strengthen its nationalist credentials and win back the 
support that it had lost to the MHP in the June 2015 parliamentary election (Sayarı, 
2016: 272). Moreover, a major goal of the AKP in November was to prevent the HDP 
from passing the ten per cent electoral threshold and gaining representation in 
parliament again. As noted earlier, the HDP’s entry into parliament in June had been 
one of the main reasons for the AKP’s failure to maintain its parliamentary majority. 
The other major issue that received extensive publicity in the AKP’s electoral 
campaign was the need for a stable and strong government at a time when Turkey 
                                                          
118 Economist (2015) ‘Turkey’s election: voting to the sound of explosions’, 30 October, available 
online 
at: http://www.economist.com/node/2167227/print (Accessed Date: 25/09/2018) 
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faced serious internal threats such as PKK or Fethullah Gülen Movement to its 
national security.  
 
In such a political environment, the AKP would put a nationalist discourse 
besides the Islamist identity in the struggle against the Kurds or the Fethullah Gülen 
Movement with the policy of being 'native and national'. This policy approach has 
been used to ensure that the AKP restores political survival after June 7, 2015. It 
would be proven that the strategy was highly successful in light of the 1 November 
2015 election results. The AKP won a sweeping victory in the November 1, 2015 
elections, increasing its votes from 40.9 in the June 7 elections to 49.5 per cent on 
November 1, and its seats in Parliament from 258 to 317, repeating its success in the 
parliamentary elections of 2011 in terms of vote per centage (Bardakçi, 2016: 14-15). 
Initial accounts revealed that the AKP had won new votes from all other parties, with 
the bulk coming from the MHP. According to IPSOS’ post-election polls for 1 
November Election, another important source of AKP votes was the conservative 
HDP voters, the AKP electorate who had not voted in the June 7 elections, and from 
the Islamic-oriented Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) and BBP.119 The AKP also 
garnered new votes abroad, from first-time voters, and from the CHP.  
 
Indeed, the AKP’s aggressive turn to nationalism brought back the 5 per cent 
of vote share that it had lost to the MHP in June. Perhaps ironically, some of these 
returning AKP voters were religious-conservative Kurds who calculated that the AKP 
(which they already found congenial on other issues) was the best bet to restore 
stability to the conflict-ridden southeast and restart the peace process. Nevertheless, 
Erdogan was aware that the AKP could be able to get over the 50% vote and protect 
its political survival with the coalition of Islamism and nationalism. For this reason, the 
‘native and national’ political force continued at the same momentum after the 
November 2015 elections. With this political stance, aggressive nationalist policies in 
the Kurdish region of the AKP and pressure and intimidation policies against the 
                                                          
119http://www.arastirmakutuphanesi.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/Ipsos_SandikSonrasi_CNNTURK-web2.pdf (Acessed Date: 25/09/2018) 
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Gülen Movement would continue after 1 November 2015 election. However, the 
issue of Erdogan's strong leadership became a point of serious question for Erdogan, 
especially after the November 2015 election. Erdogan aimed at ensuring political 
survival for both party and state administration, and he was now facing a serious 
obstacle in front of this aim: Ahmet Davutoglu. 
 
When Recep Tayyip Erdogan was elected Turkey’s president in 2014, 
Davutoglu was appointed as AKP chairperson and Prime Minister. He had been the 
most important actor of the AKP’s foreign policy during his tenure as chief foreign 
policy adviser to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2003-09) and then foreign 
minister (2009-14). An academic-cumpolitician, Davutoğlu’s writings became the 
foundation for a reorientation in Turkey’s foreign policy. His fundamental thesis was 
that, were Turkey truer to its ‘civilizational self’ (which in his mind entailed being more 
open to its Islamic and Ottoman past), it would be a stronger country overall and 
more powerful in the international arena (Davutoğlu, 1997). 
 
Obviously, there were serious differences between Davutoğlu's Islamist neo-
Ottomanism and Erdogan's Islamic nationalism. The main issue that worried Erdogan 
with this problem was Davutoğlu's position to have a leadership profile for both party 
and Turkish politics. Galip Dalay explains the potential conflict in the AKP as follows; 
 
The AKP was, from the time of its foundation, more than a party. It was a 
movement that also encompassed a political party. One of the reasons that the 
separation between these two was not very obvious previously was related to the 
fact that Erdogan was both the leader of the party and the movement. But once 
Erdogan was elected president of Turkey and became constitutionally obliged to 
sever his ties to any political party, the difference between the two came to the 
fore. Davutoglu became the chairman of the party and the prime minister, but 
Erdogan remained the uncontested leader figure for the larger conserva-tive-
Islamic social base in Turkey. There emerged two power centres: one of them 
was le-gal/constitutional represented by Davutoglu, the other one was 
sociological/political repre-sented by Erdogan. Erdogan was not willing to give up 
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on the sociological-political leader-ship of the AKP’s social base and political 
cadres.” (Dalay, 2016: 4). 
 
For these reasons, Erdogan wanted Davutoglu to leave the leadership of AKP. 
Erdogan preferred to use informal forces attached to him to force Davutoglu for his 
resignation. In May 2016, a blog entry titled the Pelican Brief (Pelikan Dosyası) was 
posted anonymously on the blog host Wordpress.com. The reference to a Hollywood 
movie about a conspiracy that bears the same title now framed the claim that the 
then Prime Minister Davutoğlu betrayed President Erdoğan (Yeşil, Sözeri and 
Khazraee, 2017: 22-23). According to Sozeri and his colleagues (2017); the blog post 
was the work of forces within AKP working directly under Erdoğan to eliminate 
Davutoğlu. They said that; in addition to the intra-party struggles, the blog post also 
revealed the existence of a network of pro-Erdogan operatives on Twitter— one that 
is separate from the larger cadre of AK Trolls. Based on the leaked emails of Energy 
Minister Berat Albayrak, researchers were able to disclose the connections between 
these operatives, a progovernment columnist and a partisan think-tank, Bosphorus 
Global. Shortly after the publication of the Pelican Brief, Davutoglu resigned Yeşil, 
Sözeri and Khazraee, 2017: 23).   
 
After the Davutoglu’s resignation, the AKP and President Erdogan seem to 
have changed tack. The former formula of ‘powerful president and powerful prime 
minister’ has been re-placed by a new one of ‘powerful president and technocratic 
prime minister’ (Dalay, 2016: 5). The new Prime Minister, Binali Yildirim, will be a 
more loyal, hence politically less-threatening, and technocratic premier who will most 
likely leave all the important domestic and foreign policy issues to Erdogan. Besides 
this personal level commitment, Erdogan has also redesigned the party’s most 
powerful internal bodies and put in place a new cabinet which will give him structural 
control over the party and the cabinet.    
 
After Erdogan obtained power in the party and state, he envisioned to become 
the first president of Turkey in the new system. In this process, he would continue to 
pursue his native and national policy as a coalition of Islamist and nationalist struggle 
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to ensure his political survival. As mentioned above, fighting against PKK and 
Fethullah Gülen Movement was the most important agenda of Erdogan and AKP. In 
the direction of this struggle, a nationalist line and a more rapid watch of authoritarian 
politics were realised during this period. Kaygusuz explains the process following the 
November elections as follows; 
 
After the formation of the new government, President Erdoğan – who has a 
constitutional duty to remain impartial – personally put a political strategy into 
effect to redesign AKP and the political equilibrium in the country. He established 
an alliance with ultra-nationalist, far right and Islamist forces, and targeted the 
democratic opposition which had won a considerable success against him during 
the June elections. The coup plot discourse of the previous period was replaced 
by a discourse of struggle against terrorism, and for the first time, Erdoğan’s 
perspective of regime security began to crystallise in his attitudes and his 
speeches against the democratic opposition. He publicly criminalised academics, 
intellectuals, politicians and human rights activists who censured his 
confrontational policies, and portrayed them as supporters of terrorist 
organisations. He also called prosecutors to action and in a very short period of 
time hundreds of people were subjected to investigations, employee reviews or 
arrests (Kaygusuz, 2018: 16). 
 
The discourses of Erdoğan and AKP also coincided with political action 
against opposition sections of the society, especially the Kurdish movement and the 
Fethullah Gülen Movement. Following of 2015 Elections, the PKK has been imposing 
upon the state and the security forces the model it calls ‘self-governance’ in Kurdish 
majority towns, particularly the ones on the border such as Cizre, Silopi, Şırnak, 
Yüksekova and Şemdinli (Gürcan, 2016:48). There was a new conflict environment in 
the region due to the military operations of the TSK as the reaction of these PKK’s 
attempts. Such an environment would enable the AKP to use the nationalist politics 
that it needed to survive more intensively. Of course, the most important goal of the 
AKP in this process would be the passivation of the Kurdish political movement. 
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Since the collapse of the peace talks last year, Kurdish civil society and 
political demands were increasingly criminalized. Many of the Peoples’ Democratic 
Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP) mayors were deposed of their positions, 
Kurdish media outlets such as Dicle and Fırat News Agencies face political 
harassment in the form of censorship and lawsuits, and scores of journalists working 
for pro-Kurdish media outlets have been under arrest. In May 2016, the parliament 
passed a constitutional change lifting the parliamentary immunities of deputies facing 
legal investigations, mainly targeting the HDP parliamentarians, which later led to the 
arrests of 13 HDP MPs, including the popular co-chairs Selahattin Demirtaş and 
Figen Yüksekdağ, further restricting the space for Kurdish politics (Sarfati, 2017: 7). 
Sarfati (2017) notes that; over 1300 academics who signed a petition earlier in the 
year calling for the cessation of hostilities between the state and the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK), and condemning the state of misconduct against Kurdish 
civilians, have been facing ongoing investigations, probations, firings, and even 
detentions. Similarly, businesses, media outlets, charity organisations and 
universities associated with the Fethullah Gülen movement were confiscated by the 
state, targeted by the police, and its members prosecuted on terrorism charges.  AKP 
government tried to control the free flow of information by passing new laws to censor 
and monitor online social media.  
 
5. The Biggest Threat to AKP’s Political Survival: 15 July 2016 Coup 
Attempt 
 
As De Mesquita mentioned in explaining the selectorate theory, leaders or 
political parties face various threats to their political survival. One of the most known 
of these threats is the military coup attempts. In the previous chapters, we mentioned 
that the AKP government was subjected to such an e-military coup attempt in 2007. 
At that time, this study was stated that the AKP government, which wanted to break 
the power of the Kemalist forces in both the judiciary and the military institutions, 
went to cooperate with Fethullah Gülen Movement and managed to deflect this threat 
towards its political survival. 
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By July 2016, it was a different situation. The AKP government has embarked 
on a relentless struggle for power with the Fethullah Gülen Movement. Nevertheless, 
it had a point that the AKP government ignored; while the Kemalist forces were 
eliminated from the judiciary and the military bureaucracy on one side, while the 
Gulen Movement supporters set up his own cadre in these public offices on the other 
side. In the AKP-Gulen conflict, which broke out with corruption at the end of 2013, 
the AKP government first aimed at breaking the judicial power of the Gülen 
movement and was partially successful. But it did not carry out any worthy struggle 
against Gülen Movement in military institutions. Fethullah Gülen, who was 
uncomfortable with the increasing violence of the operations against Gülen 
Movement, would mobilise the supporters of movement in the military institutions to 
terminate the AKP government in Turkish politics. 
 
As this chapter has already mentioned, the civil imams attached to the Gulen 
Community and the Gulen Movement supporters in the Turkish forces would take 
action against AKP in July 2016. Obviously, it is also necessary to state that there are 
other groups in Turkish military supported this attempt. According to a leading military 
analyst, the procoup forces were mostly Gülenists, but with several secular and 
pragmatic anti-Erdogan officers joining them, while some lower-ranking soldiers took 
part due solely to blackmail or other forms of pressure (Esen and Gümüşçü, 2017: 
63).  
 
On the night of July 15, Turkey experienced one of the most memorable 
events in its recent history. At about 10 pm, a series of unexplainable incidents 
followed one another, starting with the blocking of the bridges over the Bosporus by 
the troops. Television stations and news websites reporting the incident assumed 
that this must be a precaution against a terrorist attack—Istanbul had seen four 
deadly suicide bombings within the last year—but soon enough the blockade was 
followed by news of fighter jets flying low over Ankara and reports of gunfire near 
several government buildings (Altınordu, 2017: 139). The mysterious incidents were 
finally given a name at around 11 pm, when the Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım 
announced on live television that the government was facing an uprising led by a 
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group within the military (Jenkins, 2016). The ensuing hours saw the reading of a 
coup statement on public television, armed struggles for the control of key 
government buildings, and perhaps most traumatic for Turkish democracy, the 
bombing of Parliament by fighter jets controlled by the putschists. Following 
President Erdoğan’s call on live television, tens of thousands of citizens went out into 
the streets and faced the tanks and soldiers (Fırat, 2016). By the end of the night, 
240 of these anti-coup demonstrators would be killed and 2,191 injured. By about 
6:30 am, most pro-coup soldiers had surrendered, and the coup attempt ended in 
decisive failure. 
 
The coup failed because the putschists first lost the media battle and then 
decisively lost the momentum once people took to the streets en masse. It was the 
latter unforeseen development that undermined the putschists’ morale, possibly 
leading many risk-averse officers to decide against joining them (Esen and Gümüşçü, 
2017: 59) The same development also contributed to the disintegration of the 
procoup forces, particularly once the violence began to escalate. That the popular 
mobilization took the coup plotters by surprise there can be little doubt: Never before 
had a Turkish coup attempt (even the failed ones) met with such resistance. Civilians 
standing before the tanks tilted things in favor of the government and gave it an edge 
in the psychological battle that lasted through the night. How was the AKP able to 
rally the people against a military intervention in such an unprecedented way?  
 
In responding to this question, this research finds two important facts: the 
Islamist-nationalist coalition and Erdogan's strong leadership, while explaining the 
political survival of the AKP. As mentioned above, after June 2015, conflicts between 
the PKK and the TSK were increasingly intensified. It will not be wrong to determine 
that nationalism has increased in Turkish public in light of these clashes. Under these 
conditions, the AKP and Erdogan, who wanted to increase the nationalist sentiments 
of the Turkish people to their political goals, formed a coalition between the Islamist 
and nationalist political approach. Indeed, the AKP identified the 15th July coup 
attempt as a liberation struggle and watching nationalist policy would also facilitate 
the mobilisation of the masses. Another important factor was that Erdogan, who was 
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mentioned earlier, had to take leadership in both party and state administration and 
achieve a strong leader profile. 
 
Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way (2010: 67) underscore how important party 
and state strength are to the resilience of competitive authoritarian regimes. Strong 
parties and leaders, they argue, manage conflicts within their own elite ranks, 
mobilize support, and win elections, while strong states enhance incumbents’ 
capacity to suppress, outmaneuver, or coopt opponents and critics. Although such 
regimes are not inherently coup-proof, competitive authoritarianism can be highly 
effective when a military intervention needs to be resisted. The AKP case on 15th 
July coup attempt is evidence for this argument.  
 
The most important factor that changed the possible result of the coup and 
enabled the people to mobilise in this way was Erdoğan himself. At the time the coup 
statement was read on public television, Erdoğan had still not made a public 
statement and his location remained unknown. The sustained silence by this 
foremost representative of state authority led to speculations about his status and 
threatened to compromise the government’s claim that it was still in charge of the 
state apparatus (Altınordu, 2017: 146). At around 12:25 am, Erdoğan finally spoke 
live on CNN Türk via a FaceTime video call, as the news anchor Hande Fırat held the 
screen of her iPhone to the cameras. Like the prime minister, the president 
emphasized that the coup attempt was the work of a minority within the military and 
did not follow the chain of command, challenging both the legitimacy of the putschists 
and their chances of success (Fırat, 2016). He recurrently underlined that the 
government and he himself as president had been elected by the people, and thus 
represented the national will: ‘This is an uprising against the national will…In this 
country, there is no power above the national will on a human plane.’120 Against the 
challenge posed by the putschists, the president reminded the public that in a 
democratic polity legitimate political authority is determined by elections: Turkey has 
                                                          
120 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/erdoganin-darbe-girisimi-gecesi-yayinlanamayan-konusmasi-40165560. 
Accessed Date: 18 January 2017. 
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a government that has been elected with the nation’s votes; it has a president who 
has been elected with the nation’s votes.  
 
The president’s public statements throughout the night stressed that the 
judiciary would take action against the putschists and that the police had already 
begun making arrests. His most ingenious move from a performative perspective, 
however, was to call people out to the streets to face up to the soldiers. In his first 
television appearance of the night, Erdoğan asked citizens to crowd city squares and 
airports, delineating the putschists as a group outside of and opposed to the nation: 
 
“I invite our nation to the squares of our cities, I invite them to the airports. Let us 
gather as a nation in squares, in airports, and let this minority group come with 
their tanks and cannons and do what they will do to the people there. I haven’t 
recognized any power above the power of the people until today, and we would 
never recognize such a thing hereafter.” (Fırat 2016: 101).  
 
Erdogan's message and strong organisation of the party would also enable the 
AKP to mobilize the masses against the coup attempt. Esen and Gümüşçü 
summarize this situation as follows; 
 
For a decade and a half now, the AKP machine has been brilliant at mobilizing 
support and winning elections. The party won five general elections, including a 
snap election, and three local elections to establish its electoral dominance over 
the opposition. As the AKP consolidated its power and built a competitive 
authoritarian regime, it learned to add the weight of the robust Turkish state to its 
own weight as a strong party in order to silence or coopt opposition. The coup 
attempt challenged this by pitting one part of the coercive apparatus against the 
government. On the night of July 15, the AKP’s elaborate and extensive 
organisation overcame the challenge posed by this fracture between certain 
segments of the state and the party. Text messages and emergency meetings 
mobilized and organised the party faithful with lightning speed. By just after 
midnight, as Erdogan was going on television to rouse resistance, AKP members 
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and sympathizers were already gathering at provincial and district party offices. 
According to a survey conducted in Istanbul on July 26, among those who took to 
the streets prior to Erdogan’s call, 57 per cent were party members and 83 per 
cent had voted for the AKP in November 2015. After the president’s speech, the 
latter number rose to 90 per cent. (Esen and Gümüşçü, 2017: 64) 
 
The AKP government which has re-established control after the July 15 coup 
attempt, will act as the main policy instrument of the nationalist and Islamist 
combination, as it did in previous periods. In this respect, the first 'native and national' 
policy tool, which was initiated by Erdogan in the 2015 elections, spread from politics 
to all areas such as economy or culture. Erdoğan had claimed the organizers of coup 
attempt as external powers (dış güçler) and those who supported these actors from 
inside. He argued that these powers are not ‘native and national’. Thus, Erdogan’s 
approach would have increased his own power in the electorate base. For Erdoğan, 
AKP’s supporters were defined as native and national, while the opposition was 
defined as non-native and non-national who supported the external powers. The AKP 
government claimed that they would struggle further to eliminate these powers after 
July 15th. Obviously, AKP struggled with Fethullah Gulen Movement and Kurdish 
movement which the non-national and non-native powers for AKP controlled in the 
post-2014 period. 
 
Five days after the failed coup attempt, the government declared a state of 
emergency, abrogated the implementation of European Convention of Human Rights 
and started governing through governmental decrees.121 Since the main culprit of the 
coup were Gülenist officers, the main target of government’s purge were civil 
servants associated with Fethullah Gülen within state institutions, primarily the 
judiciary and military. However, the crackdown did not stop there. Two days after the 
state of emergency was declared, the government closed with decree 15 universities, 
934 schools, 109 dormitories, 104 foundations, 1125 associations, and 19 unions 
affiliated with the Gülen movement (Sarfati, 2017: 7-8). The largest purge occurred in 
                                                          
121 Turkey to Temporarily Suspend European Convention on Human Rights after Coup 
Attempt” Hurriyet Daily News, July 21, 2016. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ 
turkey-to-temporarily-suspend-european-convention-on-human-rights-aftercoup- 
attempt.aspx?pageID=238&nid=101910&NewsCatID=338. (Acessed Date: 25/09/2018) 
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the area of education. In September, 2346 academicians, including some leftists with 
no ties to Gülen, were fired en masse from their positions with no opportunity to 
defend themselves and no course to appeal. Similarly, the Ministry of Education 
suspended 42,767 administrative staff and teachers.122  
 
The AKP ruling claimed that the main purpose of this state of emergency, 
declared after 15 July, was the fight against Fethullah Gülen Movement. Erdoğan 
described the Gülen movement as a ‘cancer virus’ on society, vowing to cleanse its 
adherents from the government and every aspect of civic life (Yavuz and Koç, 2016: 
144). However, the AKP government’s witch hunt against the GM soon extended to 
other opposition groups, such as seculars, liberals, and the Kurds in the social and 
political sphere.  
 
Indeed, the first target of AKP would be the Kurdish movement. An early sign 
of this may have been when the pro-Kurdish Democratic People’s Party (HDP) was 
excluded from government actions aimed at muting tensions in the domestic politics. 
Wasilewski (2016) indicates that; the HDP’s leaders were not invited to meetings with 
the prime minister or president, nor to a huge political meeting in Yenikapı. Moreover, 
there were some subtle changes in the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) 
and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s rhetoric. After the coup, Turkey’s leaders equated the 
PKK with the Gülen movement, which it accuses of staging the attempted overthrow. 
Furthermore, they started to emphasise that ‘Turkey has no Kurdish problem, just a 
PKK problem.’ (Wasilewski, 2016). The authorities’ stance toughened even more 
after the introduction of a state of emergency on 20 July. The leaders of HDP, 
Selahattin Demirtas and Figen Yuksekdag were arrested on dubious charges in 
November 2016 (Bashirov and Lancaster, 2018, 14). Furthermore, an HRW report 
documented that the AKP “government has jailed 13 members of the pro-Kurdish 
democratic opposition in parliament on terrorism charges and taken direct control of 
82 municipalities in the Kurdish southeast region, suspending and incarcerating 
elected mayors (Human Rights Watch, 2017). The Ministry of Education further 
                                                          
122 http://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/iste-darbe-sorusturmasinda-kamuda-aciga-alinanlarin-kurumkurum- 
listesi. (Acessed Date: 25/09/2018) 
218 
 
suspended 11,285 teachers just days before the academic year started due to 
alleged links to the PKK. On September 28, the government shutdown 12 TV 
channels and 11 radio stations, mostly left-wing, pro-Kurdish and Alevi outlets, 
including IMC TV and the Voice of Life (Hayatın Sesi) (Sarfati, 2017: 8). 
 
AKP's purge was not applied only to Kurds and Fethullah Gulen Movement. 
After the coup attempt, the liberal journalists of the society or the representatives of 
the secular opposition had taken it. The CHP has also been targeted recently. In 
June 2017, a CHP lawmaker, Enis Berberoglu, was jailed for 25 years based on 
trumped-up spying charges (Bashirov and Lancaster, 2018: 14). Many liberal and 
leftist public intellectuals, such as world-renowned author Aslı Erdoğan and linguist 
Necmiye Alpay, who showed solidarity with the now-closed pro- Kurdish daily Özgür 
Gündem, economy professor Mehmet Altan and author Ahmet Altan, who worked for 
the now-closed Taraf newspaper, liberal columnist Şahin Alpay, who wrote for the 
now-closed Zaman, and Kadri Gürsel, a Cumhuriyet columnist and government critic, 
were all arrested in the on-going government crackdown (Sarfati, 2017: 8). These 
arrests were made with bogus charges of terror and involvement in the coup plans 
and were used as a way to discipline critical voices. 
 
On the one hand, the AKP continued to intimidate all other sections of the 
society with an Islamist and nationalist policy line, on the other hand, this Islamist and 
nationalist policy line was also making an effort to affect the cultural and social life. 
The first important task done at this point was to create a memorisation on July 15th. 
One of the most important political instruments of the Kemalist regime's nationalism 
in the Republican era was the policy of the memorisation of important days, followed 
by the AKP’s Muslim nationalism.  
 
In the weeks following the coup attempt, government actors undertook a major 
campaign to permanently mark July 15 in national collective memory. Less than a 
week after the failed coup, Erdoğan declared July 15 a new national holiday, The 
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Day of Remembrance for the Martyrs123. Five days later, the Bosporus Bridge, where 
anti-coup demonstrators were brutally killed by the putschists, was renamed the July 
15 Martyrs Bridge by a cabinet decree. Almost overnight, hundreds of traffic 
signboards in Istanbul were changed to register the new name of the bridge, one of 
the foremost symbols of the city and the daily point of transit for a large number of its 
residents. Around the same time, the Ankara municipality announced that Kızılay 
Meydanı, a central public square and transportation hub in the capital, would be 
renamed the July 15 Kızılay Democracy Square. Erdoğan declared that monuments 
dedicated to the martyrs of July 15 would be built in these two cities124. Through 
these acts of memorialization, July 15 became part of official national history, 
comparable in significance to central reference points from the founding era of the 
republic (Özyürek, 2016). 
 
In Chapter 4, it was stated that the Islamist politics started to be implemented 
in a populist line in the period after 2011 under AKP. One of these implementation 
points was youth policy in particular. After 15 July, the AKP’s Muslim nationalism 
would follow a similar method and try to apply native and national political force in 
youth policies. Ekrem Düzen conveys this example as follows; 
 
Out of nearly a hundred projects listed on the Ministry of Youth and Sports’ web 
page, half of them could readily be classified under the nationalist-religious-
moralist category. This does not mean that the remaining half are neutral or 
endorse liberal social-educational-cultural learning or exchange. On the contrary, 
the overarching theme of these projects is to encourage the native and 
discourage the foreign. The word “foreign” is the key term standing in as a 
euphemism for the “enemy,” and it therefore serves to differentiate the native. 
The project of indoctrination gained momentum right after the failed coup attempt 
on 15 July 2016. The ministry immediately started a campaign named “This is 
Experience Speaking : The Heroes within Us,” targeting the youth audience. The 
program brought together young people with the “heroes” who took to the streets 
                                                          
123 http://www.milliyet.com.tr/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-konusuyor-siyaset-2281848/ (Acessed Date: 
25/09/2018) 
124 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/bogazici-koprusunden-sonra-kizilay-meydaninin-da-adi-degisiyor-
40170582 (Acessed Date: 25/09/2018) 
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to resist the coup on the night of the attempt. The program was ostensibly 
intended to share and transfer the experiences of “the heroes who fought for 
democracy.” The campaign has been realized in all eighty one of Turkey’s 
provinces. Central and local authorities, military officers, bar association 
presidents, and government-operated CSOs are among the leading supporters of 
the campaign. It is worth noting that universities played an active role in the 
campaign : in more than half of the provinces, universities either hosted the 
events, or the rectors of those universities participated in the events.125 
 
As can be seen, the Islamist-nationalist coalition that summarised together 
with the native and national politics spread to all areas from politics to economics, 
from culture to youth politics. Both this policy and the wave of nationalism that 
peaked after the July 15th initiative led the AKP government and Erdogan to become 
stronger at the same time. Erdogan, who launched the July 15 coup attempt as the 
"gift of God", was aware of the increase in his power after the coup attempt. 
 
According to the Economist’s survey, since the coup attempt, the president’s 
approval rating has jumped from 47 per cent to a record 68 per cent. A mass 
gathering addressed by Erdoğan earlier this month attracted over a million people, as 
well as the leaders of two of the three biggest opposition parties. Aware of his new 
power, Erdoğan has sought to restructure state institutions as he prefers. His main 
goal is to establish a presidential system by concentrating executive power in his 
hands and challenging institutional checks and balances.  
 
6. The Turkish Constitutional Referendum of April 2017 
 
Erdogan wanted to bring the Presidential System, especially using this 
increased power after the July 15 coup attempt, but there was a problem he could not 
overcome. The party lacked the qualified majority of two-thirds of MPs required to 
amend the Constitution. Instead, it sought the support of 330 MPs (out of the total of 
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550) required to submit the constitutional package to a referendum. Having only 316 
seats in the parliament, the AKP needed some support from the opposition to 
achieve this majority. The party that solved this crisis would be MHP. Following of the 
coup attempt, the MHP leader Devlet Bahceli declared his support for heightened 
powers for the president on the condition that the first four articles of the existing 
constitution remained intact. 
 
Such support from the MHP has not been so surprising since the AKP has a 
purely nationalist line of politics, especially after the 2015 elections. However, there 
were various reasons for this support in terms of MHP. Ödül Celep explains these 
reasons as follow; 
 
One major loser of the November 1 election was the MHP, which lost half 
its seats from June 7, ending up the fourth largest party after the HDP. In the 
meantime, Bahceli’s long-time opponents, Meral Aksener, Sinan Ogan, Umit 
Ozdag, and Koray Aydin, began openly opposing his position as party leader. 
The MHP’s demotion also played a role in the growing criticism of Bahceli. In the 
period that followed, the Bahceli-led MHP central headquarters and the united 
opposition block were in a constant power struggle. The failed coup attempt of 
July 15, 2016, and the subsequent declaration of a state of emergency was yet 
another game changer for Bahceli. Though his opponents called for an ordinary 
congress with an open, democratic contest for the party chair position, Bahceli 
consistently rejected this. Opinion polls among the party delegates and the MHP 
base showed Meral Aksener as a strong contender with the potential to unseat 
Bahceli.12 The failed coup attempt worked to the advantage of Bahceli in 
maintaining his position as party chair. The AKP government also helped Bahceli 
by making the job of his opponents even more difficult (i.e., preventing the 
assembly of opponents by barring meetings and sending police forces).” (Celep, 
2017: 71) 
 
Following negotiations between the AKP and MHP, the national parliament, 
with Erdogan’s approval, declared that the entire constitutional revision package 
would be voted on in a referendum to take place on April 16, 2017.  
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The alliance with the MHP to win this referendum for the AKP’s political 
survival was especially necessary when the 2015 elections were considered. Both 
the AKP and MHP leaders were confident that the majority of the Turkish people 
would endorse the package given their electoral support of 60 per cent in the 
November 2015 elections. Indeed public opinion surveys prior to the referendum 
indicated a close relationship between partisanship and support for a presidential 
system. Nevertheless, the AKP did not think the referendum would be accepted by 
60% YES vote. The most important reason for this was the possibility that part of the 
internal party conflicts in the MHP and intra-party opponents of MHP would join the 
NO bloc for this reason. Bahceli’s opponents in the MHP were organising a campaign 
entitled, ‘Turkish Nationalists Say No’ (Türk Milliyetçileri Hayır Diyor), with a joint 
declaration of their justifications as to their opposition to partisan presidentialism. 
Prominent figures such as Meral Aksener and Sinan Ogan announced that each 
contender for the position of MHP chair would visit different provinces during the 
campaign season to speak out against the presidential transition (Celep, 2017: 72). 
 
The AKP government would add two minor political movements in the YES 
bloc against the possible reduction of votes in the MHP. One would be the ultra- 
nationalist Islamist Great Unity Party (Büyük Birlik Partisi- BBP). Thus, it was 
envisaged that the votes expected to slip from the MHP into the NO block would be 
partially compensated. On the other hand, the conservative Kurds in the East were 
also important for the AKP government. For this reason, the Kurdish Islamist Free 
Cause Party (Hür Dava Partisi, Hüda-Par), who felt his power in the region partly, 
would join the ‘YES’ bloc.  
 
During this referendum, which was a crucial position for the AKP and Erdogan 
to sustain political survival, the AKP government created a polarisation through a 
YES-NO with its Islamist-nationalist policy. The AKP relied heavily on negative 
campaigning by discrediting and delegitimising those who contested the proposed 
changes, evoking a deep polarity between ‘the people’ (yes) and ‘its enemies’ (no) 
(Esen and Gümüşçü, 2017: 308). Accordingly, PM Yıldırım, President Erdoğan and 
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several government ministers invoked conservative nationalist rhetoric to portray 
naysayers as traitors and terrorists with the aim of receiving the support of undecided 
voters within the conservative-nationalist constituency. Minister of Justice Bozdağ, for 
instance, claimed that all terrorist organisations—including FETO, DHKP-C, the 
PKK7— and legal political parties—such as the CHP and the HDP—were working 
together to defeat the referendum package126. PM Yıldırım in the same vein 
frequently asserted that the AKP was supporting constitutional change because the 
PKK, FETO, and the HDP were against it.127 President Erdoğan on a number of 
occasions equated naysayers with those who attempted the failed coup in July 2016 
(T24 2017c) and claimed that voting ‘No’ in the referendum would be a vote in favour 
of the PKK, as those who contest ‘the people’s will’ and the Turkish flag indeed 
oppose the constitutional package.128 Both President Erdoğan and PM Yıldırım also 
repeatedly accused the main opposition party CHP of acting in concert with the PKK. 
 
 It was enough for the AKP to have a yes vote of over 50% in this referendum, 
in which the AKP linked NO bloc with terrorism and conspired with its nationalist 
rhetoric for its own electoral base. The election results would confirm the AKP's plan. 
The 2017 referendum campaign was hard-fought between the two camps, as 
evidenced by the close margin of victory for the ‘Yes’ campaign. In Turkey itself, 24.3 
million voters (51.2 per cent) cast their ballot for ‘Yes’ against 23.1 million ‘No’ voters 
(48.8 per cent) (Esen and Gümüşçü, 2017: 315). 
 
On the other hand, although the outcome for the AKP was positive, the 
alliance with the MHP could not give the expected results. The ‘YES’ bloc, composed 
of AKP and MHP, seems to have lost over 10 per cent of its electoral strength since 
the November 2015 general elections. In a constitutional referendum, not all voters 
can be expected to follow their party line but the gap was quite significant in this 
case.     
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At this point, this research has benefited from post-election opinion polls that 
KONDA and IPSOS have done. Data from KONDA and IPSOS shows the aggregate 
changes in the November 2015 general elections but the party preferences of 
individual voters are not available. This study cannot therefore estimate from this 
data exactly what per centage of the ‘Yes’ vote came from the AKP and the MHP as 
well as other parties. A cursory look at the results suggests that the ‘Yes’ vote 
generally matched the AKP’s vote share in the November 2015 general elections. 
According to opinion polls, anywhere between half and two-thirds of MHP voters 
reportedly defied their leaders by choosing ‘No’ in the referendum (KONDA, 2017). 
Even if this research assume that not a single MHP member voted ‘Yes’, which is not 
improbable, the ‘Yes’ vote was still below the AKP vote share in the November 2015 
general elections in several major provinces, such as İstanbul, Antalya, Bursa, 
Denizli, and Eskişehir.  
 
Although the desired vote-turnover from the MHP did not materialise, it would 
not be possible for this referendum to yield a "Yes" outcome if Erdogan had not made 
an alliance with the MHP and had not demonstrated a strong leadership after 15 July 
with the AKP’s Islamist-nationalist policy. According to the data obtained from the 
researches made by IPSOS; 6% YES votes of the 51% who cast ballots voted for the 
MHP in the November 1st elections.129 Likewise, 27% of the 11% MHP's vote on 
November 1 had voted YES in this referendum. When we compare these two figures 
within the total figures, it is observed that the MHP electorate corresponds to a rate of 
3% in 51% of the votes. This provided the MHP with a key party when the AKP 
reached 50% of the vote. 
 
Another important determinant of the outcome of the referendum was the 
Erdogan's strong leadership. As mentioned earlier, after the July 15 coup attempt, 
Erdogan increased his power and popularity in public. This was also apparent in the 
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results of the referendum. 72% of the voters who voted yes in the referendum voted 
for Erdogan in the 2014 presidential elections. The most successful politician who 
voted 'Yes' in the referendum would be Erdoğgan with an overwhelming 85% of 
participants. The answer that reached the second highest place (21%) among the 
reasons for the YES bloc which was asked by participants who participated in 
surveillance by IPSOS was 'I gave Yes for President Erdogan'.130 
 
Although it could not reach the desired level in terms of voting per centage, the 
2017 referendum was successful for Erdogan in terms of maintaining the political 
survival of the AKP. Moreover, the positive result of the referendum will impact also 
on the AKP’s internal dynamics. Now that the President is allowed to hold office in a 
political party, the procedure had begun to give Erdoğan back his position as leader 
of the AKP.  
 
After this date, the only obstacle in front of Erdogan was the next general 
elections and presidential elections. It is only possible after the general and 
Presidential elections that the constitutional amendments will be put into practice in 
Turkish politics. For this reason, the only target for Erdoğan was to strengthen the 
political survival by becoming the first President of the new system.  
 
In the process, it was predicted that the next general and presidential elections 
would be in November 2019. Nonetheless, the debate about the necessity of early 
election for the AKP government circles after the referendum has begun. There are 
three main reasons for creating this situation. 
 
The first reason was the negative situation that the Turkish economy had 
realized. An ongoing steep fall in the value of the Turkish lira, coupled with warnings 
of an overheating economy and a widening current account deficit, threaten the 
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popularity of the AKP, which has often banked on a healthy and growing economy as 
a key element of its popular strength.131 In February 2018, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) warned Turkey about its increased vulnerabilities, such as ‘large external 
financing needs, limited foreign exchange reserves, increased reliance on short-term 
capital inflows, and high corporate exposure to foreign Exchange risk’ (IMF, 2018). 
With the Turkish economy running out of steam, keeping voters content through 
campaign spending could not be sustained all the way through to the original date for 
the elections, November 2019 (Taş, 2018: 4). 
 
The second major reason was the local elections planned before the 
November 2019 elections. Hakkı Taş (2018, 4-5) argues that; the AKP’s poor 
performance in big cities during the 2017 constitutional referendum, growing 
discontent about major AKP municipalities (especially in Istanbul and Ankara) and 
Erdoğan’s ensuing purge of six key mayors to revitalise his party raised questions 
about the next local elections scheduled for March 2019. If the large "no" vote that 
prevailed there in the 2017 Constitutional referendum recurs, an AKP defeat could 
undermine voters’ confidence in the party. 
 
The last important reason is that the nationalist sentiment that has been rising 
in the Turkish public since 2015 has reached a peak with the Turkish military forces’ 
operations in Syria. The combination of Islamism and nationalism under AKP has 
long been deliberately infused into popular culture through several television series 
on Ottoman sultans, revolving around the Turks’ struggles against domestic and 
foreign enemies (Taş, 2018, 3-4). The 2016 abortive coup and the Turkish military’s 
operations in Northern Syria and Iraq were fertile grounds to buttress this militant 
vigilantism and garner more votes. The AKP is also likely to capitalise on nationalist 
sentiment, which is on the rise after the Afrin operation. 
 
While these discussions were ongoing at the AKP front, the MHP, which 
became AKP's partner during the referendum, was also joining the debates about 
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early elections. The rapid rise of the İyi Party, founded by Meral Akşener, the leader 
of the opposition in the MHP, was the most important concern for the MHP. A 
possible early election would catch this party unprepared according to MHP’s 
politicians. As a result of this, Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement 
Party, called for early elections for the 26th of August. Following his call for early 
elections, Bahçeli met Erdoğan a day later on 18 April. Erdoğan subsequently 
announced that his party agreed with Bahçeli that an early election was needed to 
solve the ongoing 'political and economic uncertainty'.132 He therefore announced 
that early elections would take place on 24 June 2018.   
 
7. The Last Battle for AKP’s Political Survival: 24 June 2018 Presidential 
and Parliamentary Elections 
 
During the three-month election campaign, the AKP government had not 
abandoned the nationalist political line by using the native and national political force 
to preserve its political survival. This situation had occurred during Erdogan's election 
manifesto announced in May 2018. In this manifesto, Erdoğan made it clear that they 
would pursue politics through native and national force in foreign policy, security and 
economic fields. He outlined the general principles of Turkey's foreign policy as 
independence, national interest, national security and a conscientious stance, adding 
that this will remain unchanged. ‘We will not patronize other countries, just as we do 
not accept being patronized,’ the president said, stressing that his party is determined 
to continue diplomacy at an equal level with its counterparts.133 In terms of energy 
policies, which constitute an important leg of AK Party governments' economic 
agenda, the projects to decrease the dependency on external resources will 
continue, President Erdoğan pledged. Another vital part of the economic projects 
include the indigenous production of land, air and maritime defense systems. "As 
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Turkey, our goal is to have 100 per cent indigenously-made land, air and sea 
defense systems," he said.134  
 
Erdogan and the AKP were also using the nationalist sentiments as culturally 
and historically in their agenda before the election. "Such references are consistent 
with Erdogan's attempts to legitimise Turkey's role as Sunni Muslim leader in the 
region ... as well as to pay respect to voters from other parties who identify more with 
their country's pre-Ottoman roots in Central Asian Turkic tribes," Lisel Hintz, a Turkey 
specialist at Washington DC's John Hopkins University, said.135 "The usage of 
Mustafa Kemal's chosen surname of Ataturk, which Erdogan eschewed until recently 
in favour of Turkey's founder's religio-military title 'gazi', also is in line with recent 
efforts to reach out to supporters of Ataturk's party, the main opposition Republican 
People's Party. "Such laudatory language may sound flowery to outsiders, but can 
serve to stir nationalist sentiment in multiple audiences while also diverting attention 
away from the lack of a coherent policy package and the looming economic crisis."136 
 
Another focus of AKP’s manifesto was the indication that Turkey would launch 
further cross-border operations. The most recent campaign in Afrin, northwest 
Syria, against the People's Protection Units (YPG) - which Turkey considers to a 
‘terrorist group’ with ties to the PKK - was declared a success and is seen by many 
as having bolstered the government's nationalist credentials (Taş, 2018: 3). 
 
This nationalist sentiment, which AKP and leader Erdogan focused on, was 
not only campaigned during the elections but was also turned into an electoral 
coalition with the MHP. The amendments to the electoral law that the government 
rushed through Parliament only one month prior to the elections allowed political 
parties to band together – a move by the AKP designed to circumvent the 10 per cent 
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electoral threshold for its ally MHP and retain the parliamentary majority as a bloc. 
With this amendment, the possibility of the MHP to stay under the 10% threshold was 
prevented, while at the same time it was aimed that the possible vote losses from the 
AKP would go to the MHP instead of going to other parties. Thus, the prospect of 
Presidential candidate Erdogan, which the MHP announced to support him, would 
strengthen the possibility of electing President of the Republic with this electoral 
coalition. 
 
This plan would be successful in the June 2018 Elections. The winners of this 
election were Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (Adalet 
ve Kalkınma Partisi, AK Party). Thus, by obtaining 52.5 per cent of the vote, Erdoğan 
became the first President under the new system, while the AK Party received 42.6 
per cent of the vote and obtained 295 seats in the parliament (Altun, 2018, 89-103) 
Altun claims that; under the leadership of Erdoğan, by forming the People’s Alliance 
(Cumhur İttifakı) with the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP), the 
AK Party laid the way for a strong parliamentary coalition. As such, after the June 24 
elections, the People’s Alliance took its place in the legislature with a total of 344 
Members of Parliament (MP) forming a substantial majority. Formed in opposition to 
the People’s Alliance, the Nation Alliance (Millet İttifakı), composed of the Republican 
People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), İyi Party and Felicity Party (Saadet 
Partisi) failed to reach its aims. Within this framework, as the participants of this 
alliance, the CHP received 22.6 per cent of the vote and 146 MPs while the İyi Party 
received 9.96 per cent of the vote and 43 MPs (Altun, 2018, 89-103). 
 
These elections, which made Erdoğan the first President of the new system by 
ensuring the political survival of the AKP, also show that the AKP's Islamist-
nationalist coalition is the most important factor in creating these results. Post-
election opinion polls, again done by IPSOS and KONDA, will be the main evidence 
supporting this argument. At this point, it is useful to analyse the AKP’s loss of votes 
of about 7%, as compared to the elections of 1 November 2015. 
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According to the data obtained from IPSOS137 and KONDA138; a mass of 9% 
voters who chose the AKP in the November 2015 election voted for MHP in the June 
2018 election. When we apply this per centile, there is a loss of vote about 5% from 
the AKP to the MHP. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier in the presidential 
election, it is not wrong to say that the voter who voted for the MHP supports 
Erdoğan. According to IPSOS data, about 9% of Erdogan's votes, which was the 
52% of votes, come from MHP voters.  
 
The increasing nationalist policy line of the AKP government since 7 June 
created an Erdogan sympathy, especially in the MHP voter base in Central and 
Eastern Anatolia. The AKP government, aware of this sympathise, has made a 
significant progress in its partnership with the MHP until the 2018 elections. However, 
there was a possibility that these Erdogan’s supports would return to the MHP in 
these elections with the People’s Alliance. Although the AKP loses votes during the 
June 24th elections, its protection of political survival was due to the realisation of this 
possibility. The author of this study defines this electorate base as 'Ak-Wolves' (Ak 
Kurtlar).139 These Ak-Wolves, who voted the MHP in the Assembly-Erdogan in the 
Presidency, ensured that the People’s Alliance is the majority in the Assembly, and 
supported Erdogan’s presidency of the new system.  
 
In de Mesquita's selectorate theory, the most important rule is to keep the 
nominal selectorate large while assuring political survival. When the 2018 elections 
were discussed, this rule was successfully implemented by the Islamist-nationalist 
coalition under Erdogan's leadership. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
The main topic of this study was to explore the logic of political survival in 
Turkish politics through the case of the AKP. As mentioned in the introduction part, 
the AKP has been one of the most successful examples for ensuring its political 
survival in Turkish politics as compared to other political parties. The main secret to 
this success was to keep the voter base (nominal selectorate) as large as possible, 
as mentioned in the selectorate theory of De Mesquita, which was used throughout 
this study. In the previous chapters, the AKP was able to follow three different 
policies in three different periods and succeed in elections, keeping the nominal 
selectorate large and maintaining its survival until 2014. 
 
The analysis of the 2014 presidential election results showed that the AKP 
government must enter a new crossroads. The confrontation with the Fethullah Gulen 
Movement, which began before the 2014 elections, had no negative impact on the 
conservative electoral base. On the other hand, Selahattin Demirtas, who was a 
candidate of the Kurdish movement in the 2014 elections, received 10% of the votes, 
and in the next general elections, the possibility of the Kurdish movement exceeding 
the 10% threshold. These two actors, who had maintained their good relations during 
AKP’s clash with the Kemalist establishment before 2014, could be a threat to the 
AKP's political survival for the post-2014 period. In addition, the analysis of the 2014 
Presidential election results was a positive perception of Erdogan's strong leadership 
profile, especially in the nationalist electorate. All these factors led Erdogan, the 
leader of the AKP, to gather power in his hands by taking the ropes within the party, 
while at the same time engaging in a relentless struggle with the Fethullah Gülen 
Movement and the Kurdish movement. In such a picture, it would be inevitable for the 
AKP to shift from an Islamist line to a more nationalist line. 
 
This chapter aims to reveal the cause-effect mechanism between the Islamist-
nationalist combination and the political survival of the AKP. The intervening 
variables, which clarify this cause-effect mechanism, used developments such as the 
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2015 elections, the AKP-Gulen movement conflict, the AKP-Kurdish movement 
conflict, the July 15 coup attempt and the 2017 referendum. For example, the AKP 
government, which lost its power in June 2015, had received the positive results of 
the nationalist policy approach in the November 2015 elections after the conflict 
between AKP and PKK in the Kurdish region was increased. The partnership with the 
nationalist party, MHP, became the most important factor in both the 2017 
referendum and the presidential elections of 2018, which was more than 50% of the 
vote. These data and post-election surveys are evidence that proves the causal 
relations between AKP’s Islamist-nationalist policy mechanism and its political 
survival until 2018.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Most of our last 200 years is filled with turbulences, crises, strife, fights. The 
troubles we have had since 1950, the year we adopted multi-party political life, 
alone are enough for us to change our system of government. Power or 
sovereignty does not accept partners. When you make forces, which have the 
authority but no responsibility to the people, partners with the will of the 
parliament and politics, such crises are inevitable.140 
 
The introduction of the thesis begins with a quote by Niccolo Machiavelli on 
how leaders should act if they want to stay in power. The conclusion of this research 
starts with the statement by AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, made before the 
2017 presidential system referendum. This statement is, in fact, a summary of the 
continous power of Erdoğan and the AKP since 2002. Throughout its rule, the AKP 
shed its coalition partners to secure survival and maintain its dominance in Turkish 
politics. This understanding of power based on the AKP’s survival is also argued to 
be the main reason for exploring the AKP governance in Turkish politics between 
2002 and 2018. 
 
The central theme of this thesis is that the cause of the AKPs political survival 
is explored through four independent variables. AKP in four different periods handled 
these variables; 2002-2007, 2007-2011, 2011-2014 and 2014-2018. The timeframe 
of this research is between 2002 (when AKP came to power) and 2018 (when AKP 
leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected president of a new system in the Turkish 
Republic on 24 June 2018).  
 
First of all, a literature review (as it was at the beginning of each research) on 
the logic of political survival in politics was done. It is desirable to convey how the 
logic of political survival, which is the main theme of the study, should be understood 
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theoretically and how it has been developed throughout history. After this literature 
and theoretical perspective, an adaptation of the logic of political survival to Turkish 
politics was done through AKP case. The critical question is which methodology is 
being used to explore the logic of political survival in Turkish politics in light of the 
AKP governance? 
 
Following the literature review in Chapter 1, the research methodology section 
seeks answers to this question. The case study analysis, which examines the causal 
mechanism between independent and dependent variables, is the primary method 
for this study. The main reason for this method is that case studies are better when 
the writer wants to create a high-quality theory because this type produces extra and 
better approach. A single case study also makes the writer to have a deeper 
understanding of the exploring subject. Other benefits are that single case studies 
richly can describe the existence of phenomenon and it is used the writer also can 
question old theoretical relationships and explore new ones. At the same time, the 
methodology part describes how to utilise the elite interviews and other documentary 
sources (public speeches, party documents, policy changes), while the research’s 
explanation on the logic of AKP’s political survival in Turkish politics is being proved. 
Chapter 1 establishes the methodological basis of the thesis and reveals the central 
hypothesis of this research.  
 
With this chapter, two essential results are emerging. Firstly, the historical 
process was considered as a concept of political survival in the literature. Literature 
survey in this direction shows that many politicians such as De Mesquita's 
selectorate theory have developed new thoughts on political survival and have tried 
to apply it to country cases. Mong Cheung's book 'Political Survival and Yasukuni in 
Japan's Relations in China' or Anas Malik's 'Political Survival in Pakistan: Beyond 
Ideology' are the most obvious examples of this phenomenon. On the other hand, the 
concept of political survival is unpopular in the literature of Turkish political science. 
The contribution of this study will be at the point of filling this gap in the literature. The 
perception of the logic of political survival in Turkish politics will start to be rethought 
by this study. 
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After the literature review in Chapter 1, it was stated that this research was a 
methodological case study and the AKP case was chosen to explore the logic of 
political survival in Turkish politics. The methodological research conducted in 
Chapter 1 also gave important results. First of all, the election of the AKP case while 
exploring the political survival provided a comprehensive explanation of the politics of 
the 16-year AKP government. The AKP government has carried out different policies 
in each period and has undergone radical transformations in every period. However, 
especially in the literature, the analysis of the AKP government has usually been tried 
on a periodic basis. This research aims to explore the AKP's four policy lines in four 
different periods through a single dependent variable, its political survival. Thus, both 
the causal bridge between different periods was established, and the 16-year 
analysis of the AKP government was presented with a holistic explanation. In other 
words, this study aimed to find the whole picture, i.e. the elephant in the room’. 
 
After the main skeleton of the thesis has been formed by the literature review 
and methodological analysis, this study offers an explanation to find the cause of the 
AKP’s political survival in Turkish politics between 2002 and 2018. In this context, 
while creating an explanation of this research, the primary goal is to establish a 
causal mechanism between independent and dependent variables. The cause and 
effect relationship between the independent and dependent variables is not apparent, 
and the causal mechanism becomes a bridge between these variables. For this 
reason, the causal mechanism is also defined as a series of intervening variables. 
This thesis uses several intervening variables to clarify the cause-effect relationship 
between independent variables (the legitimisation of AKP’s conservatism- AKP’s 
power struggle- the rise of populist authoritarianism under AKP rule- the combination 
of Islamism and nationalism under Erdogan’s leadership) and a dependent variable 
(the AKP’s political survival). These different intervening variables of the causal 
mechanism between independent variables and AKP’s survival have been explored 
in four different periods of the AKP’s rule. 
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The first independent variable is the legitimisation of AKP's conservatism in 
the first period of the AKP. On the one hand, the AKP acted on lessons it learned 
from Milli Görüş to provide political survival, as expressed in previous chapters. On 
the other hand, the AKP had to maintain its conservatism to protect Milli Görüş’s 
electoral base. For this reason, the AKP will retain its conservative identity and 
provide legitimacy in Turkish politics under the concept of conservative democracy. 
The legitimisation of AKP’s conservatism in the first period of the AKP was a pre-
condition for ensuring its political survival. Thus, for the reformists in the Milli Görüş 
movement, political survival was closely linked to the improvement of the rights and 
liberties of its power base, and democratic reforms were perceived as possible with a 
strong external anchor. In this process of modernisation, EU conditionality came to 
be recognized by the AKP’s politicians and intellectuals as a vital instrument to limit 
the role of the military and to further individual and religious rights and liberties. The 
EU accession process became an important tool in the struggle for power against not 
only the existing political parties but also the civil and military bureaucracy, especially 
after the 28 February 1997 military coup process. 
 
The internal and external factors that the AKP uses to provide survival are 
intervening variables that clarify the legitimisation of the AKP's conservatism, which is 
the first independent variable in this study. Closely related to Western countries, the 
EU process and the lessons learned from the 28 February 1997 military coup 
redefined the AKP as a conservative and legitimate actor in Turkish politics after 
2002. This can also be explained by De Mesquita's selectorate theory, one of the 
current political survival theories. The AKP has solidified its party structure with a 
large coalition to gain votes from all sections of society. De Mesquita’s argument that 
a party’s nominal selectorate (voters) and winning coalition should be large, 
especially in democratic countries, was successfully carried out by the AKP in the 
first period. While this success was achieved, the concept of conservative democracy 
was put forward in order to protect the Milli Görüş electoral base and to gain votes 
from different parts of Turkish society. The AKP reverted to conservative democracy 
rather than assuming Islamist policies during the first term for preventing severe 
challenges to its survival in the struggle for power in domestic politics. 
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As mentioned above, the beginning of populism and authoritarianism in the 
AKP period is seen after 2007. Chapter 3 explains this period with the AKP's power 
struggle with Kemalist elites, the second independent variable of the survival of the 
AKP in Turkish politics between 2007 and 2011. De Mesquita says that selectorate 
theory may be exposed to domestic policy threats or military coups, and civil war 
threats to the survival of leaders or political parties. In this case, leaders or parties 
are beginning to narrow their large coalitions in order to eliminate these threats and 
increase their power. The AKP government faced two threats to its survival. The first 
was the presidential election crisis that took place before the elections in 2007 and 
the 27 April e-memorandum coup attempt. This is the reason why the 2007 elections 
were not taken as a starting point for the second period. During the presidential 
elections, there were clashes between the AKP and the Kemalist 
bureaucracy/military powers who did not want the AKP candidate to be from the 
Islamist or nationalist tradition. Following the AKP’s candidacy of Abdullah Gül for the 
President of the Republic, a statement was issued by the Turkish Armed Forces on 
27 April, and its displeasure at the anti-secular activities of the AKP government was 
clearly mentioned. This first threat to the survival of the AKP government would be 
overcome with the lesson the AKP has taken from the 28 February period. The AKP 
government, which declared harsh statement against the military power’s 27 April 
announcement, called early elections in the wake of the growing crisis as a result of 
the Constitutional Court’s cancellation of the 2007 presidential elections.  
 
The data obtained from interviews and other sources confirm the causal link 
between the AKP’s struggle and survival of the AKP. Having turned the presidential 
election crisis into a democratic battle, in particular, the AKP has widened its 
electorate base with the appreciation of this struggle by the centre-right voter and 
increased its votes in the elections in 2007 very much. Early general elections in July 
2007 where the party increased its support from 34% to over 46% and Abdullah Gül 
was elected as president in August 2007. Another serious threat to the survival of the 
AKP on similar grounds was the closure case brought by the chief prosecutor in 
March 2008 - the July 2008 constitutional court decision ruled against closure. Both 
outcomes were seen by AKP officials and supporters as landmark victories for 
democracy. These developments, as well as the improving economic image of 
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Turkey in the upcoming years, provided the AKP with the confidence to push through 
further reforms in civil-military relations and democratisation.  
 
Nevertheless, this has not led to the democratisation of Turkish politics. 
Instead, it has turned into an attempt to reduce the AKP’s large coalition and to 
reduce the importance of secular and Kemalist elites, who have not been involved in 
these threats in Turkish politics. Chapter 3 examines the Ergenekon and Balyoz 
(Sledgehammer) cases, which purged the secular actors from Turkish politics using 
anti-democratic procedures. At the same time, the 2010 Constitutional amendment, 
which was prepared to destroy the Kemalist elites in the judiciary entirely, is another 
intervening variable of AKP's power struggle which is the second independent 
variable. These intervening variables also affect the rise of populism and 
authoritarianism under AKP rule after 2007. Kemalist elites are the guardians of 
secularism in Turkish politics, and they are the barriers in front of the AKP 
government. The purge of these forces by the AKP was at the same time a significant 
obstacle to the AKP’s political survival. Moreover, the AKP has consolidated the 
conservative voters against the Kemalist secular elites. Chapter 3 explores this 
change and transformation through evidence such as the developments in Turkish 
politics, the narrowing of the coalition of the AKP's party structure, public speeches 
by AKP executives, data from elite interviews and other documentary sources.  
 
These data, which are used in Chapter 3, prove that the AKP's struggle with 
the Kemalists is a vital contributor in achieving its political survival. Analysis of 2011 
election results is one of the important findings of this study. The struggle of the AKP 
government with Kemalist establishment presented to the voters as a promise of 
democracy and its propaganda through constitutional amendments have facilitated 
the consolidation of the voters. In line with surveys and interviews carried out, these 
promises and rhetoric were influential in the 2011 elections as a determinant of voter 
preferences and ensured that the AKP survived in Turkish politics. At the same time, 
this political situation would be the first clues that the AKP would bring more populist 
and authoritarian policies, especially over the secular opposition in the post-2011 
period. 
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After the elections in 2011, which increased the AKP’s vote by protecting its 
power, the rise of populism and authoritarianism in the AKP period accelerated much 
more rapidly. This process demonstrated the cause of AKP’s political survival, the 
main argument of this research. While the period between 2011 and 2014 has been 
explored in Chapter 4, outstanding results have been achieved in this chapter. At the 
beginning of these results, the relationship between the survival of the AKP and the 
Turkish economy was in question. Many scholars tied the AKP's success to the 
success of the Turkish economy. However, the fact that the data in the Turkish 
economy will deteriorate with each passing year after 2011 would not adversely 
affect the survival of the AKP. The data obtained from surveys show that 
economically poor regions, on the contrary, voted more for the AKP in 2014 local and 
presidential elections. On the contrary, the AKP voters’ primary preference was 
Erdogan's strong leadership and his fight against secular opposition according to 
surveys and interviews in this chapter.  
 
As a result of this Chapter 4 focuses on the AKP’s populism and 
authoritarianism, the third independent variable of the AKP’s survival. After finishing 
the liberal and secular partnerships in the AKP’s large coalition, the AKP needed a 
new strategy to keep its large nominal selectorate. This strategy consolidated the 
conservative voters who hated the secular or Kemalist elites in Turkish society in light 
of the centre-periphery conflict. Conservative voters would continue to support the 
AKP in elections while ignoring economic or other problems due to this strategy. The 
intervening variables of this AKP’s populist strategy were policy mechanisms such as 
anti-intellectualism, anti-Kemalism, conservative family policies, and lower-class 
mythology. Chapter 4 examines how these policy mechanisms contribute to the 
AKP’s populism and authoritarianism and how it affects the causal mechanism of 
AKP’s political survival in Turkish politics between 2011 and 2014. 
 
After analysing the results of the 2014 Presidential Election, three important 
results were produced for understanding the survival of the AKP government. First, 
Erdogan's strong leadership profile, as mentioned above, has increased its popularity 
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in the eyes of the public. Second, the conflict between the AKP government and the 
Fethullah Gulen movement has not had a negative impact on the conservative 
voters. The third element is the fact that the Kurdish movement, which has received 
close to 10% of the votes in 2014 Presidential Election has passed the 10% 
threshold in the next parliamentary elections and ended the governance of AKP 
alone. This would be the three factors that will determine the survival of the AKP 
government after 2014. According to the principle of the narrow winning coalition of 
the political power of De Mesquita, it would conflict with the Kurdish movement and 
the Gülen Movement, the former partners of the coalition, which will make the 
Islamism-nationalism combination shifting to a more nationalist line while conducting 
this struggle. Erdogan and his party would try to keep power in his politics. Chapter 5 
explores the cause-and-effect mechanism of the AKP's transformation and its 
survival, while the post-2014 conflict with the Kurdish movement, Erdogan's intra-
party struggle, the clash with Fethullah Gulen and the 15th of July coup which are 
intervening variables of this causal mechanism. In this chapter, important results 
have emerged which help us to understand the survival of the AKP. Especially the 
surveys carried out after the 2015 elections, the 2017 Referendum, the 2018 
elections, the AKP's shift to a nationalist line and its partnership with the MHP led to 
both maintaining its survival and making Erdoğan the first President of the new 
system. This proves our last argument in this study. 
 
In the introduction, it was explained how the AKP's political survival was 
ensured in Turkish politics between 2002 and 2018 within four chapters. In this part 
of the conclusion, it was shown how the empirical evidences proved the causal 
mechanism between the political survival of the AKP and the independent variables. 
 
At this point, the original contributions revealed by the study should be 
explored. One of the main original contributions of this study is to show that the 
concept of national will used continuously by the AKP is a myth. This study shows 
that the concept of national will is composed of a perception designed according to 
the AKP's political survival and its voter support.  
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From the beginning of the thesis, it was explained that the political survival of 
the AKP was based on keeping its large nominal selectorate and expanding its 
electoral support continuously. In this respect, the significance of national will (milli 
irade) is one of the most important tools that the AKP has used to keep its electoral 
support continuously in elections between 2002 and 2018. In Chapter 3, it was 
emphasized that there are serious threats to the survival of the AKP from the 
Kemalist elite. The AKP government designed the concept of national will as the 
most important tool for eliminating the Kemalist elite from Turkish politics. This 
concept of national will, based on the voter population who voted for the AKP, was 
also the most important supporting argument in the AKP's struggle with the Kemalist 
elite. For instance, on March 15th 2008, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan called the 
closure of the indictment against the AKP ‘a move against the national will’. From this 
time on, as De Mesquita mentions, the AKP has emphasized the concept of national 
will against threats to its survival and the aim of the large nominal selectorate would 
be the main policy tool for AKP in Turkish politics.  
 
As mentioned in the independent variable of this thesis, the four different 
policy approaches in four different terms prove that national will is essentially 
designed for the survival of the AKP. For example, after 2007, the AKP's national will 
included supporters of liberals and Fethullah Gülen, and since the end of 2013 these 
actors have been regarded as enemies of national will by the AKP. Likewise, while 
the Kurdish peace process was under way, the nationalist voter was against national 
will but with its collapse after the 2015 elections, nationalist voters would align with 
the national will according to the AKP. The AKP, which did not introduce nationalism 
into the concept of national will until 2015, would completely change the paradigm 
after 2015. In the many speeches he made, Erdoğan introduced a ‘yeni (new) milli’ 
conception of the Turkish nation as ‘yerli (native) ve milli (national)’ which 
encompassed only Muslim communities. In this context Islam was positioned as the 
basic commonalty that defined this nation as a nation. While the phrase ‘National 
Will’ (milli irade) gained more and more prominence in the discourse of the governing 
party and its leader, the notion of Turkishness has been gradually deemphasized. 
And the Diyanet’s muftis, following Erdoğan’s advice, started to use the 
term milletimiz (our nation) or milli (the nation) instead of ‘Turkish Nation’. It is also 
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clear that Islamism would be married to nationalism and the term of national will 
would be redesigned in light of this marriage.  
 
The change of the supportive actors and the paradigm that we have described 
throughout the chapters also prove that national will is a phenomenon created for the 
AKP's survival and is entirely a myth. This result will also be one of the important 
original contributions of this thesis. 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of the study, the analysis of the AKP's 16 years 
of power is included in the Turkish literature periodically, but there is no severe study 
explaining these 16 years with the holistic approach. At this point, the most important 
original contribution of the research is that the causal relations between the logic of 
political survival during the AKP’s rule in Turkish politics and the changes of the 
policies applied by the AKP offer a new explanation to the literature. It is an 
undeniable fact that in recent years there have been significant and noteworthy 
studies about AKP’s rule in Turkish politics. For example, Simon Waldman and Emre 
Caliskan’s The new Turkey is highly recommended to anyone interested in 
understanding the rise of the AKP under the leadership of Erdoğan and its policies 
throughout his three terms in government. Necati Polat’s Regime change in 
contemporary Turkey complements Waldman and Caliskan’s book by explicitly 
focusing on the AKP’s second term, between 2007 and 2011. Tahir Abbas diligently 
analyses the complex dynamics between ethnicity, nationalism and Islam in relation 
to neo-liberalism and conservatism in Contemporary Turkey in conflict. These works 
are particularly concerned with the themes of economic development; the rise of 
Erdoğan’s leadership within the AKP; the changing dynamics of civil-military relations; 
the challenges of managing tensions between Islam, nationalism and 
democratization; the ‘Kurdish issue’ and the peace process; and the Gezi Park 
awakening (Göl, 2017, p.958). 
 
However, all these studies focused on the AKP’s political changes regarding 
AKP’s specific periods or specific political events in Turkish politics during AKP 
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governance. This research also explores the political changes that the AKP has 
experienced in different terms affect the political survival of the AKP, which is a 
dependent variable of this study. This analysis is also one of the most important 
contributions of this research.  
 
Another significant achievement of this study is that it has proved AKP’s ability 
to protect its political survival through its 16-year policies using important evidence in 
this research. At this point, elite interviews, which are one of the primary sources of 
data collection, play an essential role. Although Turkey is a country that is difficult to 
reach the politicians, the interviews with AKP’s politicians who were involved at 
different stages and policies of AKP, has strengthened the arguments of the thesis. 
 
 In this respect, Hakan Yavuz’s (2018) article; ‘A Framework for Understanding 
the Intra-Islamist Conflict Between the AK Party and the Gülen Movement’ is a 
current example of this method. Yavuz (2018) explores the AKP-Gulen conflict during 
his work with elite interviews with former and new rulers within the AKP. On the other 
hand, elite interviews in my research are focused not only by AKP’s conflict with the 
Gülen movement but also by all the important events AKP has experienced for 16 
years in light of the its political survival. At the same time, the AKP's policy to ensure 
its survival by following different policies in different terms is proved by using electoral 
results and surveys. In particular, cause-effect relations between the policies pursued 
by the AKP and De Mesquita's large nominal selectorate in his theory are supported 
by the post-election surveys in this research. As a result of this, this research offers 
an original contribution to the literature in the context of AKP’s rule in Turkish politics. 
 
Until this part of the conclusion, the new findings and explanations obtained in 
this research are emphasized. At this point, while examining the survival of the AKP 
government, there is also a holistic exploration of the 16-year analysis. Apart from 
these, it is also possible to put different comparative analyses, or new case study 
analyses in light of the political survival theories. As mentioned above, there are 
various studies on political survival from Pakistan to Japan. With the study of the AKP 
case, it will be possible to expand the work of the country and explore political 
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survival by political parties. The Ennahda case in Tunisia is one of the most obvious 
examples of this. 
 
Tunisia’s moderate Islamist Ennahda party has won the country’s first 
democratic election since the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011. Results show that 
Ennahda won more than 41% of the vote, securing 90 seats in the 217-member 
parliament (Chamki, 2014: 453-468). Ennahda, which has been in power in 2011, 
continued to increase Islamic politics during its rule and did not end pressures on the 
secular society. Ennahda’s policies seriously damaged its political survival in the 
2014 elections. The Tunisian secular Nidaa Tounes party emerged as the main 
winner in the 2014 parliament election with 38% of the vote. Ennahda was in second 
place with 31% of the vote (68 seats) in this election (Levefre, 2015: 307-311). As a 
result, Ennahda has realised that as long as Islamist politics continues, political 
survival will not be protected after this election. This awareness emerged at the 2016 
party congress when Ennahda formally announced its intention to separate its 
political and religious work in this congress. 
 
Rachid Ghannouchi, the party’s 74-year-old founder and president, declared 
before the congress: ‘Ennahda has changed from an ideological movement engaged 
in the struggle for identity to a protest movement against the authoritarian regime and 
now to a national democratic party. We must keep religion far from political struggles’ 
(Ghannouchi, 2014). Electronic vote in this congress took the most startling decision: 
93.5% of the delegates voted in favour of separating the mosque and the state; that 
is to distinguish religion from politics. As seen in this case, the Ennahda party 
decided to give up Islamist policies in order to restore voter support, which 
constituted their political survival. Although the example of Ennahda is moving 
towards a different result when compared to the AKP, political survival remains the 
most crucial factor for the causality of policy changes by political parties. 
 
There are new discussions and explanations in the literature as well as 
important limitations of the study. One of the main limitations or possible criticisms of 
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this thesis is how and why the independent variables, which are described as the 
reasons for the AKP's survival, were chosen. As mentioned at the beginning of the 
thesis, there are different cause-effect mechanisms that explore the survival of the 
AKP. For example, several studies suggest that economic factors and economic 
success in the first two periods of AKP governance are a key factor in maintaining the 
party’s political survival. However, AKP’s survival cannot be explained by a single 
factor. In this respect, the methodology used in this study reveals the factors that 
contribute to AKP’s survival. The analysis of data collected through interviews with 
political actors and election surveys supports four independent variables related to 
AKP’s survival. For example, the voting preferences of voters were examined by 
analyzing post-election surveys conducted between 2007 and 2011, and the struggle 
with Kemalist elites rather than the economic success of the AKP emerged as the 
most influential factor in voting decisions. Likewise, according to the same surveys 
and interviews, that the AKP recently turned to nationalist politics has been much 
more important than other factors in maintaining the large nominal selectorate. 
 
Another limitation to this study is that radical changes in the voting preferences 
of voters involve contradictions. In 2011, AKP supporters listed the AKP’s struggle 
against Kemalist elites as the most important factor influencing their voting decision; 
in 2018, this changed to AKP’s fight against FETÖ and its support of anti-democratic 
practices. Of course, it is inevitable that this transformation is a contradiction in itself. 
But the effect of the AKP’s massive propaganda campaign through mass media has 
not been ignored. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the AKP’s dominance and 
consolidation of the Turkish media has made it much easier to consolidate its voters. 
Influenced by this propaganda, AKP voters from 2007 to 2011 supported the fight 
against Kemalist tutelage for improving democracy in Turkish politics, while now they 
believe that the AKP’s fight with FETÖ and PKK is democratic. The most important 
tool that imposes this on the electorate is the dominance of the AKP on mass media. 
While it is not possible to explain this in detail within the natural boundaries of this 
thesis, it should be determined that this criticism opens the door to a different 
discussion when explaining the survival of the AKP.  
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One of the priority limitations is a problem created by the holistic approach 
used to explain the survival of the AKP. The independent variables that we use in 
seeking the cause of the survival of the AKP include the most basic concepts in the 
field of political science. In this context, basic concepts such as conservatism, 
populism, authoritarianism, Islamism or nationalism are discussed in this study only 
in the context of Turkish politics and AKP power. These concepts can be the most 
fundamental subjects of discipline alone, and it will be one of the most important 
criticisms that can be brought to this study only through the political manoeuvres in 
the AKP. 
 
While participating in this criticism, the logic of political survival is considered 
as the fundamental dependent variable of this study. In this respect, the concept of 
political survival has been explored theoretically and historically in Chapter 1. The 
theoretical examination of other concepts did not seem possible because it contained 
a study in itself and the limit of the number of words in this study. 
 
Another main limitation is that the De Mesquita’s selectorate theory used in the 
study has created some question marks after 2011 in light of the AKP’s political 
survival. Established with a large winning coalition (as per De Mesquita's theory), the 
AKP has consistently narrowed this coalition to protect its survival. At the same time, 
this situation led to Erdoğan to increase his power in the party (Cornell, 2014). 
Erdoğan's journey from ‘apprentice’ to ‘master’ must be understood in this way. As 
seen from this speech, Erdoğan’s style of government would change during his third 
term. 
 
The AKP’s winning coalition has become smaller than in its first years, but it 
would continue with two important members of Turkish politics - the Fethullah Gülen 
movement and some liberal intellectuals. However, this alliance had been concluded 
after 2012 with the Gezi Park protests and the 17-25 December corruption scandals. 
Following the 17-25 December 2013 corruption scandals, Erdoğan declared ‘war’ 
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against the Gülen movement and these liberal intellectuals due to their support for 
the corruption claims (Saatçioğlu, 2016: 133-146). Indeed, this conflict can be 
explained by De Mesquita’s selectorate theory because Erdoğan has continued to 
dissolve the partnership with the AKP’s coalition members to prevent threats to his 
political survival. Another point of criticism of De Mesquita's theory is that in the third 
period of the AKP, the winning coalition did not become the leader’s or party’s clique. 
On the contrary, the AKP government has begun to seek new partnerships against 
the Fethullah Gülen movement and the liberals with whom the government has 
entered into conflict. This phenomenon challenges De Mesquita’s selectorate theory. 
 
However, the interesting point is the position of other actors - such as the 
Kemalist elites - in Turkish politics during these conflicts. Some of the Kemalist elites 
who had been eliminated by the Erdoğan government during the AKP’s second term 
supported Erdoğan against the Gülen Movement (Taş, 2017: 7-8) One of them, Doğu 
Perinçek, the Workers’ Party (İP) leader who was given a life sentence in 2013 as 
part of a trial concerning the Ergenekon terrorist organisation, has said he has been 
‘fighting a battle’ against the faith-based Gülen movement since the 1970s and that 
Erdoğan is now supporting him and the İP in this fight (Akkoyunlu and Öktem, 2016: 
515). The other important member of this conflict, İlker Başbuğ, who was sentenced 
to life imprisonment as part of the Ergenekon case, supported Erdoğan’s struggle 
against the Gülen movement. He said, ‘anyone could be successful on this struggle 
against Gülen movement apart from Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. If he has not been 
successful, Gülen will become the second Humeyni in the world’.141  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the relationship between Western-style business 
associations like TÜSİAD and the AKP has become much worse after 2007. 
Following the AKP’s victory in 2007, while MÜSİAD (Independent Industrialists and 
Businessmen’s Association) and TUSKON (Turkish Confederation of Businessmen 
and Industrialists) that were close to the AKP government were in a rising trend, 
TÜSİAD fell into a more defensive position. As noted in before, TÜSİAD’s secular 
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members have been replaced by Islamic economic actors such as MÜSİAD and 
TUSKON who have a good relationship with the AKP government (Tür, 2011: 591-
592). However, this relation has been reversed since the clash between the AKP and 
Fethullah Gülen movement. The chairman of MÜSİAD, Nail Olpak, warned the AKP 
government of the impact of the Gezi Park protests and the 17-25 December 
corruption scandals and pointed out that; 
 
We are able to see closely those matters that affect the economy negatively since the 
Gezi incidents. Recently, we are following with concern the atmosphere that was 
created by the investigation launched on December 17 based on corruption and 
bribery claims, from the angle of damages it has and it will inflict on the country’s 
economy and the environment of confidence.142  
 
The umbrella organisation of the capital owners known for their closeness to 
the Gülen movement, TUSKON, again, as expected, expressed in a clearer way than 
MÜSİAD the existence of corruption and bribery. On the other hand, TÜSİAD and 
pro-Western business actors such as Aydın Doğan have stayed neutral in this 
conflict. Although the AKP has applied pressure to Aydın Doğan with tax penalties 
and threats against his media institutions during its second term, Aydın Doğan’s 
media was on Erdoğan’s side during the Gezi Park protests and 17-25 December 
corruption scandals. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the clouds of tear gas engulfed 
central Istanbul and anti-government demonstrators fought with police during the 
Gezi Park protests, billionaire Aydin Doğan’s news channel aired a documentary 
about penguins (Eğin, 2013: 47-48). Although the serious tension between Doğan 
and the AKP has continued, Doğan’s media channels have not focused on the 17-25 
December corruption scandals.  
 
The situation was similar to other TÜSİAD actors. At the meeting of the High 
Advisory Council of TÜSİAD in 2014, Erdoğan made a speech addressing TÜSİAD 
members on many occasions, from the February 28th military coup process to the 
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Gezi Park Protests and 17-25 December corruption investigations to the Gülen 
movement. Akbank Chairman Suzan Sabancı Dinçer responded ‘fabulous’ when 
asked how they found the conversation in the Yeni Şafak newspaper. Koç Groups’s 
honorary chairman Rahmi Koç, who was targeted by Erdogan for his attitude in the 
trips, used the expressions ‘I was very positive, I liked it’. Dogan Group Chairman 
Arzuhan Doğan Yalçındağ, who was intimidated by tax penalties, said he received a 
message from Erdogan's words ‘call for action in the struggle for enrichment’.143  
 
It means that Western business associations and actors aim to retrieve its 
position and power in Turkish economics against Islamic economic institutions like 
TUSKON which is linked to the AKP government and the conflict between the AKP 
and the Gülen movement is an excellent opportunity for them to realise this aim. 
 
As can be seen from these two examples, the AKP has re-entered the 
coalition with the actors that it had previously struggled against. However, according 
to De Mesquita's theory, leaders or parties eliminate all actors in the political arena 
and form their own clique. De Mesquita's theory is therefore inadequate when it 
explores to the cause of AKP’s political survival after 2011. 
 
This limitation can be the subject of a highly accurate critic for this study. 
However, this study is quite difficult to draw the future scenario for after 2018. For 
example, Erdoğan, who won the 2018 elections and was the first President of the 
new system, started to establish his own narrow cadre as De Mesquita mentioned 
after winning this election. Although in Turkey, De Mesquita exemplary of the case, 
though not like North Korea or Zimbabwe, post-2018 developments indicate potential 
to evolve into a dictatorship in this direction in light of De Mesquita’s Selectorate 
Theory. 
 
                                                          
143
http://t24.com.tr/haber/kursude-elestirilen-sabanciya-gore-erdoganin-konusmasi-
muhtesemdi,271329 (Accessed Date: 01/09/2017) 
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By way of concluding remarks, I want to highlight the most important 
contribution of my project regarding AKP’s political survival. This research argues 
that the correlation between leaders and power repeat themselves across time and 
space in light of the concept of political survival. Hence, Turkey under the AKP rule is 
not an exception to this argument. The policies and actions that the AKP pursues to 
protect and sustain the political survival have led to the gradual increase of populism, 
authoritarianism and Islamist nationalism in Turkish politics. This research aims to 
explore the cause-effect relationship between these independent variables and the 
AKP's survival in Turkish politics by using the above-mentioned intervening variables 
and offering a new explanation in the literature about the AKP's political survival.  
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Eren Erdem: CHP Istanbul MP. The member of Anti-Capitalist Muslims Movement. 
Interview by author, 18 November 2015. 
 
Fethi Açıkel: Professor in the Department of Political Science at Ankara University. 
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Mustafa Şen: Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at Middle East 
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Nimetullah Erdoğmuş: HDP Diyarbakir MP. Former Diyarbakir Mufti. Interview by 
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Özgür Özdamar: Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations at 
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Appendix B 
The Transcripts of Interviews 
 
Page 76; 
Author: I start with the same question for the participants. Going back to 2002, how 
did you define this foundation period in the establishment of the AKP? Different 
opinions exist, some see it as a continuation of Milli Görüş, others as a new centre 
under the concept of conservative democracy; how do you evaluate it? 
Abdüllatif Şener: I have prepared the party programme within the AKP.  I know of 
the party programme of the AKP, a single word still applies without change. I mean 
when I said I prepared it, this work was done through 4-5 separate committees. We 
spent 3-5 days in a hotel in Uludağ. We spent a few days working at Bilkent Hotel. In 
Afyon we worked again in isolation. At the same time, we had a lot of intensive work 
on the party. So although the group that discussed the programme changed, there 
were a few names that did not change, and I was the unchanging president of that 
team. The team discussing it changed, but I was the president of this team. And we 
were constantly arguing as president. So for this reason I say I wrote AKP’s 
programme. In particular, we have been careful not to use concepts such as a right 
wing, left wing or liberal party. Because these concepts were now hollow ideologies 
in Turkish politics. We will tell ourselves who you are, what you say, how you name it. 
And the AKP programme is a programme that emphasizes contemporary democratic 
values. Obviously, it will not fight with the beliefs of the people but it has a 
programme that emphasizes contemporary democratic values. This is extremely 
important. This is a democratic programme that is not even in the programme of any 
party. If you cite conservative words such as Islam or Muslim, you will not find it in the 
party programme. For example, if someone in the party said something contrary to 
the party's thoughts, so that it would be prohibited to prevent it from being exported. I 
do not think there is any party that has that statement. This democratic party 
programme of the AKP has never been implemented, however.  
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Page 79; 
Author: I start with the same question for the participants. Going back to 2002, how 
did you define this foundation period in the establishment of the AKP? Different 
opinions exist, some see it as a continuation of Milli Görüş, others as a new centre 
under the concept of conservative democracy; how do you evaluate it? 
Ahmet Faruk Ünsal: Of course you know the AKP was established as an alternative 
solution to those big frustrations arising from the February 28th military coup. The 
process of disintegration and dissolution of the state due to the 28 February with the 
state’s tough intervention and the Constitutional Court’s decision were a form of 
politics which had a negative effect on its own base, along with the many other 
unlawful events of February 28th. And as we saw, neither the Turkish internal 
dynamics nor the international system could stop this unlawfulness. Therefore, if 
politics was to be done, a different method had to be adopted. Milli Görüş had turned 
out to be unsuccessful, and the unlawful actions that were directed against it were 
due to the failure to pursue a political initiative that was followed by the international 
system. The AKP’s founding staff was completely made up of Milli Görüş’s politicians, 
but it was decided to continue by taking other people with them, including more 
liberal and centre-right politicians and to soften their Islamist rhetoric. 
 
 
Page 79-80; 
Author: I start with the same question for the participants. Going back to 2002, how 
did you define this foundation period in the establishment of the AKP? Different 
opinions exist, some see it as a continuation of Milli Görüş, others as a new centre 
under the concept of conservative democracy; how do you evaluate it? 
Hüda Kaya: Before 2002, we experienced very deep concerns due to the 
postmodern coup of February 28; l we feel extremely censored and faced years of 
imprisonment and filthy prosecutions. We had been through verbal harassment by 
hand movements in every occasion in our society. It was extremely difficult for me to 
intervene in the areas where I was living, since just one sovereign identity was trying 
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to suppress my own ideology. But the AKP arose out of this process as a new party 
and as a new hope for the Muslims. I personally supported AKP with my whole heart. 
For 90 years, the dominant ideologies in Turkey have always been successful, but 
the Islamic sections, were oppressed by their opponents, and have never been in 
power. When we were in power, we thought that our people would not persecute us. 
Erdoğan had a balcony talk in which he said it was supposed to be like this, Muslims, 
Alevis, Sunnis, Armenians, Kurds, etc, all people, beliefs and sects wanted peace in 
Turkey.  
 
 
Page 85-86; 
Author: I start with the same question for the participants. Going back to 2002, how 
did you define this foundation period in the establishment of the AKP? Different 
opinions exist, some see it as a continuation of Milli Görüş, others as a new centre 
under the concept of conservative democracy; how do you evaluate it? 
Ruhsar Demirel: If you look at the establishment process of the AKP when it was 
founded in 2001, you actually see the intervention in politics there. Two parties were 
split up and down around the DSP and RP. Just before the AKP was established, the 
DSP and the RP were divided into two separate political parties. I think it's the 
evacuation of these parties’ ideologies and supporters. In Turkey, the DSP is a party 
that is perceived as a left, a centre left party rather than a party purely of the left. RP, 
meanwhile, was a party with a more religious emphasis, like Milli Görüş, until that 
day. But these two parties were brought together on common ground. And there were 
two other parties in the Turkish Republic with the Young Party founded by Cem Uzan 
in the inner circle: DYP and MHP. Despite the foundation of the Young Party, it was 
held under the 10% threshold and thus two more parties were discarded from politics. 
Thus in 2002, the Turkish Republic had a two-party system.  Indeed, the AKP has too 
many stakeholders. It is a coalition, and with its current partners, they have very 
different partners at the point they are today. Some of these partners have 
disintegrated, such as liberals or social democrats. One of the social democrat 
politicians, Ertuğrul Günay, withdrew his support for the AKP after 2011. Now, the 
AKP may be more related to Milli Görüş, but it is not the only dynamic within the AKP. 
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And I think that AKP’s opportunism is exactly the politics that has responded to it. 
‘AKP does not represent Islam or nationalism; it is a simple case or example of 
opportunism in Turkish politics due to its coalitional structure’. 
 
 
Page 86; 
Author: AKP supported from outside EU and USA in 2002. What is the reason of 
this? Was the AKP presented as a democratic Muslim power model against the 
September 11 attacks? 
Nimetullah Erdoğmuş: The ideological developments in the Western world under 
the leadership of the United States are well read. For example, from an Iranian 
revolution the world knows very much from the US, and there are great wars, the 
Iranian Revolutionary leader, Khomeini, said the great devil, and for many years the 
struggles with the US fought. The first clashes began with the invasion of the US 
Embassy of a youth movement in which students in Iran, headed by Ahmadinejad. 
Then there are the Iran-Iraq wars and the Iranian reality where we are gradually 
raising the enemies. The West will be really frightened by the fact that Iran has seen 
such legal political movements more moderate and warmer. By reading like this, 
even if the doors were not fully opened in the West, it was more positively 
approaching towards the AKP. This situation was read it well by AKP. Instead of 
turning the direction to the east, AKP began to develop the relations with EU and 
West.  
 
 
Page 86; 
Author: What can be done in terms of foreign policy in the process of AKP 
establishment? How will the quest for a role model in the Middle East after 
September 11 be evaluated for the AKP? 
Özgür Özdamar: An alliance of civilisations after the 9/11 attacks helped to raise the 
AKP’s power and popularity in international relations. I believe that Turkey changed 
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its foreign policy agenda from the notion of building an intercontinental bridge to an 
alliance of civilisations under Erdoğan’s government. 
 
 
Page 87; 
Author: What can be done in terms of foreign policy in the process of AKP 
establishment? How will the quest for a role model in the Middle East after 
September 11 be evaluated for the AKP? 
Menderes Çınar: Instead of the Anti-Western National View, such a moderate 
Islamic project was compatible with the AKP. Harmonious Islamist politics was a 
blessing, very strategic, especially for the West. And the AKP was aware of it and 
benefited from it. He had a legitimacy gap, and that obligation was closed in this way. 
I did not mean to pretend to be acting, but it was such a good alliance between AKP 
and West. 
 
 
Page 90; 
Author: I start with the same question for the participants. Going back to 2002, how 
did you define this foundation period in the establishment of the AKP? Different 
opinions exist, some see it as a continuation of Milli Görüş, others as a new centre 
under the concept of conservative democracy; how do you evaluate it? 
Simten Coşar: … With the 2001 economic crisis, the central right-wing political 
parties in that area lost their legitimacy and needed a political act to fill it. What the 
AKP did was mainly to manipulate it. 
 
Page 90; 
Author: I start with the same question for the participants. Going back to 2002, how 
did you define this foundation period in the establishment of the AKP? Different 
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opinions exist, some see it as a continuation of Milli Görüş, others as a new centre 
under the concept of conservative democracy; how do you evaluate it? 
Yasin Aktay: I believe conservative democracy’ is the only possible concept with 
which to understand the survival of the AKP in Turkish political history since it is 
illegal to form a party on the basis of religious ideas.  
 
 
Page 90; 
Author: I start with the same question for the participants. Going back to 2002, how 
did you define this foundation period in the establishment of the AKP? Different 
opinions exist, some see it as a continuation of Milli Görüş, others as a new centre 
under the concept of conservative democracy; how do you evaluate it? 
Mehmet Bekaroğlu: I define the AKP as a political party, a pragmatist political 
movement aimed at power. The closure of the Welfare and Virtue Party was 
important in the establishment of the AKP. There was an institution of ideological 
guardianship against the Milli Görüş. Second, there is established capital, 
representing something else against Erbakan. These were known from Erbakan's 
statements. Erbakan was blocked by these actors. At that time, those who held the 
pulse of the community predicted the future of such a political wave. There was a 
great shift in sociology. Anatolia walked to the center of Istanbul and demanded 
power. Barriers were not possible; the AKP just took power here with the concept of 
conservative democracy. 
 
 
Page 97; 
Author: I start with the same question for the participants. Going back to 2002, how 
did you define this foundation period in the establishment of the AKP? Different 
opinions exist, some see it as a continuation of Milli Görüş, others as a new centre 
under the concept of conservative democracy; how do you evaluate it? 
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Mustafa Balbay: I think that the AKP has changed political Islam by emancipating 
Islam for the sake of it, filling it with other things and ranting it with power in party 
interests. This is not the change, but rather the metamorphosis. If the AKP had tried 
to become more authoritarian and more Islamic in 2003 or 2004, there would have 
been a huge reaction from the Turkish public and international actors against 
Erdoğan’s government. I’d like to give an example. If you tossed a frog into already-
boiling water, it would leap out. But a frog placed into a pan of water with a low flame 
under it will slowly be boiled alive, the temperature change being too subtle for the 
frog to notice. The AKP has used the same method in order to raise its power and 
there is no resistance against the AKP.  
 
 
Page 103-104; 
Author: You mentioned the Republic rallies. Since 2002, the Kemalists has claimed 
there is a secret agenda, since 2002, it says that the Islamist state was realized by 
AKP government with its hidden agenda in Turkish politics. Is it possible? 
Suat Kınıklıoğlu: So the Kemalists in the TR were right in our perception. There is 
some truth to it, actually. In other words, the reality that people do not want to see is 
the difference between the AKP of that time and the present. The EU accession 
process was one of the most important agendas of the AKP’s foreign policy in their 
first term. EU institutions instilled a discipline in the AKP. However, following 
Sarkozy’s election as French president in 2006, Turkey’s EU accession process was 
slowed down due to Merkel’s and Sarkozy’s opposition to it. After these 
developments, Cyprus’ EU accession undermined the AKP’s discipline in terms of the 
democratisation process. I believe that, the AKP is one of the more useful examples 
for the international actors in light of 9/11 and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in 
the Middle East. Moreover, Kemalist protestors do not want to have a good 
relationship with the United States or European Union and the AKP tried to prevent 
the threat of Turkey’s marginalisation in international affairs during this clash.  
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Page 104; 
Author: You also mentioned the military powers’ guardianship in Turkish politics. 
One of the important centers of the secular and Islamic clashes in the TR is the 
breaking of the guardianship of the army. Nowadays some people say that breaking 
this tutelage is the first step of the AKP to establish its own Islamist dictatorship. 
What do you think about that? 
Alev Özkazanç: I believe that illegal organisations like Ergenekon planned to engage 
in assassinations and cause chaos in society in order to overthrow the government. 
Some parts of society - like the military bureaucracy and the Kemalists - saw the AKP 
as ‘illegitimate’ since 2002. 
 
 
Page 104; 
Author: After 2007 with the Ergenokon investigations Kemalists said the hidden 
agenda of the AKP to establish an Islamist state with the eliminating of Kemalists in 
Turkish politics. How did you see this process? 
Alev Çınar: I certainly do not agree with these views. I think it is desirable to reduce 
the role of military powers in Turkish politics as much as possible. One of the best 
policies for the AKP’s government is the fight against military elites in order to reduce 
its power in Turkish politics. 
 
 
Page 113; 
Author: You also mentioned the military powers’ guardianship in Turkish politics. 
One of the important centers of the secular and Islamic clashes in the Turkey is the 
breaking of the guardianship of the army. Nowadays some people say that breaking 
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this tutelage is the first step of the AKP to establish its own Islamist dictatorship. 
What do you think about that? 
Ayhan Bilgen: The decrease of military powers in Turkish politics should be the most 
important goal for political parties in Turkey and the AKP was successful in achieving 
this. However, this achievement has existed entirely to bring about the AKP's own 
Islamist and authoritarian governance. If the AKP were sincere about democratisation 
and civilisation, it would continue to change the other anti-democratic bureaucratic 
institutions like the Higher Education Council (YÖK) or the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs (Diyanet). 
 
 
Page 114; 
Author: One of the important discussions of the secular and Islamic clashes in the 
TR is the breaking of the guardianship of the army. Nowadays some people say that 
breaking this tutelage is the first step of the AKP to establish its own Islamist 
dictatorship. What do you think about that? 
Adem Geveri: The AKP was struggling to control the military powers from one side, 
to give it a new identity and to take advantage of it from the other side. The TR army 
is not an ordinary army, but Kemalist ideology that has entered the military powers’ 
guardianship of secularism in Turkish politics. However, the AKP’s real goal is not to 
reduce the military/Kemalist bureaucracy’s power in Turkish political life - Erdoğan 
and his colleagues simply tried to control the military forces in order to gain their 
support. The support of the EU and the United States on this issue helped the AKP to 
dominate the armed forces. I think, ‘this is not success for democracy, only for the 
AKP. 
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Page 114; 
Author: After 2007 with the Ergenokon investigations Kemalists said the hidden 
agenda of the AKP to establish an Islamist state with the eliminating of Kemalists in 
Turkish politics. How did you see this process? 
İhsan Dağı: The AKP knew that improving TR's democracy in order to be able to 
exist, legitimize its conservatism and make it permanent would require more reforms 
to advance the EU process. Even if it was the secret agenda of the AKP, the AKP 
could not praise this agenda in a TR where there is closely integrated with the EU, 
and the world in light of the democratic mechanisms. The AKP develops a step-by-
step strategy for survival in Turkish politics. 
 
 
Page 117; 
Author: One of the important discussions of the secular and Islamic clashes in the 
TR is the breaking of the guardianship of the army. Nowadays some people say that 
breaking this tutelage is the first step of the AKP to establish its own Islamist 
dictatorship. What do you think about that? 
Mevlüt Karakaya: Everything is very clear when we compile and rearrange the 
interviews of the AKP executives as follows. The AKP used this struggle as a tool of 
victimisation rather than democratisation. Erdoğan and the AKP’s policy in these 
cases is pragmatist and uses religious discourse to appeal to conservative voters in 
the elections. I believe that the AKP always benefited from this discourse before the 
2007 and 2011 general elections in Turkey and one of the best-known examples of 
this is the 2007 Presidential election. He argues that Ergenekon, Balyoz and other 
cases became the AKP’s tools with which to manipulate and consolidate voters. 
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Page 118; 
Author: One of the important discussions of the secular and Islamic clashes in the 
TR is the breaking of the guardianship of the army. Nowadays some people say that 
breaking this tutelage is the first step of the AKP to establish its own Islamist 
dictatorship. What do you think about that? 
Mustafa Balbay: When Erdoğan wanted to engage in authoritarianism after 2007, he 
used these clashes to gain the support of external institutions such as the European 
Union and the United States. We started to write about the AKP’s authoritarianism 
and Islamism in 2007 and received a prize while in Silivri’ (a prison where the 
Ergenekon trials took place). 
 
 
Page 118; 
Author: After 2007 with the Ergenokon investigations Kemalists said the hidden 
agenda of the AKP to establish an Islamist state with the eliminating of Kemalists in 
Turkish politics. How did you see this process? 
İlhan Uzgel: In terms of the democratisation process, the Kurdish peace process, 
and the EU accession process, all of these dynamics were started after 1999. As a 
result, these developments did not start with the AKP government, who just 
continued these already-existing processes. However, some leftist liberals and other 
groups see the AKP as a ‘redeemer’ and Erdoğan as a ‘deliverer’. I wrote an article 
on Radikal about this issue and I said that most of the liberal scholars gave unlimited 
credit to the AKP government in the struggle against Kemalist military domination and 
they could not have been aware of the rise of AKP’s Islamism and authoritarianism in 
Turkish politics. 
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Page 119; 
Author: After 2007 with the Ergenokon investigations Kemalists said the hidden 
agenda of the AKP to establish an Islamist state with the eliminating of Kemalists in 
Turkish politics. How did you see this process? 
Fethi Açıkel: There was a wide range of debate, whether AKP had an hidden 
agenda or not. Political and intellectualist movements that are categorically opposed 
to the AKP have always been in the Turkish politics. A significant part of these also 
had serious reasons. As a result, I do not agree with the AKP’s identification as a 
‘redeemer’ from Kemalism during their clash with military/secular powers. Secularist 
or Kemalist elites were proved right about the AKP’s transition from democracy to 
authoritarianism within the rise of Islamism in Turkish politics. 
 
 
Page 119; 
Author: One of the important discussions of the secular and Islamic clashes in the 
TR is the breaking of the guardianship of the army. Nowadays some people say that 
breaking this tutelage is the first step of the AKP to establish its own Islamist 
dictatorship. What do you think about that? 
Mustafa Şen: Indeed, The AKP was established within a huge coalition in Turkish 
domestic politics. About half of Turkish citizens voted for them in the election and 
there was international support for the AKP and Erdoğan’s government from 
institutions like the European Union. It was not possible for the military forces to find 
support against the AKP, which they were supported by internal and external actors 
in the 28 February military coup. As seen in the new developments in the Ergenekon 
and Balyoz cases, these trials are based on illegal evidence and it demonstrates why 
the AKP has not been fair in its struggle against military domination. 
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Page 139; 
Author: There are comments about the rise of Islamism in Turkey after 2011. Some 
have said that the AKP has begun to return to the Milli Görüş’s perspective. How do 
you interpret this trend especially between 2011 and 2014? 
Suat Kınıklıoğlu: After the victory in the 2010 referendum with 60% of vote, Erdoğan 
thought the Kemalists sustained the defeat against the AKP. He didn’t need 
legitimization of AKP’s conservatism in Turkish politics or he did not need the support 
of liberals or seculars after 2011. As a result, Erdoğan and AKP changed his policy 
towards being more Islamist. 
 
Page 139-140; 
Author: There are comments about the rise of Islamism in Turkey after 2011. Some 
have said that the AKP has begun to return to the Milli Görüş’s Islamist perspective. 
How do you interpret this trend especially between 2011 and 2014 in light of the rise 
of Islamism in Turkish politics? 
Abdüllatif Şener: I think this process is entirely due to the rise of Erdoğan's 
pragmatism. Erdoğan had entered into a pragmatic alliance with some of the liberals 
who defined themselves as secular. ‘Erdoğan is a highly pragmatic and Machiavellian 
politician. He does everything for his self-interest in politics. He used the liberals in 
his first term and he commanded or praised them for this reason. When he felt short 
of support, he started to criticise liberals or intellectuals’ 
 
 
Page 147; 
Author: There are comments about the rise of Islamism in Turkey after 2011. Some 
have said that the AKP has begun to return to the Milli Görüş’s Islamist perspective. 
How do you interpret this trend especially between 2011 and 2014 in light of the rise 
of Islamism in Turkish politics? 
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Aykan Erdemir: I argue that both Erdoğan and AKP are more conservative after 
2011. However, this is completely strategic for me. AKP would use this perception of 
the Kemalist enemy when seeking support from the masses. Erdoğan and his group 
of AKP staff increased his speeches against Kemalism and the CHP mentality in 
order to control and consolidate their power in the whole country. 
 
Page 151; 
Author: There are comments about the rise of Islamism in Turkey after 2011. Some 
have said that the AKP has begun to return to the Milli Görüş’s Islamist perspective. 
How do you interpret this trend especially between 2011 and 2014 in light of the rise 
of Islamism in Turkish politics? 
Ruhsar Demirel: We can see this especially in AKP’s women policies. When 
Erdogan considered abortion to be a murder in the UNDP meeting, I was at the same 
conference. ‘I have never seen such a banal and vulgar speech before. Abortion is 
not a birth control method, but it is necessary in order to reduce maternal mortality. I 
have been working in the Health of Ministry for 17 years on this matter and I am very 
unhappy to blow up our efforts on this issue’. Erdoğan and his government damaged 
the gains of women’s rights made during the Turkish Republic and that he has done it 
using Islamist values. 
 
 
Page 161-162; 
Author: There are comments about the rise of Islamism in Turkey after 2011. Some 
have said that the AKP has begun to return to the Milli Görüş’s Islamist perspective. 
How do you interpret this trend especially between 2011 and 2014 in light of the rise 
of Islamism in Turkish politics? 
Student A and B (From Bilkent University): We do not accept the rise of Islamism 
and the idea of ‘Erdoğan’s leadership in the Muslim world’. if the rise of Islamism has 
been realised by AKP, the Turkish state would ban alcohol or punish adultery. If 
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Erdoğan were faithful to his religion, he would not try to create good relations with 
Israel or the United States, according to them. 
 
Student C (From Bilkent University): I’d like to give an Erdogan’s speeches on 
Egypt. In 2011 Erdoğan called on Egyptians to adopt a secular constitution, noting 
that secularism does not mean renouncing religion. On the one hand, Erdoğan has 
made many speeches against secularism in the past and present, but on the other 
hand he has made many others about the importance of secularism. He points out 
that Erdoğan’s discourse has many dilemmas and contradictions within it due to his 
political interest in both domestic and foreign politics. 
Student D (From Bilkent University): If you do not prostrate yourself in prayer 
(secde), you cannot work in public office. For example, my memory of the Canadian 
ambassador, who said to me: “the Turkish ambassadors in foreign countries do not 
go to meetings which includes alcohol due to the AKP’s pressure” 
Student E (From Bilkent University): there has been no quantitative increase of 
conservative/religious people in Turkish society, but instead that the conservative 
people in Turkey have become more Islamic and more authoritarian due to Erdoğan’s 
Islamist and authoritarian profile.  
 
 
Page 163; 
Author: There are comments about the rise of Islamism in Turkey after 2011. Some 
have said that the AKP has begun to return to the Milli Görüş’s Islamist perspective. 
How do you interpret this trend especially between 2011 and 2014 in light of the rise 
of Islamism in Turkish politics? 
Mehmet Bekaroğlu: I do not agree that; this is a real Islamism. ‘If there is a 13-year 
Islamist government in Turkey, how can we explain non-Islamic civilisation and 
urbanisation in the big cities? The AKP has built huge blocks and big malls in the 
cities rather than functional buildings’. Erdoğan increasingly uses Islamism as a tool 
for his personal political interests, paying lip service to religious ideals only when it 
suits him. 
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Page 163; 
Author: There are comments about the rise of Islamism in Turkey after 2011. Some 
have said that the AKP has begun to return to the Milli Görüş’s Islamist perspective. 
How do you interpret this trend especially between 2011 and 2014 in light of the rise 
of Islamism in Turkish politics? 
Abdüllatif Şener: I prepared for the AKP party programme to make my dreams 
come true in Turkish politics, as I’d like to show the compatibility between Islam and 
democracy in Turkey from their viewpoint. However, Erdoğan has not been 
successful on this goal. There are many corruption scandals among the AKP 
government. So, I ask, how can you explain these corruption scandals if you use 
Islam or Islamic values? Because of this, I left AKP in 2007, although Abdullah Gül 
and Erdoğan would like to see me in AKP’s staff. I consider the AK Party not as an 
Islamic party but as a party which collect votes by using Islamic discourses. Just like 
this, I do not consider Erdoğan as a person thinking by Islamic way, I also do not 
believe that he has Muslim susceptibility. His way of policy making fits neither Islam 
nor humanity nor national interests. 
 
Page 165; 
Author: There are comments about the rise of Islamism in Turkey after 2011. Some 
have said that the AKP has begun to return to the Milli Görüş’s Islamist perspective. 
How do you interpret this trend especially between 2011 and 2014 in light of the rise 
of Islamism in Turkish politics? 
İmam Taşçıer: I agree this view and AKP’s Islamism affected the Turkish society. I 
give an example. On the friendly football match between Turkey and Greece, chants 
of 'Allahu Akbar' were reportedly heard in Istanbul as some Turkey fans shamefully 
booed a pre-match minute's silence for the victims of the Paris terrorist attacks.  
 
 
